This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 001615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, DRL, G, INR, S/P, R; LONDON AND 
PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 191395 
 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 1134 
     ¶C. (04) NDJAMENA 1725 
 
Classified By: P/E Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  The United States has important interests 
at stake and a potentially decisive role to play in promoting 
democracy in Chad.  Earlier this year, President Deby 
succeeded in removing presidential term limits in a 
constitutional (but questionable) process, and is now on the 
path to remain President-for-life.  Recent army defections, 
emergence of activity by armed opponents, and dissension 
within the family seem to confirm that if Deby continues in 
power beyond his current mandate, he is setting the stage for 
an unconstitutional and possible violent change in power. 
Such an outcome could be damaging to our interests in the 
Darfur peace process, humanitarian assistance to 200,000 
Sudanese refugees, counter-terrorism efforts, and support for 
transparent oil revenue management.  Setting the stage for a 
peaceful, democratic transition is the desired outcome for 
the next six to eight months.  We believe that encouraging 
Deby to retire is critical and should be the centerpiece of 
our diplomatic strategy.    Specific actions and resources 
that would bolster these efforts include a definitive 
statement against removal of term limits, invitations to 
visit Washington, coordination with France, the EU, and 
like-minded African leaders, election support, and help with 
a face-saving exit strategy.  We should also work to improve 
financial management in Chad, reform its military, and 
strengthen its democratic institutions.  Many Chadians are 
looking to the United States for leadership in promoting 
democratic change.  There is no guarantee that even a 
well-managed transition would avoid upheaval.  But given the 
potential for even more serious instability if we do not take 
action, it is important to take steps to convince Deby to 
manage Chad's next political transition.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The following assessment responds to ref A request 
for a focused democracy promotion strategy.  It identifies 
key areas of democratic deficits (para 5), outlines desired 
outcomes (para 6), presents a six-month strategy (paras 
7-11), identifies specific needs (para 12), discusses major 
impediments (paras 13-16), and considers consequences of a 
reform agenda (para 17). The role of the international 
community is addressed in paras 4, 9, and 11.  The GOC's 
support for democracy promotion is included in the discussion 
of major impediments. 
 
-------- 
Backdrop 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  In refs B and C, we outlined the consequences of the 
removal of presidential term limits in Chad and Deby's likely 
intent to remain in office for life.  Despite his "victory" 
in amending the Constitution, the regime was shaken by the 
low voter turn-out, which revealed the ruling party's 
inability to win the referendum.  Recent military defections 
and the military's refusal to attack the deserters have 
weakened the President's position with the military and among 
his closest family members.  Deby now needs large amounts of 
cash to use in negotiations with military deserters, 
disgruntled family members, and other armed opposition groups 
and to regain lost political ground.  As a result, the 
already-cash strapped government, recently ranked the most 
corrupt in the world by Transparency International, announced 
it is proceeding with the revision of the oil revenue 
management law to increase the amount of money flowing 
directly into Government coffers. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Rumors about the President's poor health circulate 
often.  Talk about upcoming presidential elections are muted 
as the opposition refuses to participate without the revision 
 
of the electoral code and the electoral lists.  Meanwhile, 
military deserters, armed opposition groups in the north and 
east, deserters in the west, and various armed elements along 
Chad's southern border are increasing the regime's need for 
arms to defend itself.  The Government has publicly accused 
neighboring Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels and privately 
mentions Libya's dubious intentions as a key concern.  The 
potential scenarios for change, as outlined in Ref B, are 
unpredictable and likely violent. 
 
------------------------------ 
Overcoming Democratic Deficits 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Key areas of democratic deficits include weak 
institutions such as the ruling party-dominated National 
Assembly; personality and regionally-based opposition 
parties; a barely functioning judicial system susceptible to 
executive interference; a bloated, untrained, unpaid, 
ethnic-based military; poorly educated population; high 
levels of corruption; and lack of respect for human rights 
and rule of law. 
 
