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C O N F I D E N T I A L MINSK 001342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
KIEV FOR USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/15 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: MILINKEVICH TEAM OUTLINES CAMPAIGN STRATEGY 
 
Ref: A) Minsk 1205  B) Minsk 1227  C) Minsk 1284 
 
Classified by Ambassador George Krol for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief recently met 
with 10+ presidential nominee Aleksandr Milinkevich and 
several leaders of his team to discuss their plans to bring 
about democratic change around the time of the 2006 
presidential elections.  The strategy, though still in its 
elementary stage, aims to increase Milinkevich's popularity 
rating to 30 percent by March 2006, mobilize 30,000 to 
50,000 street demonstrators in the event the 10+ candidate 
is disqualified during the candidate registration process 
or on election day, and launch a negative PR campaign 
against President Lukashenko and his policies.  However, 
Milinkevich's team thus far has placed more emphasis on 
strategy than message.  They know what they want to 
accomplish (change), and they believe they know how to 
accomplish it (street demonstrations), but they have yet to 
develop the campaign message that will motivate enough 
Belarusians to seek change.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) On October 26, Aleksandr Milinkevich provided a 
general overview of his activities since his October 2 
presidential nomination at the 10+ coalition democratic 
congress (ref A).  The focus of his meeting with 
Ambassador, however, was on the need for quicker 
disbursement of foreign assistance to the coalition. 
(Note: A report on Ambassador's meeting with Milinkevich 
will be sent septel.)  In separate meetings, several senior 
members of Milinkevich's team discussed with Ambassador and 
Pol/Econ Chief the details of the organizational structure 
and strategy of the campaign. 
 
 
Milinkevich Offers Up The Crown Jewels To Maintain Unity 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador he needed to act 
quickly following the democratic congress to keep the 
coalition from splintering.  Apparently, the two main 
contenders for the 10+ presidential nomination, pro- 
democracy Belarusian Party of Communists (BPC) leader 
Sergey Kalyakin and United Civic Party (UCP) leader Anatoly 
Lebedko, were seriously disappointed with the results of 
the congress and considered walking away from the 
coalition.  Thus, Milinkevich picked Kalaykin to be his 
campaign manager, even though he would have preferred his 
close associate Victor Karnyenko for the position. 
Milinkevich gave Lebedko, the 10+ leader who was facing the 
most pressure from his party to withdraw from the 
coalition, any position he wanted (except campaign manager) 
to keep him on board.  Lebedko chose the position of head 
of the national committee, which is the team responsible 
for formulating political, economic, social policy for the 
campaign.  Milinkevich assured Ambassador the coalition is 
now a cohesive organization. 
 
 
Kalyakin's Team 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Valery Ukhnalyov, a deputy in the BPC and a ranking 
member of the Milinkevich campaign team, confirmed for 
Pol/Econ Chief on October 19 the key players in Kalyakin's 
campaign staff: 
 
-- Victor Karnyenko Q responsible for forming campaign 
teams at the regional and local levels; information 
dissemination; Milinkevich's campaign trips around the 
country; and the collection of the 100,000 signatures 
needed to register Milinkevich as a presidential candidate 
(see ref B for an explanation of the electoral process). 
Karnyenko was the head of the NGO Civil Initiatives before 
joining Milinkevich in the lead up to the democratic 
congress. 
 
-- Aleksandr Dobrovolsky Q responsible for developing 
campaign strategy; public relations.  Dobrovolsky is a 
deputy in the UCP. 
 
-- Vintsuk Vyachorka Q responsible for international 
relations, including attracting financial support 
(Vyachorka de facto shares this responsibility with 
Lebedko); Milinkevich's international trips.   Vyachorka is 
the head of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF). 
 
-- Valery Ukhnyalov Q responsible for the administration of 
the team's financial resources, including money received 
from abroad. 
 
