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RUCJBBA/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHRMAAE/SOCCENT FWD BAHRAIN PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025 
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR PGOV PREL PINS KISL KE
SUBJECT: COASTAL SECURITY KEY TO KENYAN COUNTER-TERRORISM 
EFFORTS 
 
REF: NAIROBI 0873 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Members of post,s Coastal Security 
Working Group discussed the security situation and options 
for engagement with law enforcement and local leaders during 
a three-day visit to Lamu. The U.S. Navy Special Warfare 
training program in Lamu is progressing well, and post is 
looking into other options to build on their success and 
further security along the coast up to the Somali border. 
Efforts will need to encourge increased cooperation among the 
Kenya Police, the Navy and the Wildlife Service to improve 
effectiveness of coastal patrols.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Navy Training Program Producing Results 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  POLOFF traveled to Lamu November 2-5 with CJTF-HOA 
Civil Affairs (CA) team and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 
Deputy Program Manager to look at coastal security issues and 
explore avenues for engagement.  Post,s Coastal Security 
Working Group (CSWG) views the waters from Lamu to the Somali 
border at Kiunga as vital to our counter-terrorism efforts in 
Kenya, and as such are looking at a multi-tracked approach to 
enhancing Kenya,s capacity to patrol these waters.  The most 
robust effort presently remains Maritime Operations (MAROPS) 
training conducted by U.S. Navy Special Warfare personnel out 
of Manda Bay Navy Base.  (NOTE: The 10th cycle of the MAROPS 
course was completed on November 2nd.  The course 
incorporated students from the Kenyan Navy, Kenya Police, 
Administrative Police and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS); 15 
students successfully completed the course.  During the final 
maritime interdiction operations, the students successfully 
boarded 27 boats, confiscated two dhows and arrested eight 
people smuggling endangered species.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3.  (C)  POLOFF and ATA officer met with the Commander of the 
U.S. Navy Special Warfare Unit contingent at Manda Bay.  He 
assessed their presence on the waters has contributed to 
security by deterring possible arms smugglers, drug runners 
or terrorists.  Although the Kenyan Navy has not detected any 
of this type of activity during their training or boardings, 
their increased presence, backed by the U.S. Naval presence, 
is known and felt throughout the area.  (NOTE: The MAROPS 
students have had at least two successful boardings over the 
past six months, which led to the arrest of illegal 
turtle-meat smugglers.  These arrests were publicized in the 
media.  END NOTE). The commander noted that the addition of 
the Kenya Police, Administrative Police and KWS to the 
training has contributed to strengthening the necessary 
inter-agency cooperation on coastal security. Because the 
Kenya Navy does not have arrest authority, it is key to 
incorporate the two police agencies and KWS into maritime 
patrols. 
 
---------------------------- 
Kiunga: Key to Securing Kenya 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  The group attempted to travel to Kiunga by boat on 
November 4, but was unsuccessful due to abnormally low tides. 
 Kiunga is completely isolated from the rest of Kenya, both 
economically and socially.  The road from Kiunga to Lamu is 
un-drivable during the rainy season, and even newspapers are 
hard to come by.  There are two water routes from Lamu to 
Kiunga, one through the channels, and one through open ocean 
waters. From town, during high tides, the journey would take 
approximately two hours by speedboat along the channels plus 
one hour by road.  The boat operators in Lamu do not feel 
comfortable traveling through the open waters and readily 
admit there is no security closer to the Somali border. 
Emboffs were able to find a speedboat operator to take us as 
far as Mkokoni, approximately a 40 minute drive from Kiunga. 
Once we passed the outlying Pate Island, boat traffic reduced 
drastically.  In fact, we did not pass any other boats after 
Kiwaihu Bay, approximately halfway between Lamu Town and 
Kiunga. Just a few miles south of Mkokoni, extremely low 
tides forced emboffs to turn back.  (COMMENT: The ordeal of 
finding a boat operator comfortable with taking us north of 
Mkokoni highlighted the need for increased security presence 
in these waters.  Cost was not even the issue, as Lamu 
residents readily admit they were nervous about banditry and 
&bad guys8 in the northern-most tip of the Kenyan coast. 
END COMMENT). 
 
