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Viewing cable 05MUMBAI2251, SHIV SENA ROCKED BY RAJ THACKERAY'S RESIGNATION AS PARTY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05MUMBAI2251 2005-11-28 08:59 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Mumbai
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 002251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IN
SUBJECT: SHIV SENA ROCKED BY RAJ THACKERAY'S RESIGNATION AS PARTY 
FACES UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
 
REF: A:  MUMBAI 2199;  B:  MUMBAI 2222 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Raj Thackeray, nephew of Shiv Sena founder Bal 
Thackeray, rocked the Mumbai political establishment on November 
27 by announcing his resignation from all Shiv Sena party 
leadership posts over differences with his cousin and party 
executive president Uddhav Thackeray.  Raj's announcement came 
in the wake of Shiv Sena's colossally poor showing against 
former Shiv Sena leader Narayan Rane in the November 19 Malvan 
by-election.  The humiliating Malvan loss to Rane, who defected 
to the rival Congress Party, appeared to have exacerbated the 
long-standing rivalry between Raj and his cousin Uddhav and has 
led to a full-fledged public leadership crisis.  The open fight 
among the party's leaders and the election loss has highlighted 
the challenges facing Shiv Sena and which threaten its relevancy 
in Maharashtra.  Shiv Sena also faces the possibility of more 
defections to the Congress Party.  Long-term political and 
demographic shifts further threaten the party's prospects as a 
political force in a changing Mumbai.  Finally, Shiv Sena's 
ineffectual record in office, both in Mumbai and the state 
government, has left supporters disillusioned with the party. 
End Summary. 
 
LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE BETWEEN THACKERAYS BREAKS OUT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2.  (SBU) Raj Thackeray's resignation from his Shiv Sena 
leadership posts, as chief of the party's campus wing (the 
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Sena) and his position on the national 
working committee, on November 27 rocked the party.  The move 
has instigated a publicly fought leadership battle between Raj 
and his cousin, party executive president Uddhav Thackeray.  In 
a fiery resignation speech, given in front of a large crowd of 
supporters, Raj attacked Uddhav's leadership and questioned his 
ability to rally supporters to the party's cause.  Raj did not 
quit the party itself, leaving open the possibility that he 
planned to challenge Uddhav for Shiv Sena's leadership.  These 
moves came in the wake of the November 19 Malvan by-election 
loss, in which Shiv Sena's candidate was beaten badly by former 
party leader Narayan Rane.  Claiming he had been pushed aside in 
recent elections, Raj blamed the poor election showing on Uddhav 
and the current Shiv Sena leadership.  This open dissension 
among the Shiv Sena leadership, along with the fallout from the 
recent election loss, threatened to split the party and could 
accelerate the ultimate implosion of Shiv Sena. 
 
3.  (SBU) The leadership crisis is not unexpected.  The rivalry 
between Raj and Uddhav had been a long-simmering source of 
dissension within Shiv Sena.  Party founder Bal Thackeray, 
Uddhav's father and Raj's uncle, has dominated Shiv Sena since 
its founding in 1966.  With a charismatic personality and florid 
rhetorical style, not to mention a keen sense of the dramatic, 
Thackeray was able to maintain the unquestioned loyalty of his 
Shiv Sainiks ("Soldiers of Shiva") until recently.  Advancing 
age and ill health have limited his day-to-day involvement in 
decision-making and party activities in recent years and he 
ceded nearly all day-to-day authority to Uddhav.  Raj, however, 
had long hoped to take up his uncle's mantle as party leader. 
 
4.  (SBU) As party leader, Uddhav appears to have neither his 
father's charismatic appeal nor his organizational skills. 
Several political observers, including Mumbai University 
Politics Professor Uttara Sahasrabuddhe and Mumbai Mirror news 
editor Vaibhav Purandare, told poloff that Uddhav was not 
well-loved among Shiv Sena's political organization or its core 
voters and could not count on their support over the long-term. 
Purandare stated that many Shiv Sena members viewed Uddhav as 
inflexible, incompetent and incapable of holding his father's 
supporters together.  Raj, however, has captured the support of 
many among the Shiv Sainik rank-and-file.  Raj bears an uncanny 
physical resemblance to his uncle and has emulated his 
rhetorical and sartorial style.  Raj's leadership style is also 
more emotional, and many in Shiv Sena appear to prefer it to 
Uddhav's more business-like management approach.  At one time, 
Raj was seen as the most likely inheritor of Shiv Sena's 
leadership.  Bal, however, largely relegated Raj to the 
sidelines in favor of Uddhav. 
5.  (SBU) The conventional wisdom had been that a final 
resolution of this leadership contest awaited Bal's final 
passing.  Following the Malvan loss, which has raised doubts 
about Uddhav's ability to contest elections, however, Raj and 
his supporters now appeared ready to move the leadership issue 
to the forefront.  Purandare told poloff that Raj would probably 
win over the party's loyalists against Uddhav in the long-run. 
Most local political observers, however, have noted that neither 
Raj nor Uddhav was likely to solve the party's problems. 
Purandare described Raj as a poor organizer without a vision for 
the party's direction who preferred spending late nights in 
local clubs to putting in long days at the office.  "Imitation 
of Bal," argued Purandare, "won't get Raj far" toward saving the 
party. 
 
