This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004559 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PM/RSAT FOR BERNETA LEE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2025 
TAGS: MARR PTER MASS PREL KE
SUBJECT: KENYA PURSUING PURCHASE OF F5'S FROM SAUDI ARABIA 
 
REF: A. A) 04 SECSTATE 206331 
     ¶B. B) NAIROBI 4428 C) NAIROBI 4462 
 
Classified By: POL/C Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Post has received Kenyan End-Use Monitoring 
(EUM) Assurances for a pending purchase of 14 used F-5 
aircraft from Saudi Arabia.  In separate meetings with the 
Permanent Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, 
Ambassador and DCM addressed concerns surrounding the 
impending purchase, particularly inappropriateness of 
fighters in countering the primary threat (terrorism) that 
Kenya faces; possible corruption in the sale; the drain on 
Kenyan military budgets; and the opportunity costs likely to 
be incurred by the U.S. in helping maintain them -- assuming, 
that is, that FMF and IMET are re-established if/when Kenya 
signs an Article 98 agreement. 
 
¶2. (C)  Despite our misgivings, we recognize that this is a 
sovereign decision, one which the Kenyans appear to have 
weighed with some care.  We do not believe it is in our 
interest to oppose this purchase.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------- 
A Long Time In The Making 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The GOK first proposed this purchase in 2004.  In 
November of 2004, Poloff gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) a list of assurances required before the sale could be 
consummated (ref. A).  In March 2005, Post received and 
forwarded to the Department a diplomatic note accompanied by 
a signed agreement for end-use, retransfer, and security 
assurances for 10 F-5E aircraft and four F-5F aircraft from 
Saudi Arabia to Kenya.  This agreement (which was dated 28 
December 2004), was signed by a former P.S. of KDOD, Sammy 
P.M. Kyungu.  Mr. Kyungu was not the P.S. of KDOD at the time 
Post actually received the agreement, and thus Post requested 
another copy of the agreement signed by the current P.S. 
Almost seven months later, Post received another diplomatic 
note (dated October 18, 2005) and signed agreement for 
end-use, retransfer, and security assurances for the 10 F-5E 
aircraft and four F-5F aircraft (refs A and B).  This 
agreement was signed by the current Permanent Secretary 
(P.S.) of the Kenyan Department of Defence (KDOD), Zachary N. 
Mwaura (he signed the agreement on 7 October, 2005).  (Note: 
This final agreement incorporated the exact text Poloff 
originally left with the MFA on November 1, 2004.  End note.) 
 The MFA and KDOD called Post several times the week of 
October 24 asking the USG to provide the End User 
Certificates to Saudi Arabia so they can conclude this 
purchase. 
 
