This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 RANGOON 001235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID SW FR GM UK YI IT EZ BM
SUBJECT: ENGAGE BURMA: EUROPEAN VIEWS 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1199 
     ¶B. RANGOON 1198 AND PREVIOUS 
     ¶C. RANGOON 1059 
 
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Recent meetings with all European diplomatic 
missions represented in Rangoon (plus two accredited missions 
resident in Bangkok) revealed waning support for advancing 
democracy and human rights in Burma, and growing interest in 
expanding humanitarian assistance.  The British join us as 
the staunchest supporters of the democratic opposition and 
the use of pressure as a means to seek change from the 
current regime, though they differ somewhat on tactics. 
Ennui best describes the attitude of the other Europeans 
present in Rangoon.  End Summary. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM: SEARCHING FOR NEW WAYS TO PROMOTE CHANGE 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Charge made her first courtesy call in Rangoon 
(September 1) on British Ambassador Vicky Bowman.  The UK 
joins us as the staunchest supporters of the democratic 
opposition, democracy, and human rights in Burma and our 
encounters with our British colleagues are frequent.  For 
example, our respective policy teams met for a working lunch 
on October 11 to discuss a range of political and economic 
issues as well as public diplomacy efforts. 
 
¶3. (C) The British not only share overall U.S. objectives in 
Burma, they are easily the most visible and active supporters 
of the democratic opposition among European missions (four EU 
member states are resident in Rangoon and over a half dozen 
missions, including the EC delegation, are accredited but 
resident in Bangkok).  In particular, British diplomats 
regularly visit National League for Democracy (NLD) 
headquarters and they often join us as the only diplomatic 
missions in attendance at NLD party functions.  The British 
also have a robust public diplomacy program; their British 
Council activities parallel many of those at our American 
Center, including civics and democracy-building instruction 
to members of the political opposition and to former 
political prisoners. 
 
¶4. (C) The British, particularly during Amb. Bowman's tenure, 
have advocated more humanitarian assistance for Burma. 
Although we share objectives, our tactics sometimes diverge. 
Bowman, for example, believes the GOB should be a full 
partner on most assistance projects.  She recently secured 
the assignment to Rangoon of a representative of the UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID) to coordinate 
growing British assistance activities. 
 
¶5. (C) Bowman, on her second tour in Rangoon and a fluent 
Burmese speaker, has become quite passionate about Burma. 
She has sharply criticized the decision by the Global Fund to 
withdraw from Burma.  She freely expresses displeasure with 
Burmese exiles and their supporters who lobby overseas to 
oppose any collaboration with the GOB and its entities.  She 
organized a closed meeting at Wilton Park, in September, to 
discuss new approaches to humanitarian assistance. (Note: The 
UK tasked Michael Ryder to prepare a report on this meeting, 
and follow-up discussions, for submission to the FCO at the 
end of October.  End Note.)  As Chair of the UN Expanded 
Theme Group on HIV/AIDS, Bowman has marshaled support for the 
Fund for HIV/AIDS in Myanmar (FAHM), which partners with the 
GOB's Ministry of Health.  The UK is the largest donor to the 
FAHM and contributed over $17 million last year; Sweden and 
Norway are the other main donors. 
 
FRANCE: "SANCTIONS FEEL GOOD, BUT DON'T DO GOOD" 
 
¶6. (C) On September 19, the Charge called on French 
Ambassador Jean-Michel Lacombe, who has been in Burma for two 
years.  Lacombe said that sanctions "feel good, but don't do 
good," and are only effective if most neighboring countries 
participate.  He acknowledged that the only sanction that 
really hurts is the visa sanction, referring to the EU 
decision to deny the GOB Minister for Economic Development a 
visa to attend an ASEM meeting.  The visa sanction, he said, 
highlights the regime's lack of legitimacy.  Lacombe viewed 
Secretary Rice's comments on Burma at the September ASEAN 
 
SIPDIS 
foreign ministers meeting in New York as helpful, but added 
that sanctions give more influence to China, which is 
"colonizing Burma,"  He said in Burma, the West is "not 
fighting the junta, but fighting Chinese diplomacy."  The 
Charge observed that China wants stability in Burma, but also 
must confront a flow of cross-border drugs and disease. 
 