6.  (SBU) Beyond Uddhav and Raj, however, Shiv Sena appeared to 
have no strong leadership alternatives.  Bal's leadership style 
brooked little challenge to his authority and he often pushed 
rising popular leaders, such as Chhagan Bhujbal, out before they 
could challenge him.  Former state Chief Minister Manohar Joshi 
has been largely relegated to a supporting role.  Bal's failure 
to develop younger leaders or even mid-level party managers left 
a void in the party organization and weakened its long-term 
prospects. 
 
BY-ELECTION LOSS MAY SIGNIFY LONG-TERM PROBLEMS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7.  (SBU) Former Shiv Sena leader Narayan Rane's huge victory 
over his Shiv Sena opponent in the November 19 Malvan district 
by-election race for the state parliament (reftels), appeared to 
have precipitated this latest fight over the direction of the 
party.  Rane, who served as state Chief Minister in 1999, bolted 
Shiv Sena last summer in an acrimonious dispute over the party's 
leadership before joining the rival Congress Party as Revenue 
Minister in the ruling Congress-NCP state coalition government. 
The loss of this one seat means little for the balance of power 
in the state parliament, but has already proven significant in 
reshaping Shiv Sena's leadership and may redraw the political 
landscape in Maharashtra.  The colossal margin of Rane's win (he 
took almost eighty-four percent of the vote) and Shiv Sena's 
complete ineffectiveness in rallying party loyalists following 
an all-out campaign to beat their one-time colleague has led 
many local pundits and politicians to doubt the long-term 
viability of the party.  Many in the media here see the loss and 
resulting fall-out, including Raj's recent moves, as symptomatic 
of chronic underlying problems that have been festering for some 
time.  The win particularly represented a personal embarrassment 
to Bal and Uddhav, who treated Rane's resignation and reelection 
campaign as public challenges to their authority and legitimacy 
as party leaders. 
 
KONKAN MAY BE LOST, MORE DEFECTIONS POSSIBLE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) In the midst of this leadership crisis, Shiv Sena is 
struggling publicly and privately with a number of other 
significant problems.  The party now faces the prospect of a 
collapse of support in the rest of its former stronghold Konkan 
region, additional defections by legislators as well as members 
of the rank and file, and uncontrollable demographic and 
political/cultural shifts that will weaken the party's local 
power base.  Any one of these problems may prove fatal to the 
party. 
 
9.  (SBU) The Malvan by-election loss may signify a collapse of 
party support in the western coastal region of the Konkan, where 
the district is located.  Rane had long served as the face of 
the party in the region and had cultivated strong ties among a 
broad range of supporters through extensive local patronage 
efforts.  Few of Shiv Sena's current leaders have reliable 
contacts in the region, and Rane's win, dominance of Konkan 
politics, and prominent position in the current Congress-NCP 
state government will make it difficult for Shiv Sena to 
maintain its control over the area, which had been considered an 
impregnable Shiv Sena bastion just six months ago. 
 