---------------- 
Desired Outcomes 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  As we argued over a year ago (ref C), we are 
convinced that our overarching strategy should focus on 
persuading President Deby not to seek a third term and to 
assist in the management of a peaceful, democratic 
transition.  The ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation 
(MPS) Congress, which will nominate its candidate for 
President, may be held in December.  We need to move quickly 
to discourage the President from seeking the nomination and 
instead select another MPS member to run or establish a 
political transition committee to oversee Chad's next 
elections. As outlined in greater detail in the following 
paragraphs, over the next six to eight months, the desired 
outcome would be: 
 
--  convincing Deby not to run for a third term; 
 
In the event that Deby takes himself out of the race, we 
recommend: 
 
--  promotion of political dialogue about the electoral 
process and other issues of national concern to set the stage 
for elections; 
 
--  assistance with electoral support to revise the existing 
electoral list and electoral law; 
 
--  assistance to transform the Chadian military from a 
clan-based to a genuinely national and professional force. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Strategy for Encouraging Deby Not to Seek Third Term 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  We must act immediately to set in motion our 
strategy to persuade Deby not to run for a third term.  For 
this strategy to succeed, the Department, at the highest 
level, must make public statements against the removal of 
term limits and/or seeking additional terms.  Our support for 
Constitutional changes as long as they are done legally has 
ignored the undeniable reality that many democratic 
institutions in African countries are tools of entrenched 
rulers that manipulated them to stay in office for life and 
provide little development to their populations.  We should 
not pretend that the "people", many of whom fear the 
repercussions of opposing undemocratic reforms, accept such 
change because they refuse to participate in a rigged process 
and do not take to the streets in protest. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Several other African countries are in the process 
of or have already changed their constitutions.  We need to 
articulate a strong policy message in favor of alternating 
power as a means of consolidating democratic change in 
Africa.  A speech by Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick followed up with contact with African leaders, 
including Deby by the Under Secretary for Democracy and 
Global Issues, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, and other high-level USG interlocutors could provide 
Ambassadors and Embassy staff the necessary support needed to 
pursue genuine democratic change in Chad and other countries 
facing the same fate.  An invitation to visit Washington is a 
symbolic gesture that Deby has longed for.  An offer to 
receive him should he decide to step down would be an 
incentive for him to make that decision.  We can also remind 
him that he would leave behind an important legacy if he can 
arrange to retire peacefully.  Appealing to his ego is a key 
point of leverage. 
 
¶9.  (C)  A second component of this strategy is developing a 
consensus among allies and other diplomatic missions to 
support our strategy.  Recently relayed French concerns about 
Chad's future prospects may be the beginning of a dialogue 
with the major player here.  A coordinated Washington-Paris 
effort supported by our contacts on the ground would be 
critical to the success of this strategy.  It will also be 
important to mobilize key African leaders, sitting and 
retired, to make the case to Deby for stepping down.  In a 
larger context, we should lobby the African Union to make 
public statements and develop positive and negative sanctions 
to discourage potential Presidents-for-life. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Thirdly, Deby, his family, and his tribe need an 
exit strategy.  Developing post-presidential pursuits for 
Deby could sweeten the pot.  However, he is under 
considerable pressure from his immediate and extended family 
to remain in power for their own protection and perks.  Many 
Zaghawa fear significant reprisals once they are no longer in 
power.  A face-saving exit, perhaps through tacit national 
agreement on a Zaghawa successor acceptable to other ethnic 
leaders may be a potential solution. 
 
¶11.  (C)  We repeatedly hear those around Deby say that his 
fear of reprisal is a key reason he would rather die in 
office than be pursued.  The Chadian political opposition has 
repeatedly said that they would give Deby amnesty for his 
crimes and that he could remain in Chad.  However, the recent 
indictment of former President Hissein Habre by a Belgian 
court and reported statements by Habre's lawyer that Idriss 
Deby is as culpable means that a new Chadian Government would 
not be able to guarantee that Deby could escape international 
prosecution in exchange for stepping down. 
 
--------------------- 
Needs for USG Support 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Should Deby decide to leave or otherwise depart the 
scene prematurely, we must be prepared to support a genuine 
political transition, albeit less-than-perfect and probably 
less-than-democratic.  Deby could decide to groom a ruling 
party member, likely a Zaghawa, to run in his place and then 
attempt to rig the process for his candidate to win.  We 
could help make the process as transparent as possible.  An 
alternative is to recognize that it will not be possible to 
have sound elections before the expiration of the 
presidential mandate and support the appointment of a 
political transition committee.  This committee could be made 
up of the ruling party and its allies, political opposition 
parties, armed opponents, military, technocrats, civil 
society and religious groups that would be headed by someone 
that agrees not to run for office.  This group would oversee 
the next elections and deal with other transitional issues. 
There are various permutations of such a group floating 
around between the opposition camps and the government.  We 
 
would need to be prepared to provide technical assistance to 
support a revision of the electoral lists and electoral law, 
election monitoring, political party assistance, and voter 
education. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Removing Impediments: Improving Financial Management,... 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  Emphasizing the transparent and accountable 
expenditure of Chad's oil revenues as well as other revenues 
is fundamental to ensuring stability of an incoming 
government, which will need funds to function.  Chad was 
recently named the most corrupt country in the world by 
Transparency International.  We are concerned about the 
temptation of looting of the Chadian Treasury and oil 
revenues by an outgoing regime leaving empty coffers for any 
incoming government.  Chad is already on this path.  Deby is 
finding it necessary to make regular "withdrawals" to 
negotiate with his armed opponents and to shore up his base 
with his family and military.  A U.S. Treasury advisor 
recently arrived to assist in strengthening capacity for 
transparent management of oil revenues.  Additional support 
for improving public financial management in concert with the 
World Bank and other partners will be needed. 
 