The National Committee 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Milinkevich offered Lebedko, the runner-up in the 
congress, the position of head of the "national committee," 
or policy team.  On October 20, Lebedko told Ambassador the 
national committee would be separate from the daily 
operations of the presidential campaign but would provide 
the campaign with policies.  While the leaders of the 
expert groups would not have titles, such as shadow 
economic minister, the idea would be to develop the policy 
platforms the single candidate can use to engage with the 
public.  Lebedko stressed he works closely with Milinkevich 
and Kalyakin. 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment: Putting Lebedko in charge of policy 
guarantees the opposition will adopt a libertarian free 
market platform.  UCP deputy Yaroslav Romanchuk, who also 
heads the Mises Center economic think tank, told Econoff on 
October 26 that he has already written several libertarian 
economic policy proposals for Milinkevich.  Surprisingly, 
Kalyakin and his Communist party support these proposals. 
However, Vyachorka and his nationalist BNF party have 
complained loudly about the papers, and are pushing 
Milinkevich to adopt a more socialist economic policy.  End 
Comment. 
 
Despite Competition, Milinkevich Is Not Bowing Out 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7.  (C) Milinkevich told Ambassador that Kozulin has 
already made up his mind that he will run alone.  However, 
Ales Yanukovich, deputy chairman of the BNF and member of 
Milinkevich's national campaign team, told Pol/Econ Chief 
on October 20 Kozulin is still in the "wait and see" mode. 
Kozulin's supporters have informed several 10+ leaders the 
former BGU rector will reexamine his presidential 
aspirations in February 2006, after all democratic 
presidential contenders have had an opportunity to 
determine each other's prospects for attracting the most 
amount of money, campaign volunteers, and popular support 
to run a successful campaign during the official campaign 
season. 
 
¶8.  (C) Despite attempts by Kozulin, former Parliament 
Speaker Aleksandr Voitovich, and others to convince 
Milinkevich to withdraw his candidacy (ref C), Yanukovich 
told Pol/Econ Chief Milinkevich has made it clear to his 
team that he intends to stay in the race until the end. 
Milinkevich is the only opposition candidate who can claim 
he was nominated in an open democratic process and that he 
has the backing of an entire network of NGOs and parties. 
Yanukovich pointed out the other opposition candidates 
nominated themselves and their support extends to a few 
dozen volunteers at best. 
 
¶9.  (C) Lebedko told Ambassador he hoped to include several 
presidential aspirants in the national committee he heads 
as a way of further consolidating democratic forces prior 
to the candidate registration process.  Specifically, he 
planned to reach out to Voitovich on science policy, former 
MP Vladimir Parfenovich on sports, and former Agriculture 
Minister Vasily Leonov on agriculture.  (Note:  Milinkevich 
apparently has different plans for Leonov.  He told 
Ambassador he wants Leonov to take charge of the "Eastern 
Front," drawing on his contacts in Russia to build support 
in Russian public and private sectors for a Milinkevich 
presidency.) 
 
 
QCampaign Strategy Based On Three Pillars 
---------------------------------------- 
¶10.  (C) Dobrovolsky and Ukhnalyov acknowledged to Pol/Econ 
Chief the campaign's strategy for fomenting democratic 
change around the upcoming presidential elections is still 
in the elementary stage.  However, they were able to 
describe the strategy's three basic tenets: significantly 
increased voter support for Milinkevich, large-scale street 
mobilization, and a negative PR campaign against President 
Lukashenko. 
 
 
Pillar #1: Popular Support For Milinkevich 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) The 10+ coalition's number one priority is to 
increase Milinkevich's popular approval ratings from around 
one percent to 25-30 percent by March 2006.  Reaching such 
a level would put Milinkevich in a close race with 
President Lukashenko.  (Note: The campaign team is working 
off the assumption Lukashenko's true popularity is 35%.) 
Ukhnalyov stressed if they failed in significantly boosting 
the 10+ nominee's ratings by March, the battle is already 
lost. 
 