-------------------- 
Voicing Our Concerns 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Several contentious issues surround this purchase. 
First, post does not believe these aircraft respond to the 
threat.  F5s are not the most appropriate aircraft to serve 
as an air defense/deterrent capability, and Kenya would be 
better off investing the money in either reconnaissance or 
helicopter lift assets.  Second, there is concern that the 
original deal may be marred by corruption.  The KDOD P.S. who 
provided the original set of assurances was sacked in an 
anti-corruption shake-up and was implicated in corrupt 
security-related procurement. Additionally, KDOD,s budget is 
already experiencing negative growth, and the cost for this 
aircraft could reach as much as $31 million, according to 
local press reports.  Lastly, the opportunity costs are too 
high.  Post is concerned that KDOD will be forced to seek to 
use significant amounts of future U.S. FMF authorizations to 
maintain this expanded fleet of F5s -- assuming, that is, 
that Kenya signs an Article 98 agreement and FMF assistance 
once again becomes available (ref C) -- which could be used 
more wisely. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador and Poloff (note-taker) called on the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ambassador Boaz Mbaya, October 31 to discuss Kenya,s plans 
to purchase the 14 F5 aircraft from Saudi Arabia. Ambassador 
voiced his concerns about this purchase, asking the following 
questions: 1) How do these aircraft meet the border security 
challenges facing Kenya? 2) Is the GOK aware that without an 
Article 98 agreement, future FMF will not be available to 
assist in maintaining and equipping these aircraft? and 3) 
Can Kenya ensure this is a transparent and uncorrupt deal? 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to the first question, Mbaya explained 
that Kenya lives in a volatile environment, with Ethiopia and 
Eritrea to the north, and Sudan and Somalia on either side. 
While Kenya is not preparing for war, he said it is in their 
national interest to be prepared for any threat to their 
national security from these bordering countries.  He assured 
the Ambassador that corruption is not an issue and that 
nobody in the Kenyan Government wants another Anglo 
Leasing-type scandal on their hands.  He said the current F5 
fleet is old and must be replaced.  He understood the 
implications of not signing an Article 98 agreement, and that 
FMF (and IMET) cuts will impact this purchase, should Kenya 
seek assistance in maintaining and equipping the aircraft as 
well as training for pilots.  He added he hoped the 
Ambassador could convince the USG to grant Saudi Arabia the 
end user certificates and allow Kenya to pursue their 
national interests. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Simultaneously, DCM, accompanied by Deputy Chief of 
KUSLO and Poloff (note-taker), called on KDOD P.S. Zachary 
Mwaura to discuss the same issue. KDOD Vice Chief of the 
General Staff, LtGen J. W. Karangi, was also in attendance. 
DCM inquired how the F5s fit into Kenya,s defense strategy 
and why they are looking at buying these particular aircraft. 
She also asked about the long-term plan to keep the aircraft 
equipped and maintained, explaining that FMF funding will not 
be available to assist due to the Article 98 situation. 
Deputy Chief KUSLO suggested the money could be better used 
for other aircraft, such as lift asset aircraft.  Karangi 
responded rather defensively that both aircraft are part of 
the GOK's military plan but that the F5 purchase is a higher 
priority. 
 
¶7.  (C) Mwaura, who just returned from Saudi Arabia, 
explained that the current fleet of F5s is deteriorating, and 
KDOD wants to replace the fleet with the same aircraft the 
country has been operating for a number of years. Karangi 
said the F5s would maintain the status quo; they are not 
seeking to change their capacity.  The issue of financing for 
spare parts and maintenance raised some concern, with both 
Mwaura and Karangi saying they did not see the connection 
between Article 98 and this purchase.  The DCM explained the 
issue further, noting that spare parts and maintenance are 
costly, and the U.S. will not be able to assist until an 
Article 98 agreement is signed.  Mwaura stated that even 
without assistance, Kenya will still have to defend its 
borders, and therefore will find a way to purchase the parts. 
Karangi added "There is a price to pay for national 
security.8  DCM asked Mwaura if there was any update on the 
possible signing of an Article 98 agreement.  Mwaura 
responded negatively, saying it was now "a political matter." 
 Both officials took the opportunity to say that they did not 
see why an Article 98 agreement was necessary since there is 
already a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) protecting U.S. 
military personnel stationed in Kenya. DCM responded that an 
Article 98 agreement is broader and provides protection to 
civilian as well as military personnel. 
 
¶8.  (C) The DCM wrapped up the meeting by explaining that the 
Saudi government will need to resubmit their request for 
end-use certificates to the USG because the case had already 
been closed due to a lack of response from Kenya. (NOTE: The 
MFA did not send their end user agreements to Post until 
after March 1, at which point the DPM/RSAT already responded 
to Saudi Arabia with &Returned without Action.8 END NOTE.) 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT:  Despite the concerns surrounding this 
purchase, it is not our place to stop it.  This purchase is 
not the best use of scarce military monies, but the Kenyans 
have made it clear they plan to go forward with the deal. 
Withholding end user certificates would not benefit our 
bilateral relationship with Kenya.  We practiced due 
diligence by insisting the deal be transparent and explaining 
we will not be able to assist in future costs associated with 
the purchase until an Article 98 agreement is signed.  END 
COMMENT. 
BELLAMY