This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2567
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
AMEMBASSY ACCRA 
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 
AMEMBASSY DAKAR 
AMEMBASSY BANGUI 
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMEMBASSY ROME 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USLO TRIPOLI

UNCLAS  NDJAMENA 001624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/C, PRM, DRL, INR; LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA 
FOR REFCOORDS; ROME FOR FODAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PGOV CD SU CZ
SUBJECT:  CENTRAL AFRICAN REFUGEES: PRM VISITS CAMPS IN 
SOUTHERN CHAD 
 
REF:  NDJAMENA 1616 
 
¶1. Summary.  PRM/AFR Mary Lange (Deputy Director of the 
Africa Office) and Neil Ahlsten (Chad/Darfur Program 
Officer) traveled to southern Chad from October 10-15 to 
visit the refugee camps in Amboko and Yaroungou.  The visit 
was prompted by the arrival of an estimated 10,700 new 
refugees from the Central African Republic to Amboko camp 
since June 2005.  Amboko and Yaroungou camps now host a 
combined 40,000 CAR refugees who are supported by UNHCR, 
Cooperazione Internazionale, African Concern and Africare. 
Several hundred additional CAR refugees recently arrived at 
the border.  UNHCR believes that refugee inflows will fall 
in the coming months.  UNHCR and its partners at Amboko were 
caught off guard by the new inflows, and the initial 
registration and basic service provision were poor.  UNHCR 
has since improved its operations considerably through the 
support of an Emergency Response Team.  UNHCR is in the 
process of establishing a new refugee camp at Gondje, with a 
contribution of Euro 2 million from ECHO, that should 
further ameliorate the situation.  CARE will be the lead 
implementing partner and assume camp management, while MSF 
will provide health services.  Africare will provide support 
for agriculture and income-generating activities.  UNHCR's 
budget needs for Gondje have been met by the ECHO 
contribution, but additional support for ongoing programs in 
Amboko and Yaroungou is still required for UNHCR and WFP. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Refugee Background, Locations, and Numbers 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  In 2003, pockets of insecurity developed in northern CAR 
after current President Bozize took power.  Since then, a 
small number of armed groups are suspected of operating in 
the area, including `loyalists' of the Patisse regime, 
military deserters and highway robbers.  Economic insecurity 
and poor agricultural production in northern CAR may have 
exacerbated this instability.  The first caseload of CAR 
refugees arrived in southern Chad in 2003.  UNHCR 
established Amboko camp near the town of Gore and Yaroungou 
camp near the town of Danamadji.  The situation remained 
relatively stable until June 2005, when unidentified armed 
groups attacked villages in northern CAR, precipitating the 
new influx of refugees into southern Chad.  The most recent 
attack occurred on September 27, when a group of 
unidentified armed men attacked a small military post in the 
village of Markounda and displaced its 1,500 inhabitant. 
 
¶3.  UNHCR's latest statistics indicate that there are 24,526 
refugees at Amboko camp and 15,000 refugees at Yaroungou 
camp.  For Amboko, these figures are divided into the old 
caseload of13,826 and the new caseload of 10,700.  Yaroungou 
camp has no new refugees.  Several hundred additional 
refugees were scheduled to arrive at Amboko by convoy 
shortly after the PRM visit.  UNHCR and NGO staff believed 
that the figures for the old caseloads at both camps 
probably overestimate the actual population by 10-20 
percent.  Neither camp has had a census since 2003.  For the 
new caseload in Amboko, very little demographic data is 
available.  Within the next month, UNHCR plans to register 
the head of household from the new caseload as a first step 
to improve registration for the new refugees.  UNHCR hopes 
to do a more in-depth "Project Profile" registration 
starting in January 2006. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Amboko: UNHCR's Response and Contingency Planning 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  During interviews with field staff, it was evident that 
UNHCR and its partner NGOs had insufficient capacity and 
contingency plans at the onset of the new refugee inflows. 
The UNHCR field office in Gore (Amboko camp) had only two 
relatively inexperienced international staff and was 
providing minimal assistance for the old caseload.  The 
visit was prompted by the arrival of an estimated 10,700 new 
refugees from the Central African Republic to Amboko camp 
 
 
since June 2005.  Amboko and Yaroungou camps now host a 
combined 40,000 CAR refugees who are supported by UNHCR, 
Cooperazione Internazionale, African Concern and Africare. 
Several hundred additional CAR refugees recently arrived at 
the border.  UNHCR believes that refugee inflows will fall 
in the coming months time of the PRM visit). 
 