¶7. (C) Amb. Lacombe described the Global Fund's withdrawal 
from Burma as a "U.S. Congressional decision" and said the 
action will hurt the ability of NGOs to work in country.  The 
international community should let in humanitarian aid, urged 
Lacombe, because the situation is no worse in Burma than it 
is in Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam.  Lacombe, who has also 
served in Georgia and Bangladesh, added that donors give aid 
to some other countries knowing up that up to 70 percent goes 
into government coffers.  The Charge countered that donors 
should not provide any assistance in Burma without capable 
people to deliver the aid.  She also observed that if the 
international community remains divided on this issue, it 
only serves to bolster the GOB's interests. 
 
¶8. (C) Lacombe said that the regime has no real interest in 
democracy and described the National Convention as a sham 
exercise.  He opined that former Prime Minister General Khin 
Nyunt had attempted, but failed, to address the concerns of 
the international community, so the only remaining hope for 
political change in Burma today is the new generation of 
military officers.  However, Lacombe added, the SPDC makes a 
valid point in emphasizing its important security role 
because ethnic divisions do threaten national unity. 
Alluding to cease-fire arrangements over the past 17 years, 
Lacombe said that the regime is slowly extending central 
authority to the country's borders. 
 
GERMANY: OSTPOLITIK REDUX 
 
¶9. (C) On September 26, the Charge called on German 
Ambassador Dietrich Andreas, a new arrival in Burma, who 
transferred here directly from Dhaka in July.  Andreas 
complained that Burmese exile groups have an "opinion 
monopoly" controlling Western policy.  He observed that 
Western nations have "isolated" themselves from contact with 
the GOB, while the regime benefits from supportive contact 
with countries with which it enjoys closer relations. 
 
¶10. (C) In response, the Charge noted that the GOB is 
extremely inwardly focused and that even those countries that 
maintain close contact do not seem to have much influence. 
The Charge noted that other autocratic ASEAN countries have 
recognized that standards of living could improve with more 
open policies.  This did not seem to be the case in Burma. 
She suggested that the international community, which concurs 
on most long-term objectives, should not waste time arguing 
over short-term tactics, since it allows the GOB to divert 
the argument from its own failures to international 
differences on Burma. 
 
¶11. (C) Discussion shifted to the next generation of military 
leaders and whether they shared the same inward focus of the 
current generals.  The second tier officers seemed to all be 
"yes-men," according to the Charge, who are part of the same 
system and want to share its spoils.  Perhaps younger 
officers recognize how far Burma has fallen behind.  Andreas 
said that the Germans have had some contact with third tier 
officers, but their views remain cryptic.  He added that the 
decline in education standards in Burma severely limited the 
potential of successor generations.  The Charge agreed, 
noting that the regime leaders sent their own children and 
grandchildren abroad, while driving the Burmese educational 
system backwards. 
 
¶12. (C) The German Ambassador asserted that sanctions had not 
won any more freedom for Aung San Suu Kyi.  He asked what 
would result in any change in U.S. sanctions policy, and 
whether there are any differences among the legislative and 
executive branches in the United States and the U.K. on this 
issue.  The Charge described the overwhelming bipartisan 
agreement on Burma policy in the U.S.  She reiterated that 
forward leaning engagement had shown no results either, 
adding that U.S. and EU policies also had the important 
result of denying the SPDC the legitimacy it craves.  Andreas 
observed that the opposition remains weak and passive.  The 
Charge replied that it is hard to be active when many of its 
members are in jail. 
 
¶13. (C) Based on his involvement in the reunification of 
Germany in 1990, Andreas stressed the importance of talking 
to all parties, in order to move quickly when the right time 
comes.  The Charge said that the U.S. placed a high priority 
on promoting a dialogue inclusive of all Burmese to produce 
genuine national reconciliation.  She pointed out that the 
U.S. reaches out to a wide range of Burmese citizens today 
through our American Center programs.  However, she noted, it 
is not the West, but rather the Burmese Government that bans 
exiles and most legislators from visiting and engaging in 
public dialogue here.  More sharing of information would 
benefit all. 
 