¶5.  (C)  Chairman of the Lamu chapter of the Supreme Council 
of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) and a private contractor working 
closely with CA team, Aboud Abu Bakaar, spoke openly about 
the insecurity in and around Kiunga.  He said he did not tell 
anyone of his plans when he traveled there in the past with 
CA teams because of fears that someone would send word to 
their &Somali associates8 in Kiunga, who could create 
trouble for the Americans. He said the 12 kilometers between 
Kiunga and the Somali border are completely unpatrolled, and 
he would not advise moving through those areas without armed 
security.  The Somali community crosses the border virtually 
unchecked; most have relatives that reside on the Kenya side 
of the border. Abu Bakaar assessed that the majority of 
terrorist-related activities that occur in Kenya are 
supported by Somalis who come through Kiunga either by boat 
or road and move freely into Lamu Town and beyond.  (COMMENT: 
There are just four official border crossing points along the 
entire 862 kilometer Somali-Kenya border: Mandera, Liboi, El 
Wak and Kiunga. POLOFF visited the Liboi border in June. 
Somalis cross this border without trouble, choosing whether 
or not to register at the immigration office in town, a 
20-minute drive from the border.  Abu Bakaar described the 
exact same scenario for the Kiunga crossing.  END COMMENT.) 
 
------------------------------ 
Police Face Security Challenges 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) POLOFF and ATA officer called on the new Officer 
Commanding Police Divison (OCPD), John Kamau, in Lamu Town to 
discuss security issues. Kamau replace Mohamed Yerow (reftel) 
on September 26.  Unlike his predecessor, Kamau openly admit 
the security challenges he faces, particularly in Kiunga and 
in the waters.  Kamau said he believes the terrorist threat 
in Kenya is both high and credible, worrying that, with the 
upcoming anniversary of the November 2002 Kikambala bombing, 
&these guys8 might want to remind us of their presence. He 
said Lamu, in particular, is fertile ground for terrorists to 
operate.  He highlighted the challenge of border security, 
saying he has no partner to work with on the Somali side of 
the Kiunga border, as it is run by militia. He stressed the 
need for a controllable road from Kiunga in order to be able 
to increase inland patrols.   As for the waters, drugs, 
piracy, arms trafficking and terrorist movement are the main 
issues.  He believed terrorists use Kiunga as their major 
transit point and Lamu for their planning. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Complicating matters are the local Sheikhs, who 
Kamau accused of working against the police by &pulling the 
religious card8 whenever the Police (or the Kenya Navy, 
backed by U.S. Navy) make progress in investigations, arrests 
or detentions. As has happened in the past when the MAROPS 
students successfully arrested turtle-meat smugglers, Kamau 
said the Sheikhs attempt to distract Lamu residents from the 
issues of terrorism by whipping up local sentiment and 
accusing the Police (or &U.S. Marines8) of harassing 
Muslims.  Kamau admitted he will have trouble working closely 
with the Sheikhs as he is not Muslim, but he has Muslim 
police officers under his command who will continue to work 
with the religious leaders. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Kamau said his biggest need is boats to patrol the 
waters. The Lamu Police have two boats, but one is completely 
broken and the other is in bad shape.  Kamau has to ask the 
Kenya Airports Authority or KWS to loan him boats if he needs 
to respond to a threat or situation in the water.  Kamau said 
that without working boats, it is impossible to do the job of 
the police in Lamu.  Although he admits the police will not 
have the capacity to adequately patrol all the waters, it is 
key to have their presence felt by at least putting a few 
boats out in the water to be seen by all.  He firmly believes 
that deterrence is the key, and coastal patrols will 
contribute greatly to this. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Another of Kamau,s goals as new OCPD is to work 
more closely with the other security elements in Lamu. 
Currently, the police and military cannot communicate as they 
do not have compatible radios.  Kamau wants to build a 
cohesive team with the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), 
Central Investigation Department (CID) and KWS, but he has 
had trouble coordinating efforts with the Navy and Fisheries 
Department. He appealed to us to help empower the police, 
saying the Navy cannot effectively patrol the water on their 
own, especially as the police are the ones with arrest 
authority. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  COMMENT:  Two conclusions were glaringly clear from 
this visit.  FIRST: There is still vast amounts of work to be 
done on coastal security; Kenyan inter-agency cooperation is 
the key to success. The Manda Bay model of their most recent 
MAROPS course, incorporating the Navy, Police and KWS into 
one class, should be the example for future training.  No one 
agency can do it on their own, and each clearly sees coastal 
security as a top priority. The new OCPD is serious about 
combating terrorism and should be a good partner.  Unlike his 
predecessor, who sugar-coated the security situation and did 
not address anything of real substance with POLOFF, Kamau is 
well-versed, intelligent, and takes this position seriously. 
 
¶11.  (C)  COMMENT (CONTINUED):  SECOND:  Kiunga is a vital 
area for both coastal and border security. Poor, 
disenfranchised and conservative, with a large Somali 
community that moves freely across the border, residents in 
Kiunga are susceptible to outsiders who could exploit their 
isolation. We do not have a current foothold in Kiunga.  The 
CA teams are beginning to look at engagement in the area, 
which will greatly enhance access in the near term, and 
hopefully security in the longer term. Kiunga will present 
new challenges for us, particularly because of its geographic 
isolation, but the opportunities to further Post,s Muslim 
outreach efforts and enhance security are considerable.   END 
COMMENT. 
ROWE