¶5.  In July, the UNHCR field office in Gore received a four- 
person Emergency Response Team from UNHCR/Geneva with 
protection, logistics, program and administrative 
international staff.  The team has significantly improved 
basic assistance as well as emergency response to new 
arrivals.  UNHCR personnel from field offices in the eastern 
Chad and Danamadji have also come to Gore for short-term 
assignments.  The resulting team appears to be both capable 
and motivated.  New arrivals are now transported from the 
border to the temporary extension of Amboko camp in 
organized convoys, registered immediately, screened by 
health and nutrition workers and given a ten-day food 
ration, a tent and some non-food items (although blankets 
and mosquito nets have not been sufficient).  Basic services 
in Amboko remain stretched and international standards are 
not yet being met in terms of health services, nutrition, 
water, and sanitation.  Water availability, for example, is 
currently only 7-8 liters per person per day.  In terms of 
food aid, for several months prior to October, WFP suffered 
from funding and resource shortfalls for the southern Chad 
EMOP and had not delivered the planned rations.  At the time 
of the visit, new refugees were finally receiving a full 
2,100 kcal food ration.  The old caseload of refugees was 
receiving the planned ration of 1,800 kcal.  While this 
situation has improved in the short-term, WFP staff warned 
that funding for this operation is very tenuous. 
 
¶6.  In response to the refugee influx into southern Chad, 
UNHCR has had to borrow heavily from its contingency stock 
for Darfur refugees in the east.  Most of the non-food items 
distributed to the new arrivals came from stocks in eastern 
Chad.  In some cases, such as kitchen sets, this has 
depleted almost the entire stock.  A few items, including 
5,000 mosquito nets, came from programs in support of 
UNICEF's non-emergency operations in Chad.  UNHCR did not 
provide blankets to the new refugees from CAR because it 
wanted to maintain its stock of blankets for the cold season 
in eastern Chad.  The UNHCR senior program officer in 
N'Djamena noted that UNHCR was obliged to try to replenish 
eastern stocks using funds earmarked for the new influx in 
the south, but she was skeptical of receiving sufficient 
funding to do so.  The new influx has had only minimal 
impact on staffing for UNHCR programs in eastern Chad.  The 
Emergency Response Team was comprised of staff from Geneva 
or other international offices.  The additional staff that 
came from programs in eastern Chad was deployed only for 
short term assignments.  The head of the UNHCR office in 
Gore said that the office was developing contingency plans 
for up to 5,000 new refugees, but he was not able to provide 
any concrete details regarding the plan.  He believes, and 
UNHCR/N'Djamena agreed, that any new refugee inflows into 
southern Chad would be small because most of the population 
in the bordering areas of CAR has already been displaced 
either to Chad or further inland in CAR. 
 
¶7.  WFP has also had to borrow from stocks in the east to 
meet emergency food needs of new refugees in southern Chad. 
WFP currently only has sufficient food stocks to cover needs 
in southern Chad for one more month.  By December, the 
pipeline for vegetable oil will break.  Subsequent breaks 
for cereals and pulses are anticipated for January and 
February.   WFP/N'Djamena indicated it would be requesting 
authorization from USAID/FFP to borrow $1 million worth of 
commodities from a recent USD 7 million contribution for the 
eastern Chad EMOP.  Otherwise, no alternatives have been 
identified. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Continuing Operations at Yaroungou Camp 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
¶8.   The situation in Yaroungou was much more stable and 
manageable.  From October 13 to 15, PRM visited UNHCR's 
programs for Yaroungou camp, which has a population of 
15,000 refugees, all of whom date back to the 2003 influx. 
The team found no major concerns with the camp operations. 
UNHCR and its partners are delivering most basic services at 
an adequate level.  PRM visited the health, nutrition, water 
and sanitation programs of COOPI, which has a strong team 
and reasonably well-managed operations.  Low vaccination 
rates were the main shortcoming of COOPI.  This was caused 
by a break in the supply of vaccines on the part of the 
Government of Chad and has since been rectified.  The 
operations and staff of African Concern (camp management, 
education, agriculture, community services) were not as 
strong as COOPI, particularly in terms of community 
services.  For example, they recently established four mills 
to be operated by refugee committees, but due to poor follow 
up two of them are no longer operational and the two 
functional mills do not have resources for basic 
maintenance. 
 
¶9.  The refugees at Yaroungou camp have a similar ethnic 
background as the local population, and relationships 
between the two groups are good.  This is reflected in the 
fact that many refugees have gained access to farmland in 
areas around Yaroungou camp.  African Concern and FAO have 
helped refugees access 1,700 hectares of land (50m x 50m 
plots per family) and have provided seeds and tools to boost 
their production of staple and vegetable crops. 
Agricultural production could be a cornerstone of self- 
sufficiency for refugees in Amboko.  Refugee leaders said 
that the land around Yaroungou camp was very productive. 
UNHCR noted that even if peace comes to northern CAR, at 
least half of the refugee population will likely stay in 
southern Chad.  Given the refugee access to farmland, UNHCR 
field staff and the visiting WFP-UNHCR joint assessment 
mission agreed that reduced rations and perhaps targeted 
food aid might be feasible for 2006. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Future Plans for UNHCR and Implementing Partners 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  The most appropriate near-term solution for Central 
African refugees in Chad is clearly local integration and 
self-reliance activities, and UNHCR is hoping that 
sufficient funding will be available in 2006 to pursue this 
strategy.  UNHCR recently secured GOC authorizations for a 
new site at Gondje, situated five kilometers from Amboko, 
with sufficient land for both the camp itself and 
agricultural land for refugees.  ECHO has agreed to fund the 
development of the site as part of a two million euro grant 
to UNHCR and implementing partners.  CARE will take over 
camp management and will develop the site, with refugees 
being divided into nine to ten "villages" of roughly 1,500 
people each with surrounding fields available for 
cultivation.  .  MSF will open a health center at Gondje on 
a temporary basis, with potential handover to COOPI when 
emergency health conditions have abated. 
 
¶11.  Africare, with the support of UNHCR, has already 
started a program in vegetable gardening and hopes to 
implement programs in staple food production for the rainy 
season starting in May of 2006.  PRM staff visited some of 
the current and proposed locations for Africare's 
agricultural support programs.  Africare has worked with 
over one hundred groups of refugees to clear ten hectares 
for vegetable production.  An additional forty hectares of 
land will be used for staple crops (sorghum, rice and 
maize). 
 
¶12.  In both Amboko and Yaroungou, conditions are ideal for 
refugee self-reliance within a year or two.  Refugees enjoy 
exceptional hospitality from the local population and 
support from local and traditional authorities in terms of 
access to land.  With the proper agricultural support (oxen, 
seeds, and tools), UNHCR and WFP agreed that refugees in 
Yaroungou could be self-reliant by the end of 2006. 
 
 
Refugees in Amboko and Gondje could be self-sufficient by 
the end of 2007. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13. The PRM team offers the following conclusions and 
recommendations based on their visit to southern Chad: 
 
(a)  PRM and other donors should support UNHCR's strategy of 
local integration and self-reliance for CAR refugees. 
Refugees are more than willing to work, and only require 
minimal agricultural support.  The donor community, with 
minimal investment, should act now to prevent a protracted 
situation of refugee dependence on international relief. 
 
(b)  PRM agreed with WFP's assessment that food aid can be 
reduced for old caseload refugees in 2006 and possibly ended 
for the Yaroungo population by September 2006 (after the 
harvest), provided agricultural support is sufficient and a 
safety net of targeted feeding remains available for 
vulnerable refugees. 
 
(c)  As for immediate food needs of CAR refugees, additional 
donor contributions are required.  USAID may also wish to 
consider WFP's request to shift some commodities from the 
well-resourced EMOP for Sudanese refugees (full pipeline 
through May) for the under-resourced CAR EMOP. 
 
(d)  UNHCR should develop more detailed contingency plans 
for possible new refugee inflows to southern Chad.  While 
large influxes are thought to be unlikely, even smaller 
inflows of 5,000 - 10,000 will tax UNHCR's current capacity. 
UNHCR should not continue to rely on stocks from eastern 
operations to meet emergency needs in the south. 
 
(e)  UNHCR's current Head of Field Office in Gore is 
departing at the end of 2006.  UNHCR should quickly identify 
a strong manager for Amboko and Gondje operations and should 
also move quickly to fill the new Protection and Field 
Officer posts recently established.   A much stronger UNHCR 
team is required in Gore to ensure effective emergency 
response as well as to implement self-reliance programs for 
CAR refugees. 
 
¶14.  Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
 
WALL 
 
 
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