ITALY: ISOLATION IS WHAT THE REGIME WANTS 
 
¶14. (C) Italian Ambassador Raffaele Miniero, during the 
Charge's courtesy call on September 29, said that after three 
years in Rangoon he believes the SPDC regime is now "in a 
perfect situation, right where they want to be."  He said the 
regime generals are isolated by the international community, 
"free from outside pressure, so they are capable of doing 
whatever they want to do."  He observed that the practical 
outcome of Burma's membership in ASEAN was that the "Burmese 
generals exert influence on ASEAN, rather than the other way 
around, as was anticipated." 
 
¶15. (C) Miniero advocated engagement with the regime, but 
acknowledged that he had given up on his own efforts at 
dialogue, with either GOB officials or with opposition 
figures.  "It's completely useless to try and talk with these 
guys," he said.  Miniero criticized the Global Fund for 
terminating its Burma programs, assessing that even if some 
funds went to the regime, "at least some of the assistance 
benefited the Burmese people." 
 
¶16. (C) Miniero also criticized the EU decision to deny a 
visa to the Burmese Minister for Economic Development to 
attend the September ASEM Economic Ministerial.  "This great 
mistake," he said, "creates solidarity among the ASEAN 
countries on Burma and reduces communication with the 
regime."  (Note: Miniero has told others that the Dutch visa 
decision was unilateral, rather than in accordance with the 
EU's Common Position on Burma. End Note.)   The Charge cited 
the utility of reminding the senior generals that they are 
not legitimate leaders and pointed but that Miniero had 
already commented that there was no point in even talking to 
the Ministers. 
 
¶17. (C) Ambassador Miniero agreed that political change must 
come from inside Burma, but added that "this won't happen; 
there's no movement among students or within the military." 
He criticized the Burmese people for being passive, "unlike 
the Latin Americans, who can fight."  He observed that there 
will be no political change as long as China and India 
maintain a policy of engagement and assistance.  "As a matter 
of survival," Miniero added, "the generals will continue to 
rely on these two neighbors." 
 
¶18. (C) The Charge disagreed with the Italian Ambassador's 
assessment on the future of Burma, noting that many observers 
had also been skeptical that militaries would give way in 
Indonesia and Thailand.  They changed.  Even in Burma, she 
said, large numbers of people grew so frustrated in 1988 that 
they took to the streets, where they risked machine gun fire 
to express a desire for democratic government.  "The military 
acts in its own interests," she added, "and if the winds 
change, there could be officers and soldiers who change also." 
 
SWEDEN: WE ONLY WANT TO HELP BURMA 
 
¶19. (C) On September 28, the Charge received Swedish 
Ambassador Jonas Hafstrom, who resides in Bangkok and has 
been accredited to Burma since June.  Hafstrom questioned the 
Dutch/EU decision to deny visas to senior regime officials, 
adding that many in the EU thought it was time to review the 
policy.  "We can have a tough policy," he said, "but we don't 
want to look foolish (by denying visas, but agreeing to meet 
the Burmese elsewhere)."  He regretted the Global Fund 
withdrawal from Burma, saying that the international 
community needed to provide help, especially in the education 
and health sectors.  In this regard, he added, the European 
Commission would soon post an aid officer (ECHO) to Rangoon 
to facilitate assistance programs. 
 
¶20. (C) The Charge acknowledged that dialogue is important, 
but countered that a genuine dialogue requires that the GOB 
produce interlocutors who are willing and capable of 
exchanging serious views.  "The problem," she said, "is that 
the regime refuses to discuss anything that makes it 
uncomfortable."  She noted that ASEAN members preach 
engagement with the regime, but "even they don't get access 
to top leaders."  The Charge added that sanctions denied the 
regime generals the legitimacy that they craved.  She 
encouraged the EU to maintain a visa ban when reviewing its 
Common Position on Burma. 
 
