This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 008071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KIRC KPAO OIIP OTRA FR NATO EUN
SUBJECT: NATO Tour for Young French Political Leaders - 
October 13-14, 2005 
 
 
¶1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  The future shape of NATO as 
well as its ability to ensure collective security and co- 
exist with an independent European defense have been the 
subject of discussions in French political and media 
circles for some time.  At an illustrative debate at the 
French Senate last year, two members of the French Foreign 
Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Committee were 
particularly critical of NATO.  Former Senator and member 
of the Commission, Jean-Yves Autexier, stated that "NATO is 
not a security alliance, but a tool for global American 
strategy in this it is an obstacle for European Defense." 
Helene Luc, Vice-president of the Committee said: "We 
should look at things honestly. NATO represents the 
American dominance of European defense."  Their comments 
represent an example of one French mindset. 
 
¶2. Given these types of French apprehensions, the Mission 
takes full advantage of NATO tours for select participants 
to broaden their knowledge of defense issues.  The Public 
Affairs Section recently arranged for a NATO tour for 
emerging political leaders, both left and right of center, 
and their tour highlighted NATO and European defense as 
compatible, not antithetical. The day at the Joint Force 
Command headquarters brought home that NATO is first and 
foremost a military alliance as opposed to a political 
organization.  The French participants, mostly staff aides 
on Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees at the French 
Senate and National Assembly selected by Embassy Paris, 
praised the tour for deepening their understanding of NATO, 
the role of the Joint Force Command, and the importance of 
collective defense to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century.  End Introduction and Summary. 
 
DAY ONE 
 
¶3. NATO headquarters: USNATO's Deputy Chief of Mission, 
John Koening, began the day of briefings with an overview 
of both the U.S.'s role in NATO and France's contributions 
to the Alliance. He stressed that France and the United 
States share the same vision for the strategic development 
of NATO, but that where Iraq is concerned, the U.S. would 
like to see greater French participation in the Training 
Mission in ar-Rustamiyah. The DCM detailed U.S. involvement 
in various peacekeeping missions, including Afghanistan and 
the Sudan. He outlined how NATO coordinates humanitarian 
efforts and gave the example of the strategic air bridge to 
Pakistan that assisted the victims of the devastating 
earthquake earlier that month. 
 
¶4. The French Ambassador to NATO, Richard Duque, 
accompanied by his deputy welcomed the group to the French 
Mission to NATO. Ambassador Duque began the briefing with a 
history of France's involvement in NATO and the withdrawal 
from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. He 
underscored that the fact that France does not belong to 
the integrated military structure is no longer an issue for 
France or for its allies, and in no way hinders France's 
ability to fully cooperate in NATO operations. The 
Ambassador described NATO as an "instrument of 
stabilization" and touched on NATO transformation, a term 
he said he finds "mysterious," but recognizes that it is 
in the interest of France to promote greater 
interoperability. Ambassador Duque touched on the 
"ambiguous attitude" of the U.S. with regard to the EU, 
saying that the U.S. wants a strong Europe, but only within 
the Alliance.  NATO, he added, allows the U.S. to have a 
presence in Europe and an independent European defense 
would undermine this. The newest members to NATO are, 
according to Ambassador Duque, adverse to an independent 
European defense because they are intent on maintaining 
their strategic alliance with the U.S. and are generally 
wary of the EU. Finally, he suggested that the U.S. is not 
as present as it once was in NATO because today it is 
looking for more flexibility with the various ad hoc 
coalitions it has established in Afghanistan or Iraq for 
example. 
 
¶5. The Counselor for the Portuguese Delegation to NATO, 
Andre Melo Bandeira, gave a briefing in French on the 
Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperative 
Initiative that was very well received. Mr. Bandeira 
discussed the Broader Middle East Initiative emphasizing 
the difficulty in determining the boundaries of the Broader 
Middle East. He also spoke about Turkey's membership bid to 
the EU and again of the difficulty in defining the 
political and geographical boundaries of Europe. This 
briefing was followed by a discussion on NATO in 
Afghanistan and the challenges facing NATO in that region. 
This discussion was led by Colonel Andrew Budd of the 
Strategic Policy and Concepts Branch of the NATO 
International Military Committee. In a frank presentation 
of the situation in Afghanistan, Colonel Budd regretted a 
lack of planning ahead on the part of NATO and SHAPE in 
Afghanistan. He said that this lack of vision is 
responsible for the problems that ISAF has experienced 
since 2004 and added that the massive sending of troops to 
the region was not the right solution. The fact that NATO 
commits to operations such as the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan without sufficient attention to the "end state" 
is NATO's principal weakness, said Colonel Budd. He 
described the logistical problems that slow down both the 
reconstruction of the country as well as its stabilization. 
He explained the purpose of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) that are made up of military and civilian 
personnel and sent to remote regions to extend the 
authority of the Afghan central government, promote and 
enhance security, and facilitate humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction operations. He warned, however, of the 
dangers that the PRTs face, being isolated and at the mercy 
of local warlords. 
 
¶6. The working lunch was an occasion to discuss NATO-EU 
relations. Overall, briefers and guests agreed that France 
and the U.S. are more aligned than separate and that NATO 
and the EU generally speak with one voice. The briefing 
after lunch continued the discussion on NATO and the EU 
with a debate on the adaptability of the Berlin Plus 
agreement and whether or not Berlin Plus is the best way 
for the EU and NATO to work together. The example of Darfur 
was put forth as an instance where Berlin Plus does not 
work. The discussion also focused on the efforts that 
remain to be made toward greater interoperability between 
the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups. The final 
briefing in French, by the Deputy Public Affairs Officer 
for USNATO, provided the group with a chance to recap the 
information that they had gathered over the course of the 
day and ask some final policy-related questions. 
 
DAY TWO 
 
¶7.  Brunssum - Joint Force Command Headquarters: The Press 
and Information Officer gave an extremely well-presented 
and informative presentation of JFC and its place within 
NATO's military structure. The group came away from this 
briefing with a broader view of JFC's organization, its 
mission range and its operational priorities. The briefer 
gave an overview of JFC's command of the NATO Response and 
ISAF operations in Afghanistan. The preparations for the 
upcoming exercise in Cape Verde, "Steadfast Jaguar," were 
outlined and the JFC Press Officer highlighted the extent 
of the challenges that face NATO because of the need to be 
operational quickly in any part of the world. Part of the 
briefing was devoted to NATO Transformation and what this 
means for the future of the Alliance. The participants' 
questions focused, for the most part, on Afghanistan and 
consequences on the ground of combining the commands of the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
peacekeeping operation  with the U.S-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom. France has been outwardly opposed to combining 
these two operations and the group reflected this position. 
The briefer stressed the danger of confusing peacekeeping 
and the war on terror. At the end of the day the group was 
unanimously enthusiastic about the day in Brunssum noting, 
however, that this briefing, which dealt with the 
operational and technical details of NATO missions ideally 
should have come before the day-long briefings at NATO 
headquarters that focused on policy and the decision-making 
aspect of NATO. 
 
¶8. CONCLUSION: The participants were extremely impressed by 
the quality of the briefings as well as by the briefers. 
Discussions in the train returning to Paris focused on the 
tour's usefulness in dispelling a common notion in France 
that NATO is an ageing institution that has become quasi- 
obsolete since the end of the Cold War. Instead, 
participants came away with a sense of NATO's adaptability, 
both in its peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations, 
and its new function in the war on terrorism. End 
Conclusion 
STAPLETON