This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 004866 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF 
STATE PASS AID 
DHS FOR ICE 
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2025 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI PIRACY -- ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
RE: CONOPS TO COMBAT PIRACY OFF THE SOMALIA COAST 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (S) Country Team elements directly engaged in the issue 
of piracy off the Somali coast met to discuss the impact of 
possible interdiction operations in the Somali political, 
clan, and CT context.  We recommend options that mitigate 
any impact on the current Somali political process or on- 
going CT efforts. We believe this can be accomplished 
through the use of appropriate existing authorities under 
international law for the interdiction of piracy on the 
high seas.  We caution against plans that require 
operations against land-based targets, or inside Somali 
territorial waters.  It would be most useful to conduct any 
eventual operations with coalition partners, if possible. 
Appropriate regional states and authorities should be 
briefed prior to operations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S) DCM (then as CDA) chaired a meeting of key 
intelligence, military, security and political officers of 
the Country Team on 16 November 2005 to discuss the 
dramatically increased incidence of hijacking and piracy 
off the Somali coast.  Participants were encouraged by 
ongoing efforts from Coalition Forces Maritime Component 
Command (CFMCC) to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
for the disruption and prevention of further acts of piracy 
in the vicinity of the Somalia coast.  While there appears 
to be clear USG interest in taking action to disrupt and 
eliminate piracy off the Horn of Africa, Post reiterates 
some key points to all involved in the planning and 
execution of potential courses of action.  It is not the 
intention of these recommendations to limit the 
effectiveness of potential planned actions, but only to 
ensure that all precautions are taken to protect USG 
interests in the Horn of Africa. 
 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) The political situation in Somalia can be described 
as fragile, at best.  The individuals and clans engaged 
over the last three years in the creation of Transitional 
Federal Institutions (TFIs) to bring central governance to 
Somalia are now preparing for open warfare among 
themselves.  Neither the TFIs nor their individual members 
can be considered as interlocutors on the subject of 
interdiction or prevention of piracy.  None are in control 
of more than a portion of Somali national territory, and no 
one individual or group is able to impose order on the 
nearly 2,000 km-long Somali coastline. 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF POTENTIAL 
USG ACTIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Post strongly urges that any possible plans of 
Coalition and U.S. action be formulated with the clear 
objective of maintaining the current USG position of 
neutrality in relation to both the TFI stalemate and the 
complex web of Somali clan alliances and antagonisms.  In 
this context, direct USG action against land targets 
(camps, beached boats, people) is likely to be problematic. 
Such action would be extremely difficult to target on 
actual perpetrators, and could easily result in collateral 
damage to members of the general population. 
 
¶5. (S) The USG has sought to maintain a delicate balance in 
our relations with all non-extremist factions and 
individuals, focusing on a return of governance as the most 
important outcome to support our CT efforts in the Horn of 
Africa.  All effort should be made to ensure that USG anti- 
piracy actions do not in fact catalyze further conflict 
among the parties to this tense stalemate.  Direct action 
against Somali territory, especially if civilian casualties 
result from it, could spark a nationalistic backlash. 
Possible negative consequences for us could include the 
loss of cooperation within Somalia among individual 
partners in our CT efforts, as well as increased activism 
among, and legitimacy for, Islamist or Jihadist extremists. 
 
¶6.  (S) It is noteworthy that individual members of the 
TFIs, including the titular "Transitional Federal 
President", Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and "Prime Minister", 
Ali Mohamed Ghedi, have issued public requests for 
assistance against piracy in international waters off 
Somalia's coast.  Requests from individuals holding these 
titles and positions could be seen as providing 
justification for USG action on Somali territory.  This is 
not the case; in reality, such requests are inevitably seen 
as one faction attempting to impose itself as the sole 
representative of the TFIs.  Accordingly, such a request by 
one faction of the TFIs can and will be perceived by other 
factions -- and possibly by Islamist and Jihadist 
extremists -- as counter to their interests.  To act on the 
request would only serve to place the USG with one side or 
the other in their conflicts.  Lastly, we must also 
consider potential retaliation for USG action that might be 
taken against ships crews, among them nationals of USG 
allies, currently held onboard pirated ships. 
SEEK LEGITIMACY IN EXISTING 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Post encourages planning agencies and commands to 
pursue an outcome of any USG action that can be perceived 
by the people of Somalia and the international community as 
an action taken against international piracy and not 
against the Somali people.  Existing international laws 
should provide ample justification for intervention of 
coalition forces in international waters against 
perpetrators of piracy.  We remind agencies and commands 
that Somalia's status as the world's quintessential "failed 
state" is defined as an absence of central governance, not 
as a removal of international protections of territorial 
sovereignty.  We therefore recommend that every effort be 
made to avoid action within Somali territorial waters, in 
order to reduce accusations of a "U.S. versus Somalia" 
policy.  If action within Somalia's territory or 
territorial waters is deemed indispensable to the success 
of our mission, or to protect U.S. assets or personnel, we 
strongly urge that the concerns in Para. 5 above be 
factored into our planning and that such action be 
considered on only a case-by-case basis. 
 
¶8. (S) We think it would be useful to conduct such 
operations with coalition partners if possible.  This might 
even include elements of the Kenyan Navy if they could be 
operationalized.  The political optics of an international 
coalition to combat piracy are better than those of a U.S. 
unilateral operation.  (Our Kenyan interlocutors, for 
example, would strongly support anti-piracy action in 
Somalia, provided it is perceived as a 
multinational/coalition operation.)  We should plan to 
brief other regional states and authorities prior to the 
conduct of operations in the expectation that they too 
would support or endorse action to combat piracy. 
 
BELLAMY