¶21. (C) Responding to the Swedish Ambassador's plea for 
assistance in Burma, the Charge acknowledged the country's 
humanitarian needs, but cautioned that donors must avoid 
benefiting the regime.  As an example of the need for 
vigilance, she cited a World Food Programme (WFP) report 
earlier this year that revealed the GOB had diverted millions 
of dollars in aid by surreptitiously taxing WFP's local 
procurement of food.  Ambassador Hafstrom described Sweden as 
the largest donor on the Thai-Burma border and added that the 
EU was considering a new plan that could involve up to 20 
million euros in assistance annually.  He acknowledged that 
Burma would continue to have a serious problem absorbing 
humanitarian assistance, but was encouraged by the Charge's 
assessment that there are ways to make a difference in the 
country without strengthening the regime, primarily by 
working through responsible NGOs. 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC: STILL BELIEVES 
 
¶22. (C) Czech Ambassador Jiri Sitler injected a refreshing, 
positive note when he met with the Charge on October 14. 
Also resident in Bangkok, he expressed regret that he had not 
had many opportunities to visit Burma.  He requested 
suggestions on how the Czechs could effectively provide 
assistance.  He mentioned that visits to the Burmese exile 
community in Thailand revealed many differences among those 
advocating democracy in Burma. 
 
¶23. (C) The Charge mentioned that the Havel-Tutu report had 
touched a nerve with the regime, which indicated that the 
military was more sensitive to outside criticism than it 
liked to admit.  Sitler replied that former President Havel 
was amused by the bad poetry the military had published in 
the New Light of Myanmar (official regime newspaper) 
criticizing the report.  He added that Havel was very sincere 
in his desire to promote democracy in Burma.  Sitler provided 
us with a copy of Havel's booklet, entitled "Power of the 
Powerless," which had been translated into Burmese.  The 
Charge suggested that a Burmese translation of at least the 
executive summary of the Havel-Tutu report would be eagerly 
devoured. 
 
¶24. (C) After describing our American Center programs, the 
Charge suggested that we might be able to work together to 
arrange programs for Czech speakers.  Sitler seemed very 
interested, assuming the speakers would get visas.  He knew 
of speakers, familiar with the Czech Republic's transition 
from authoritarian to democratic rule, who could discuss how 
journalists handled censorship or how to build coalitions and 
the art of compromise.  He also offered to provide English 
translations of books like "The Good Soldier Schweik" that 
lampooned autocratic regimes and videos of comedians 
satirizing government. 
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: WHY IS HE HERE? 
¶25. (C) The Charge made a brief courtesy call in late 
September on Dragan Janekovic, Charge d'Affaires for Serbia 
and Montenegro.  Janekovic, considered a cartoonish 
lightweight among the local diplomatic corps, especially by 
other European representatives, offered no real observations 
on Burma's domestic political or economic situation.  He 
claimed that Serbia had a strong interest in Southeast Asia, 
but revealed no details, other than to say that Serbia and 
Montenegro wanted to export agricultural machinery and 
electronics.  (Note: Although they have had a presence in 
Rangoon since the 1950s, Serbia's small diplomatic presence 
in Rangoon is widely considered to be aimed at supporting 
Serbian commercial arms sales to the Burmese military. 
Janekovic did not address this topic.  End Note.) 
 
COMMENT: OUT OF SYNCH WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE? 
 
¶26. (C) Close coordination with the EU member states in 
essential for advancing Burma policy.  Their support for 
democracy and human rights provides a crucial multilateral 
context to our own policy efforts.  Their local advocacy of 
engagement with the regime, however, strikes us as being out 
of synch with their own public (which several of the 
Ambassadors acknowledged and summarily dismissed).  The 
private grumbling and pointed criticism we've heard over the 
EU visa decision and the Global Fund's withdrawal from Burma, 
for example, do not correspond with the EU Common Position on 
sanctions nor with the EU's well-prepared annual draft of the 
UNGA resolution.  Perhaps it requires Europeans, like the 
Czechs, still reveling in democracy.  Fortunately, our 
European friends who have enjoyed democracy for much longer 
do appreciate the power of the people, even if their 
diplomats do not.  We should ensure that our public diplomacy 
programs in these EU countries emphasize shared interest in 
promoting democracy and human rights in places like Burma, 
and make sure that Burma remains sufficiently high-profile in 
order to avoid getting sidelined by bored diplomats.  End 
Comment. 
VILLAROSA