This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 003233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR LTG WHITCOMB FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR LTG WHITCOMB'S VISIT TO SANAA 
 
Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C)  Welcome to Sanaa.  We have requested meetings for you 
with Minister of Defense MG Abdullah Ali Aliwa, Minister of 
Interior Rashad Mohammed al-Alimi, and Commander of the 
Yemeni Special Operations Forces (YSOF) Ahmed Ali Abdullah 
Saleh.  Chief of Staff MG Mohammed al-Qassemi is currently in 
the United States for medical treatment. 
 
¶2. (C)  You will find these officials anxious to discuss what 
they characterize as excellent but inadequate U.S. assistance 
to support what they view as Yemen's role in the GWOT.  They 
will likely express some disappointment that President 
Saleh's visit to Washington last week did not result in an 
agreement to substantially increase military assistance.  MOD 
officials may complain that the Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) system, with which they are just now developing some 
familiarity, is too slow, cumbersome and difficult, and may 
make an appeal for rapid and direct transfers of equipment, 
spare parts, and cash -- something the Office of Military 
Cooperation (OMC) has repeatedly made clear is not possible. 
You should expect a more congenial meeting with the Minister 
of Interior whose open and cooperative attitude has enabled 
MOI to maximize training and FMF opportunities. 
 
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COOPERATION AT ARM'S LENGTH 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Although Yemen remains an important regional partner 
in the GWOT with a post-9/11 string of CT successes, 
cooperation on this front has not been perfect --  a point 
that was made clear to President Saleh during his visit to 
Washington.  He and his ministers often claim that they have 
"done everything asked of them," that they are "fighting our 
fight" in the GWOT, but that USG assistance has not been 
commensurate with their efforts.  In fact, ROYG CT 
cooperation is spotty, and is tinged with mistrust, often 
leading to the hoarding of information both between ROYG 
agencies and between the ROYG and the USG.  You may want to 
press your interlocutors to use the recently created MOD 
Working Group and the MOD's new 3-5 year CT and Border 
Security Plan as the basis for greater, routine information 
sharing.  You may want to make the point that, while the 
Yemenis often respond to requests for information at the very 
highest levels, close partners should not wait for arms to be 
twisted before sharing useful data on a common enemy.  You 
may particularly wish to impress upon the Minister of Defense 
and the YSOF commander, who is also the President's son, on 
the need for direct, continuing engagement between U.S. 
military trainers and YSOF units. 
 
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SMALL ARMS/LIGHT WEAPONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C)  For decades, President Saleh has performed a delicate 
balancing act between competing military, tribal, and 
islamist interests, and has masterfully used USG assistance 
as a major point of leverage.  While many of the aspects of 
this internal politicking are invisible to us, one is 
particularly threatening to Yemeni and international 
security:  the proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW).  Saleh and his ministers are aware that weapons 
ostensibly procured through official MOD channels have ended 
up in the hands of terrorists in Saudi Arabia, Somalia and 
elsewhere.  The President pledged privately in March to stop 
relying on arms dealers to equip his armed forces, and, at 
our insistence, made the pledge public in November.  There is 
no evidence thus far that the message has been received by 
weapons brokers, who continue to purchase arms abroad. 
 
¶5.  (C)  You should make clear to the Minister of Defense 
that it is simply too dangerous for our diplomatic presence 
in the region, for our troops in Iraq, as well as for the 
Saleh regime to allow the arms trade to continue.  We are 
willing to help the ROYG monitor the flow of arms, but there 
must be a high-level acceptance of our repeated offers to 
build a weapons inventory system for the ROYG.  You may wish 
to press the Minister of Defense on this issue, perhaps by 
requesting that we start at the unit level and work up from 
there. 
 
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INTERNAL POLITICS 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Your visit comes against the backdrop of the 
beginning of the campaign season for Yemen's presidential and 
local council elections, which are scheduled to take place 
next year.  Saleh has announced that he will not seek a third 
term, but most observers expect the ruling party to formally 
nominate him at their general conference in December -- and 
for Saleh to reluctantly accept.  At that point, Saleh is 
expected to name a caretaker cabinet until the elections, a 
long overdue move that will alter the political landscape, 
but will not likely have a major impact on the ROYG's 
foreign, defense or CT policies.  It is not clear to us if 
the ministers with whom you are scheduled to meet will see a 
change in their portfolios as a result of this re-shuffling; 
they may not know themselves at this point and for that 
reason may be more cautious than usual in their interactions 
with you. 
¶7.  (C)  Your meetings offer an important opportunity to 
firmly reinforce the message President Saleh heard in 
Washington about the need for better cooperation on CT 
efforts to safeguard Yemen's stability.  Previous U.S.-Yemeni 
CT cooperation offers a good foundation, but it is critical 
that Yemen make the transition from ad hoc cooperation to a 
fully developed partnership.  The ROYG needs to make 
verifiable commitments to stopping the arms trade and 
routinizing information sharing.  Your support for this 
approach will be helpful indeed. 
Khoury