This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 008072 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL FR IR IS IZ KDEM KPAL LE MO PARM PREL SY
SUBJECT: DNSA ABRAMS' 11/22 MEETINGS WITH SENIOR FRENCH MFA 
AND PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: November 22 discussions between Deputy 
National Security Advisor (DNSA) Elliott Abrams and senior 
French officials focused on Syria/Lebanon, Iran, and 
Israeli-Palestinian issues, with Morocco, Iraq, and BMENA 
discussed in passing.  Presidency officials predicted Syrian 
non-cooperation with Mehlis, and suggested sanctioning 
individuals and possibly Syrian institutions, while ruling 
out economic or civair sanctions.  French officials were 
unenthusiastic about a possible UNSCR on the recent Larsen 
report, and suggested a PRST instead, citing Syria/Lebanon 
"fatigue" in the UNSC.  GoF officials viewed Hizballah's 
position as hardening, condemned Hizballah's recent Blue Line 
attack, and sought U.S. intervention with Israel to seek 
return the bodies of Hizballah fighters, with the French FM 
making a parallel approach to FM Shalom.  French officials 
stressed the need to keep avoiding Lebanese President Lahoud, 
while conceding that his removal appeared unlikely in the 
near term.  On Iran, French MFA Political Director Laboulaye 
said an EU-3 meeting with Iran was possible in early 
December, with active Russian participation.  Laboulaye 
stressed that Russia could not just play a mediator and had 
to choose sides, and described Beijing as more 
forward-leaning than Moscow on UNSC referral.  French 
officials were largely in listening mode on 
Israeli-Palestinian issues, and confirmed GoF plans to 
contribute to the EU monitoring mission, while praising the 
U.S. role in brokering the Rafah agreement.  Presidency 
officials shared concerns on potential instability in 
Morocco, citing economic/demographic problems, an ascendant 
Algeria, and weak leadership by King Mohammed VI.  On Iraq, 
French officials praised the recent Arab League 
reconciliation meeting, and confirmed that Iraqi FM Zebari 
would pay a first visit to Paris November 28.  Meanwhile, MFA 
officials explained lack of French ministerial participation 
in the Bahrain Forum for the Future as due to suburban unrest 
in France, and repeated familiar concerns on creating new 
BMENA institutions and labeling the Foundation and Fund for 
the Future as G-8 initiatives.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) DNSA for Global Democracy and Deputy Assistant to 
the President Elliott Abrams met separately November 22 with 
Presidential Advisor for Middle East/Americas Dominique 
Boche, MFA Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, and had 
a working lunch with MFA A/S-equivalent for North 
Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault and other senior 
GoF officials.  Outgoing MFA A/S-equivalent for IO/UN Affairs 
Jean-Maurice Ripert, Thibault, and MFA DAS-equivalent for 
Egypt/Levant Herve Besancenot attended the Laboulaye meeting. 
 The DCM-hosted lunch with Thibault included PM Diplomatic 
Advisor Christophe Farnaud, MFA S/P-equivalent Pierre Levy, 
and Middle East/UN advisor to FM Douste-Blazy Christophe 
Guilhou.  Also on November 22, DNSA Abrams had a working 
breakfast with French opinion leaders and a media 
backgrounder with leading French and Arab journalists, during 
which questions focused on U.S. policy on Syria, Egyptian 
elections and the U.S. approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the U.S. role in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and U.S. 
domestic opinion on Iraq. 
 
SYRIA NEXT STEPS IN UN, REGIME STABILITY 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Elysee Middle East advisor Boche was convinced that 
Bashar al-Asad would not cooperate with Mehlis.  Such 
cooperation would call into question regime stability, with 
there being no separation line between the Syrian security 
services and Bashar's family.  At the same time, Boche 
predicted the Syrian president would exercise maximum effort 
to give the appearance of cooperation, continue to make 
unworkable proposals to Mehlis, and seek to mobilize 
pro-Syrian elements within Lebanon and Arab world solidarity. 
 Boche suggested it was likely that Mehlis would come back to 
UNSC before his December 15 deadline, and stressed that if 
the UNSC did nothing in response to SARG non-cooperation, the 
UNSC would lose credibility.  He suggested UN sanctions 
targeting individuals named as suspects by UNIIC, and going 
beyond that to include higher-level officials as well as SARG 
institutions, such as the Ba'th party, army or security 
services.  Boche ruled out economic sanctions, citing 
negative impact on the Syrian people, and described civil 
aviation sanctions as likely to destabilize Lebanon.  Boche 
reported the GoF was undecided whether consensus for a second 
UNSCR was absolutely necessary.  Abrams agreed with Boche 
that a follow-up UNSCR to 1636 should go beyond the four or 
five individuals to be named by Mehlis, and said we were now 
reflecting on what additional targeted sanctions might be 
imposed on selected individuals or institutions. 
 