¶12.  (C) Milinkevich said his target group were those 
Belarusians who support democratic change but are either 
unfamiliar with or unsure about the 10+ candidate. 
Milinkevich firmly believes Belarusians in many different 
demographic groups fall into the pro-democracy category, 
but he acknowledged Lukashenko enjoys considerable support 
and said it would be "pointless" to go after those voters 
who strongly back the President.  Dobrovolsky told Pol/Econ 
Chief the two key ingredients for building voter support in 
the target group in a relatively short time period are a 
massive informational campaign (flyers and bulletins in 
voter's mailboxes) and a door-to-door voter outreach 
campaign. 
 
¶13.  (C) Ukhnaylov also noted the Milinkevich team plans to 
gather one million signatures during the candidate 
registration process (probably in April 2006).  The 
electoral law requires candidates to gather 100,000 
signatures, but the campaign team intends to bombard the 
Central Electoral Commission (CEC) with so many signatures 
that it would appear ludicrous to deny Milinkevich's 
registration application.  To achieve that goal, deputy 
campaign manager Karnyenko will try to gather 10,000 
volunteers who will serve as signature collectors by 
February 2006.  Ukhnalyov noted that the successful 
gathering of one million signatures also means they have 
secured a potentially large number of people willing to 
participate in street demonstrations in the event the CEC 
disqualifies Milinkevich during the registration process. 
 
 
Pillar #2: Street Demonstrations 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) The second priority for the Milinkevich campaign 
team is to mobilize a critical mass of voters to engage in 
street demonstrations in the likely event Lukasenko will 
either disqualify Milinkevich during the candidate 
registration process or the vote counting.  Milinkevich 
stressed to Ambassador the street protests would be 
peaceful in nature.  Dobrovolsky said he aimed to organize 
approximately 30,000 to 50,000 volunteers who are so 
committed to democratic change they are willing to form 
massive street demonstrations on a moment's notice to 
defend Milinkevich's candidacy.  The same group of people 
would also be responsible for disseminating information on 
the need for Belarusian citizens to protect their right to 
vote.  This particular aspect of the information campaign 
would not be tied directly to Milinkevich's candidacy; it 
is focused on voter awareness.  Dobrovolsky recognizes his 
goal of attracting 30,000 die-hard volunteers to engage in 
such risky activities is lofty, but says he is committed to 
making it happen. 
 
 
Pillar #3: Smear Campaign Against Lukashenko 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) The goal of the negative PR campaign would be to 
juxtapose Belarusian life with Lukashenko remaining in 
power ("bad") with Belarusian life with a democratic 
candidate like Milinkevich in power ("good").  The anti- 
Lukashenko PR team would focus on gathering and 
disseminating information on specific cases of human rights 
abuse and political repression, the unsustainability of the 
economy, the increased isolation of the Lukashenko regime 
by the international community, and the corrupt dealings of 
Lukashenko and his family.  Dobrovolsky noted the team in 
charge of the negative PR campaign would maintain no direct 
ties to the Milinkevich team, although Dobrovolsky 
acknowledged he is responsible for creating the team and 
overseeing its general operations. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C) The Milinkevich campaign strategy is in its 
rudimentary stage, but his team clearly envisions a bold 
plan for encouraging democratic change around the time of 
the 2006 presidential elections.  The 10+ leaders, 
including Milinkevich, sense the next elections may be 
their last best opportunity to awaken voters from their 
political apathy and seek a change.  But they also 
recognize their main difficulty lies in being able to reach 
out to voters and encourage the voters to confront the 
regime.  The campaign team so far has concentrated its 
energy on discussing strategy and not on developing an 
attractive message that will motivate enough Belarusians to 
seek change.  It is also worth noting the 10+ coalition has 
yet to launch its campaign almost a month after the 
congress.  The campaign leaders are quick to point out 
their financial constraints, but voter outreach is 
fundamentally a labor-intensive Q not a capital-intensive Q 
endeavor.  Milinkevich and his team still do not seem ready 
to take the plunge in commencing outreach in Belarus to 
develop a domestic momentum after the Congress.  The clock 
is ticking. 
 
KROL