This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007920 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: PREL FR MNUC IR PINR KNUP
SUBJECT: FRENCH THINK TANKER ON VISIT TO IRAN 
 
Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  French think-tanker Francois Gere, who 
claims to have extensive ties to the local Iranian Embassy as 
well as the Quai and Israeli Embassy met with us November 18 
to report on his recent trip to the Isfahan nuclear facility 
at the Iranian government's invitation.  Gere -- who many 
would say is too close to the Iranians -- is a tireless 
proponent and would-be initiator of dialogue between Iran and 
the U.S.  Gere described a less-than-sophisticated but 
sustained and enthusiastic effort by Iran to acquire a 
nuclear weapons capability within the next 10-15 years, which 
might or might not proceed to the actual production of 
nuclear weapons.  Gere viewed Iranian President 
Ahmadi-Nejad's statement on Israel as a part of an internal 
power struggle.  He cautioned against viewing reformist 
minded (at least in appearance) Iranians as "pro-American." 
We see Gere as an apologist for the Iranians, but report his 
observations for what they are worth.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a November 18 meeting with Deputy Polcouns, Gere 
had just returned from a trip to Isfahan and said he was 
granted access to the site.  He likened the workers -- with 
their long hair, jeans, and no beards, to young Americans 
between 25 and 30 years of age.  He said the Iranian nuclear 
program presented a huge technological challenge, and 
compared it to France's own practice, when it embarked on 
developing its own nuclear weapons nearly fifty years ago, to 
hire young scientists.  (The older ones, many of whom were 
Communist sympathizers, refused to work on the program.) 
Despite the young scientists' relative inexperience, Gere 
said the Iranian government was providing them with the 
resources they needed so that the program could forge ahead. 
 
¶3.  (C) Gere said it was nonetheless slow going: the Isfahan 
facility is not yet completely finished, and Iran has had 
difficulties, for example in acquiring the kind of 
high-quality specialized steel it wanted.  Germany had 
refused, and the U.S. had intervened with China to the same 
effect.  He speculated that Iran was now manufacturing the 
steel itself or perhaps acquiring it from countries like 
Pakistan.  Even though Iran broke the IAEA seals to resume 
the production of gas from uranium cake, Gere said there were 
cameras everywhere to monitor the actual production, 
including in unnecessary places.  Gere judged that the 
Iranians would not be in a position to produce nuclear 
weapons for another 10-15 years. 
 
¶4.  (C) Gere characterized President Ahmadi-Nejad's comments 
on Israel as intended primarily for internal consumption: a 
provocation reflecting internal power struggles and the 
desire of a younger generation to take over from the old. 
Gere maintained that, while it was clear Iran wanted to have 
the capability to produce nuclear weapons should it choose to 
do so, this did not necessarily mean that Iran intended to 
proceed to actual production.  (Deputy Polcouns took the line 
that the history of Iranian deceptions provided no basis for 
such a willfully benign interpretation.)  He pushed for 
dialogue as the only means of persuading the Iranians not to 
develop a nuclear weapons capability, including "informal" 
meetings initially between Iranian and U.S. think-tankers. 
The departing Iranian ambassador here had told him, he 
claimed, that such meetings were still possible despite the 
apparent hardening of the regime.  Gere conceded the point 
that the emergence of a harder-line regime would seem to make 
dialogue even less likely and more difficult than before, but 
he insisted that such a dialogue nonetheless remained 
possible. 
 
¶5.  (C) Asked how young Iranians were reacting to the regime, 
Gere divided them into three groups: the masses people in the 
country who were often illiterate and easily manipulated by 
the regime; hard-liners in the cities who were the vanguard 
of the Republican Guard; and those who were fed up with 
clerical rule and longed for a more normal life (i.e., to 
wear blue jeans and make-up).  On the latter group, in 
response to mention of newspaper articles suggesting that 
many Iranian youth were pro-American, Gere said it would be a 
mistake to equate a desire for a more universal youth 
lifestyle with pro-Americanism.  He nonetheless found his 
reception by average Iranians, where he was hospitably 
treated and invited to tea despite being an obvious 
Westerner, far preferable to the harassment he said he would 
likely encounter in Yemen or Saudi Arabia under similar 
circumstances. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  Francois Gere, President of the Institut 
Francais d'Analyse Strategique (IFAS), is well known to 
Embassy and is one of many opinion leaders -- Thierry 
Montbriand of IFRI, Alexander Adler of "Le Figaro," Francois 
Heisbourg of the Foundation for Strategic Research -- in 
regular contact with the Iranians here.  Gere has insisted 
that he consults regularly with the Israelis and Quai 
officials on Iran; indeed, Deputy Polcouns ran into him in 
the lobby of the MFA before scheduling this latest meeting. 
We see Gere as an apologist for the Iranians, but report his 
observations for what they are worth.  One well-informed MFA 
contact informally cautioned that Gere is too close to the 
Iranians, does not have much credibility among GoF 
disarmament specialists, and implied that we should also be 
careful with Gere's information.  That said, there is also 
some evidence that the GoF values his insights; Gere was 
recently awarded the Legion d'Honneur and now sports a natty 
red bar on his lapel.  End comment. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
Stapleton