¶4. (C) In the interim period before the expected December 15 
issuance of Mehlis' next report, Abrams proposed a narrow 
UNSCR citing conclusions of the Larsen report on UNSCR 1559 
implementation, as a way to express support for Larsen's 
efforts and maintain pressure on Damascus.  Boche suggested 
GoF disappointment with the Larsen report and noted there was 
not a lot in it to use against Syria, adding that time had 
passed since the report's issuance.  Boche concluded that any 
UNSC reaction to the Larsen report should be modest and not 
complicate the UNSC response to the next Mehlis findings, 
expressing a preference for a PRST.  MFA Political Director 
Laboulaye, in later discussion, stressed "Syria/Lebanon 
fatigue" in UNSC, the need not to overextend ourselves, and 
reiterated the suggestion of a PRST (vice UNSCR) in response 
to Larsen report.  MFA IO A/S-equivalent Ripert noted that 
Larsen had told French officials in New York October 31 that 
he did not see need for a UNSCR in response to his report. 
Abrams agreed to follow up with Larsen, and offered to send 
the French a draft text of a Larsen UNSCR shortly for further 
discussion between our delegations in New York.  Abrams 
conceded that if Mehlis reported back to the Council before 
his deadline, we could run out of time for separate UNSC 
action on Larsen's report in the interim. 
 
¶5. (C) French officials agreed with Abrams on the need to 
press SYG Annan to offer greater support to Mehlis, and 
counter the negative advice of Brahimi and others.  Boche 
noted Chirac had spoken by phone with Annan on November 19 
and stressed the need for Annan to support Mehlis.  Boche 
opined that Annan did not want to be isolated from his "Arab 
electorate," and suggested that Annan's tour of Arab capitals 
had made the SYG rethink his view that Arab governments did 
not support pressuring Syria.  Boche noted that Annan made a 
point of complimenting Mehlis during the Chirac conversation. 
 
¶6. (C) MFA officials and PM Diplomatic Advisor Farnaud, in a 
separate working lunch with Abrams, expressed greater caution 
on Syria next steps, including on a new UNSCR to respond to 
the next Mehlis report.  MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault 
stressed the difficulty in achieving unanimity on UNSCR 1636, 
and expressed uncertainty whether such an outcome could be 
repeated, even in the aftermath of a tougher Mehlis report 
more directly implicating Syria.  Farnaud evoked the 
possibility that Asad might hand over Asif Shawkat to UNIIC 
investigators -- a prospect ruled out by Elysee Advisor Boche 
-- which he said would open the door to a more easily 
achievable UNSCR pressing for Syrian cooperation without 
punishing the Syrian people.  Farnaud also stressed the need 
to consider the dynamics within the UNSC as well as regional 
stability, namely the positions of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
before rushing to action on a resolution to follow up on 
UNSCR 1636.  Abrams reminded Farnaud and others that Saudi 
King Abdullah had essentially washed his hands of the SARG 
and that Egyptian President Mubarak was not far behind. 
Farnaud agreed that Bashar was clearly disliked by the Saudi 
and Egyptian leadership, but concluded that both governments' 
desire to maintain stability in the region could keep them 
from moving "too fast, too far" to avoid excessive pressure 
on the SARG. 
 
¶7. (C) Exchanging views on SARG regime stability, both Abrams 
and his GoF interlocutors agreed that there were no signs of 
Alawite or Sunni conspiracies against the regime, though no 
one could rule out a surprise coup, and that fears of 
widespread Muslim Brotherhood (MB) influence in Syria 
appeared to be overblown.  PM advisor Farnaud concluded that 
the MB was probably not a threat to the regime and would not 
attempt to overthrow the government, though it would want a 
role in a successor government.  Asked for clarification on 
GoF contact policy with the MB, Farnaud (who served 
previously as French DCM in Cairo) admitted that the GoF was 
in contact with the MB in Egypt, but said the GoF had no such 
contacts with the Syrian MB in exile in Europe. 
 
LEBANON: HIZBALLAH, LAHOUD 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) On Lebanon, Boche described Hizballah as becoming more 
hard-line and susceptible to Syrian and Iranian pressure.  He 
concluded that we should avoid provoking a Hizballah crisis 
with the GoL.  MFA NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault cited GoF 
condemnation of Hizballah-instigated Blue Line attack, and 
said the French embassy in Washington would make a high-level 
approach to ask Secretary Rice to intervene with Israeli FM 
Shalom, to urge Israel to return the four bodies of four 
Hizballah militants killed November 21.  Thibault confirmed 
that FM Douste-Blazy would make similar appeal to FM Shalom. 
 