10.  (SBU) Three Rane supporters resigned their Shiv Sena 
membership and state parliament seats in October in support of 
Rane.  Rane, both before and after his election victory, told 
local press that several other state Shiv Sena legislators were 
preparing to jump onto his new Congress party bandwagon.  Local 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lobbyist Kishor Joshi told poloff 
that some Shiv Sena corporators in the Mumbai city government 
could also resign.  If true, this might be the strongest 
indication that the rank and file has lost confidence in the 
party's leadership and its prospects for contesting future 
elections in Maharashtra. 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS, DECLINING APPEAL OF HINDUTVA SHIFTING THE GROUND 
UNDER THE FEET OF THE SONS OF THE SOIL 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Broader political and cultural shifts, as well as 
changing local demographics, represent the greatest threat to 
Shiv Sena's long-term relevance as a political movement in 
Maharashtra.  Shiv Sena's most significant electoral success 
came in the 1995 Maharashtra state parliament elections, in part 
through its successful exploitation of the Hindutva (Hindu 
nationalism) movement, in coalition with the BJP, following 
Hindu-Muslim communal violence in Mumbai in the early 1990's. 
The late 1990's, however, represented the apex of Hindutva's 
appeal to voters in Maharashtra, as the BJP-Shiv Sena coalition 
was voted out of office in 1999 and has not won a state-wide 
election here since.  Hindu nationalism appeared to have taken a 
backseat to development issues in the minds of voters.  Local 
BJP politician Ashish Shelar told poloff that the Maharashtra 
branch of his party "no longer talked about Hindutva that much," 
as economic and development issues played better with the 
electorate and noted that his party's leadership was debating 
whether to further distance itself from Hindutva.  Without 
galvanizing events such as the 1992-3 Mumbai communal riots, 
Hindutva's ability to draw supporters will continue to be 
limited, according to Nehru Center Director Satish Sahney. 
 
12.  (SBU) Even worse for Shiv Sena, the "Sons of the Soil" 
movement of Marathi speakers, the original driving force behind 
party's creation, appeared to be losing ground to demographic 
shifts.  In 1966, when Shiv Sena was founded in part to respond 
to the perceived economic and social threat of newly arrived 
migrants to Mumbai, Marathi speakers made up about forty percent 
of the city's residents.  By the end of the Twentieth Century, 
that percentage had fallen.  Media reports have indicated that 
recent moves to re-draw city and state electoral districts 
threatened to swing power from the Marathi-dominated urban areas 
to the suburban areas where more of the recent migrants live. 
Depending on how the lines are redrawn, Shiv Sena could have 
trouble contesting local elections as the number of districts 
where it is competitive are reduced and newer arrivals to the 
city dominate the new districts.  Each year, more "foreign" 
migrants from the rest of India arrive in the city, making it 
increasingly difficult for Shiv Sena to keep up with other 
broader-based parties. 
 
VOTERS SOURED BY MISMANAGEMENT AND INEFFECTIVENESS IN OFFICE 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) In discussions about Shiv Sena's prospects, several 
local political observers told poloff that many voters had been 
turned off Shiv Sena by its recent performance in office.  The 
1995-1999 BJP-Shiv Sena state government was largely 
ineffectual, with changing the city's name (from Bombay to 
Mumbai) and building several city road interchanges in Mumbai 
its most significant accomplishments, according to Mumbai 
University Politics Professor Uttara Sahasrabuddhe.  Purandare 
stated that, although Shiv Sena had campaigned in part on a 
clean government platform, its officials in office have engaged 
in the same sort of corrupt practices as other parties' 
officials.  Sahasrabuddhe pointed out that devastating recent 
floods in Mumbai, where Shiv Sena has dominated the government 
for much of the past two decades, are widely seen as having been 
caused in part by poor municipal planning and badly maintained 
sewers and infrastructure. 
 
SHIV SENA'S ELECTION PROSPECTS IN DOUBT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (SBU) In the face of these serious problems, many local 
political observers question whether Shiv Sena can long survive 
as a force in Maharashtra politics.  The party faces local 
district elections next year, but its most significant upcoming 
political test will be in the 2007 Mumbai municipal elections. 
Shiv Sena currently controls the city government in coalition 
with the BJP.  Sahney told poloff that Rane's defection and the 
continued struggles within Shiv Sena's organization will allow 
Congress to mount a serious challenge for control of the city 
government.  If Shiv Sena should lose the Mumbai city elections, 
it will be lights out for the party in Maharashtra, predicted 
Purandare. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (SBU) The twin earthquakes of Raj's leadership resignation 
and Rane's defection and smashing by-election win have left Shiv 
Sena's future in doubt.  Further fallout from the Malvan 
election loss continues to roil the party and its membership, 
and events remain fluid.  The immediate outcome is difficult to 
predict, but, whatever happens in the next few weeks, it appears 
that dark and difficult times lie ahead for Shiv Sena.  Raj's 
resignation and attacks on Uddhav, at the least, threaten to 
split the party if the resulting leadership crisis is not 
resolved quickly.  These recent issues appear to be symptoms of 
chronic problems that will continue to challenge the party, no 
matter who leads it.  The party faces an uncertain future beset 
by leadership difficulties and uncontrollable political and 
demographic changes that will threaten the party's long-term 
relevancy in Maharashtra.   End comment. 
OWEN