--------------------------------- 
... Reforming Chad's Military,... 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C)  Democratic change in Chad depends heavily on 
military reform.  We cannot ignore the importance of finding 
ways and means to support the transformation of the Chadian 
military into a downsized, professional, and national force. 
If not, the ethnic-based military will remain an impediment 
to democratic change.  An immediate need is the regular 
payment of salaries, which could provide an immediate 
improvement in the security situation in Chad, not to mention 
boost morale.  We are providing training to one unit of the 
Chadian army under the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism 
Initiative and various IMET programs.  Visits to Chad by 
senior U.S. military officials could help deliver our message 
of support for democratic change in Chad and relay to 
military officials the costs of participating in an irregular 
change in power.  Earlier this year, the Chadian military 
began to take steps to address its problems, conducting an 
internal review of the Army which recommended a number of 
major reforms, including downsizing, which would require the 
de-mobilization of thousands of uneducated, untrained 
soldiers.  We would seek creative ways to fund the 
de-mobilization and re-training of soldiers, such as the 
creation of a separate Ministry of Veteran's Affairs to 
provide services, educational opportunities, training, and 
buy-outs to encourage soldiers to leave the military. 
Without these types of initiatives, it will be impossible to 
downsize and professionalize the military. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
... And Building Democratic Institutions 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U)  We are already providing support to build the 
capacity of the judiciary and the National Assembly through 
the use of Economic Support Funds.  We would like to solicit 
additional ESF funds or visitor exchanges to do additional 
capacity-building.  The fledgling Ministry for Moralization 
and State Control and the Ministry for Human Rights are 
desperate for financial, logistic, and training assistance. 
These ministries are tasked with providing accountability 
within the government and protecting of human rights. 
Support for these ministries could help raise their public 
profile, change negative behaviors, and erode the culture of 
impunity and violence that has become a dominant 
characteristic in the day-to-day lives of Chadians.  We are 
proposing to use TSCTI public diplomacy funding for programs 
 
with these ministries.  Excess USG furniture and equipment 
donations would also assist these officials in carrying out 
their duties. 
 
¶16.  (U)  Likewise, human rights groups remain underfunded 
and limited in their activities.  Human rights associations 
are full of talented and committed individuals, but lack 
mobility, basic office equipment, and resources for programs 
such as providing legal defense for victims of human rights 
abuses.  We will also seek opportunities through visitor 
exchanges and perhaps, educational and training 
opportunities, for human rights groups.  The goal is not only 
to help strengthen the connection between human rights groups 
and the Chadian population, but also to enhance their 
credibility with the government.  Despite this summer's 
arrest of journalists, Chad has a vibrant, free, independent 
press, which we should continue to support.  Our training 
efforts to improve investigative reporting and enhance the 
capacity of the Arabophone press could be funded through 
additional ESF funds. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Consequences: Risks of Promoting Democratic Transition 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶17.  (C)  Convincing Deby not to run is not without risk for 
us.  Although Deby has said that he is tired and has not yet 
officially stated that he is going to run for a third term, 
we still could alienate Deby, the key player in any 
transition scenario.  The Ambassador's Independence Day 
speech emboldened many in Chad hoping for democratic change, 
but Deby reacted harshly.  There is a risk that he would 
similarly view U.S. efforts to convince him to leave power as 
siding with his enemies.  To minimize this risk, we need 
strong backing from Washington and a coordinated message from 
other members of the diplomatic community.  We need to be 
seen giving tangible assistance, not promises, to put Chad on 
the right path forward.  The country has never had a peaceful 
handover of power in its post-independence history.  Its 
chances for doing so now -- and its future as a stable, 
cooperative partner with us on Darfur, refugees, 
counter-terrorism, and oil -- depend on creating the 
conditions for a genuine democratic transition.  We can make 
a difference by our efforts toward encouraging a more 
peaceful, democratic future for Chad. 
WALL 
 
 
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