¶9. (C) Although Boche conceded that we could accomplish 
"nothing" with Lahoud in place, he concluded there was little 
likelihood he would be removed in the near term.  Lahoud's 
removal remained a Lebanese decision, and one on which the 
Maronite Patriarch must pronounce, though he was not ready to 
do so.  Boche also cited divisions within the Lebanese 
Christian community on a possible replacement, with the 
"Qornet Shehwan" faction still humbled by its electoral 
defeats, and Aoun remaining unacceptable to Lebanon's 
Shi'a/Sunni majority.  In the interim, Boche counseled 
continued isolation of Lahoud; he noted that French 
Ambassador Emie did not attend Lahoud's November 22 national 
day reception, while President Chirac sent "the Lebanese 
people" a one-line congratulatory letter on the occasion. 
 
IRAN, EU-3, RUSSIA AND CHINA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Political Director Laboulaye described recent London 
meetings between the EU-3, U.S., Russia and China as very 
constructive.  He stressed the EU-3's message to Russia that 
it couldn't just play mediator and had to choose sides. 
Laboulaye described China as more forward leaning than Russia 
on UNSC referral, citing the relative openness of the PRC 
representative at the London meetings, in contrast to the 
"Soviet style" Russian representative, Kislyak.  Laboulaye 
described China as more outspoken that the Russians at 
London, and more understanding of the need to tell Iran that 
the UNSC is an option to be considered, though the time may 
not be right now.  Laboulaye confirmed that an EU-3 meeting 
with Iranians was possible in early December (possible venue 
Switzerland); Russia would have to take more active part in 
such a meeting and could not be a mere go-between.  Laboulaye 
described two camps in Tehran: those who want to start 
enrichment tomorrow, and those who want to start it slightly 
later, giving time to build international, especially NAM, 
support.  The EU-3 would try to deliver the opposite message 
to Tehran, to show that the international community, 
especially China and India, were on our side.  The main 
challenge, in Laboulaye's view, was to avoid losing momentum 
from the September 24 IAEA resolution.  Laboulaye commented 
that India had asked the GoF not to seek an IAEA vote 
November 24, citing domestic pressure.  He added that 
Pakistani officials, during a visit he made to Pakistan last 
week, had concluded that Iran will continue to lie about its 
nuclear program and go ahead with development, just as 
Pakistan had done.  Laboulaye expressed great interest in 
what President Bush had told PRC leadership on Iran/EU-3 
during the his recent visit to Beijing. 
 
¶11. (C) Presidential Advisor Boche, in more brief remarks on 
Iran, stressed the need to be realistic and build consensus 
for UNSC referral, which would not coalesce by November 24. 
Boche conceded that there was no evidence Iran was willing to 
resume talks and described Iranian rejection of the Russian 
proposal, contained in a letter from Iran State Security 
Advisor Larijani, as profoundly negative.  Boche reported 
that Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Gourdault-Montagne had 
traveled to Moscow the previous week and found the Russians 
highly vexed by the Iranian rejection of their proposal.  At 
the same time, Boche stressed that there was an internal 
debate going on in Iran, and advocated letting the Iranian 
government fall into isolation so that the more moderate camp 
of former officials could improve its standing.   DNSA Abrams 
stressed the need to avoid actions that in fact encourage 
Iran's hard-liners, which was why the U.S. continued to 
declare Iran as in violation of its commitments and to call 
for UNSC referral.  Abrams emphasized the need to consider 
how we might influence the ongoing debate in Iran, and at 
what point UNSC referral might strengthen internal opponents 
of the hard-line Ahmadinejad government.  Boche, meanwhile, 
stressed the need for unanimity in sending the Iran file to 
the UNSC.  Abrams also emphasized to his GoF interlocutors 
pending Congressional legislation which could tighten 
sanctions on Iran and its trading partners, stressing the 
need to be able to show tangible results from the EU-3 
effort, which were not evident. 
 
ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The GoF side commended the Secretary's role in 
brokering the Rafah agreement, and was largely in listening 
mode as DNSA Abrams briefed them on the run-up to the 
agreement and next steps.  Boche praised Secretary Rice's 
engagement and suggested that the parties could not proceed 
without the U.S. acting as a third party.  Abrams concurred 
that the Secretary had intervened successfully at the right 
moment, but cautioned against expectations that the Secretary 
would become the Palestinian "desk officer" or launch shuttle 
diplomacy.  Abrams emphasized the urgent need for the PA to 
commence dismantling militias immediately after January 
elections, emphasizing the Palestinian roadmap commitments 
and explaining the differences the USG had with Israel on the 
issue of Hamas election participation.  Boche suggested that 
having Hamas in the PLC would open possibility to change the 
nature of Hamas, akin to Hizballah's situation in Lebanon. 
DNSA Abrams cautioned against any outcome which envisioned 
Hamas remaining a permanent, armed terrorist faction within 
the Palestinian government, which would jeopardize U.S. 
financial support for the PA, as well as prospects for 
achieving a Palestinian state within the next few years. 
Laboulaye, meanwhile, raised familiar cautions on pressing 
Abbas too hard on security, citing the weakness of the PA 
President and the need for Israelis to stop targeted 
killings.  Abrams emphasized Washington fatigue with 
Palestinian excuses for inaction, and stressed that January 
elections could bring a reinvigorated PA and new cabinet and 
PM, which, combined with successful implementation of the 
Rafah agreement, could result in a new, virtuous cycle. 
Abrams also cited the imminent arrival of General Dalton to 
replace General Ward in the Palestinian security assistance 
mission; the French side expressed interest in meeting Dalton 
if he stopped in Europe en route to the region.  Laboulaye 
and other MFA officials stressed the GoF's willingness to 
contribute to the EU monitoring at Rafah, which should be in 
place by November 25.  NEA A/S-equivalent Thibault conceded 
that the GoF had encountered difficulty in securing 
participation from the French Interior Ministry, which 
remained focused on restoring order domestically following 
widespread suburban unrest. 
 
MOROCCO CONCERNS 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (C) In response to a query from DNSA Abrams, Boche 
confirmed that the GoF had serious concerns on Morocco's 
long-term stability, due more to economic than political 
reasons.  Boche cited Morocco's bad harvest this year, high 
oil prices, its youth bulge, and lack of job creation as 
factors stretching the GOM's already overextended budget. 
Meanwhile, Boche described King Mohammed VI as intelligent, 
but surrounded by bad advisors and former schoolmates, who 
were "prevaricators of the first order."  Boche also 
questioned King Mohammed's timidity on the international 
scene, noting he had lost the international diplomatic 
credibility built up by his father, such as the Al-Quds 
committee role, didn't travel to international meetings, and 
was the only regional head of state to miss the Mediterranean 
Forum.  Meanwhile, Boche described Algeria as increasing its 
economic means via rising oil prices, which changed the 
regional equilibrium and put Morocco on defensive on Western 
Sahara.  Asked to what degree President Chirac could 
intervene with the King, Boche conceded that Chirac retained 
a "paternal" role with King Mohammed and even intervened in 
family matters.  Boche reported that the GoF was trying to 
encourage the King to improve relations with Algeria as a 
precondition of progress on the Western Sahara; the GoF had 
also sought, unsuccessfully, to encourage Morocco to put 
forward a new autonomy proposal on Western Sahara which could 
divide the Polisario refugees from the Algerian government, 
as the interests of the two did not overlap.  Thus far, Boche 
concluded, the Moroccan government had been too timid and 
uninventive about the Western Sahara issue, and the GoF was 
not "reassured." 
 
PRAISE FOR ARAB LEAGUE IRAQ EFFORTS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) In passing, Laboulaye praised the recent Arab 
League-sponsored Iraq reconciliation meeting as a "ray of 
hope, at last" in Iraq.  He also commended Arab League 
Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Iraq for its symbolic 
value and positive impact on Iraqi Sunni engagement in the 
political process -- which Laboulaye quipped was perhaps the 
first example of the Arab League being useful.  Thibault, 
meanwhile, confirmed Iraqi FM Zebari would visit Paris on 
November 28, his first visit to France as FM.  Thibault noted 
that Zebari would be Paris after attending the Barcelona 
Summit, a UK-issued invitation which privately infuriated the 
GoF.  Abrams, meanwhile, described the Arab League initiative 
as generally positive and indicative of a shift in Arab 
views.  Arab governments were now convinced they should reach 
out to Iraq and encourage Sunnis to engage, having realized 
that U.S. failure in Iraq or increased Iranian influence in 
Iraq were not in their interest. 
 
FORUM FOR THE FUTURE/BMENA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) DNSA Abrams described the Manama Forum for the Future 
as resounding success, citing creation of the Foundation and 
Fund for the Future and the dramatic increase in Arab 
government participation since Sea Island.  Thibault 
expressed regret that no GoF minister had attended the Forum 
in the end, and noted that the French education minister had 
to cancel his planned participation at the last minute due to 
ongoing suburban unrest.  As a result, the GoF delegation at 
the Forum consisted of working-level MFA officials, led by 
the French Ambassador to Bahrain.  Thibault reiterated GoF 
support for BMENA, but raised familiar cautions on creating 
new institutions or the labeling Foundation and Fund as G-8 
initiatives. 
 
¶16. (U) This message was cleared by DNSA Abrams. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton