This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004762 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025 
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR KPKO SU SLM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S NAIROBI MEETING WITH 
AU ENVOY SALIM (NAIROBI, SAFARI PARK HOTEL, NOVEMBER 8, 
2005) 
 
Classified By: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Zoellick met with AU Special 
Envoy Salim Salim at the start of a day of meetings intended 
to address the rift within the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM).  The Deputy Secretary and Mediator agreed that the 
international community should act together to encourage the 
SLM to achieve a common negotiating team.  Salim anticipated 
three potential scenarios: re-unification of the SLM, 
agreement between the different factions to adopt a common 
negotiating strategy, or establishment of two distinct 
organizations.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) PARTICIPANTS: 
USG: 
Deputy Secretary Zoellick 
A/S Jendayi Frazer 
NSC Cindy Courville 
NSC Mike Gerson 
D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla 
Amb. John Yates 
D Special Assistant Taiya Smith 
Embassy Notetaker Lisa Peterson 
 
AFRICAN UNION: 
Dr. Salim Salim, Special Envoy 
Amb. Baba Gana Kingibe, Special Representative 
Amb. Christophe Liundi, Assistant to Salim 
(one additional support person not identified) 
 
¶3. (C) Zoellick expressed concern about the divisions within 
the SLM and ongoing violations of the cease-fire, which he 
thought could be an indication of break-down in command and 
control within the SLM.  He emphasized that the SLM could not 
win militarily, and its divisions were providing an 
opportunity for the government to manipulate the peace talks. 
 Salim agreed, saying the government could attend the talks 
in Abuja and appear cooperative because the SLM were creating 
the major obstacles in the talks. 
 
¶4. (C) Zoellick noted a recent sense that the balance of 
power was shifting within the SLM, with Minni appearing more 
successful.  However, given the collective nature of the SLM 
leadership, even Minni's position was somewhat fragile. 
Salim was not surprised that Minni had been able to draw in a 
large number of participants to his recent conference because 
Abdulwahid had effectively driven away a number of his 
commanders with his stubborn insistence that he remains the 
chairman.  In the interest of stability, it is important to 
take both factions seriously.  Kingibe cautioned against 
attributing too much success to Minni's recent initiative. 
Many of Darfur's smaller tribes, he said, have serious 
reservations about Minni. 
 
¶5. (C) Zoellick said the international community must work 
together to push the SLM to unify, respect the cease-fire, 
and issue a short written statement publicly committing 
themselves to these actions.  As a carrot, the U.S. would be 
prepared to help with the negotiations if the SLM could 
achieve these steps.  If not, a stick would be loss of 
international support and, potentially, targeting the rebels 
with existing UN sanctions.  Salim noted that the 
international partners, working seriously together, could 
make a difference to the success or failure of the peace 
process.  The Declaration of Principles had been successfully 
negotiated in part because there was a common position among 
the international players. 
 
¶6. (C) Salim described three possible scenarios for 
developments within the SLM: 1.) the SLM unites and re-enters 
negotiations as a single entity; 2.) the SLM does not unite, 
but is able to establish a common negotiating position; or 
3.) two separate SLMs come to the next round of negotiations. 
 Whatever the outcome, Salim said those negotiating need to 
be truly representative of the people of Darfur and be 
capable of producing action on the ground. 
 
¶7. (C) Kingibe said he thought the Khartoum government was 
not psychologically prepared to understand the need to move 
forward with the Darfur negotiations.  He said government 
forces are now working more brazenly with their allied 
militias.  He also expressed concern about the potential for 
the current conflict to spill over into Chad.  In response to 
the placement of helicopter gunships at the airport at El 
Geneina, the Chadian Government has moved its forces to 
prevent any kind of move from Sudan that could lead to the 
fall of Abeche.  Each side, he said, suspects the other of 
providing succor to its rebels. 
 
¶8. (C) Kingibe noted a need to emphasize the AU Mission in 
Sudan's (AMIS) right of free passage in Darfur.  Minni has 
repeatedly stated that he never agreed to an AMIS presence 
and therefore is not obligated to respect the terms of its 
deployment.  This has contributed to maverick behavior on the 
part of the rebels. 
 
¶9. (C) Zoellick inquired about the AU's mandate in Darfur and 
whether it needs to be expanded.  He asked about the 
possibility of NATO providing planning support, or linking up 
the southern peacekeeping operation with the AU mission. 
Kingibe thought the current mandate was sufficient, although 
it could be amended to specifically include protection 
responsibilities.  Zoellick assured him that, if he felt a 
stronger mandate were necessary, the U.S. would support such 
a call.  In terms of linking AMIS and UNMIS, Kingibe thought 
it best to keep the two operations separate, establishing an 
end state for the AMIS operation, providing for a degree of 
interface between the two operations, and ultimately handing 
the operation over to UNMIS. 
 
ROWE