This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ENRG PE VE
SUBJECT: COUNTERING CHAVEZ IN PERU 
 
REF: A. LIMA 4569 
     ¶B. LIMA 4521 
     ¶C. LIMA 4420 
     ¶D. LIMA 4271 
 ...

id: 45879
date: 11/22/2005 22:00
refid: 05LIMA4983
origin: Embassy Lima
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 04LIMA5757|05LIMA2304|05LIMA2551|05LIMA3175|05LIMA359|05LIMA4132|05LIMA4271|05LIMA4420|05LIMA4521|05LIMA4569
header:
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 004983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ENRG PE VE
SUBJECT: COUNTERING CHAVEZ IN PERU 
 
REF: A. LIMA 4569 
     ¶B. LIMA 4521 
     ¶C. LIMA 4420 
     ¶D. LIMA 4271 
     ¶E. LIMA 4132 
     ¶F. MONSERRATE-MARGULIES EMAIL 9/17/05 
     ¶G. LIMA 3175 
     ¶H. LIMA 2551 
     ¶I. LIMA 2304 
     ¶J. LIMA 359 
     ¶K. 04 LIMA 5757 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies.  Reason:  1.4(c 
,d). 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY 
---------- 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is actively 
seeking to project his "Bolivarian Revolution" to Peru 
politically, institutionally (via Venezuela's membership in 
the Andean Community and South American Community of 
Nations), commercially (energy integration and offers of 
development funding), and covertly (support for far-left 
parties and to the fascistic Ollanta Humala).  Peru should be 
fertile ground for Chavez, populist and anti-systemic 
message; the poverty rate is 52 percent, and INR,s recent 
region-wide poll shows that distrust of government 
institutions and dissatisfaction with the fruits of democracy 
is the highest in the Andean region.  This cable analyzes the 
&wedge issues8 that have prevented Chavez from broadening 
his support here, and notes some areas where he could gain 
ground.  It also lists groups that we view as our potential 
allies in blocking the spread of &Bolivarianismo8 in this 
country.  END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
WHO ARE CHAVEZ'S "ALLIES" IN PERU? 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Embassy sources, GOP officials and media reportage 
indicate that the Venezuelan Embassy has been very active in 
organizing "Bolivarian" events, attempting to engender 
support for "Bolivarianism" among leftist parties and 
organizations, sponsoring the travel of students and youth 
leaders to Venezuela, and providing funding (perhaps through 
the Cuban Embassy) to far-left parties and Ollanta Humala's 
fascistic Nationalist Peruvian Party (Refs D-E).  The 
Venezuelan Embassy may become smoother and more effective at 
these influence operations with the recent arrival of new 
Ambassador Cruz Manuel Martinez Ramirez, reportedly a Chavez 
confidante.  Martinez replaces a Charge d'Affaires whose 
effectiveness was blunted by her stridency. Despite its 
efforts, the GOV has not/not had noticeable success in 
fostering "Bolivarianism" here, with disappointing attendance 
at rallies and minimal pro-Chavez activism on the part of its 
erstwhile allies. 
 
¶3. (C) One reason is that the overwhelming majority of 
Peruvians reject the local partners cultivated by Chavez.  By 
alternately offering and withholding financial support, 
Chavez is aiming to build a brown-red coalition to contest 
Peru,s 2006 elections.  The country's unreconstructed 
Stalinists and Maoists, who represent the red integer in the 
equation, enjoy minimal popular support, are led by veteran 
political has-beens, and are tarred in the court of public 
opinion by their historic linkages to the Sendero Luminoso 
and MRTA terrorist organizations.  Brown shirt Ollanta 
Humala, according to recent polls, is doing much better.  He 
may have as much as a 10-12 percent nationwide following, 
centered in the long-neglected southern and highland 
departments.  Like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Humala is trying 
to moderate his image in order to broaden his appeal.  The 
Humala threat should not be dismissed; he has a good prospect 
of winning enough seats (up to 10 percent) to be a disruptive 
force in the next Congress, but a minuscule chance of winning 
the Presidency or imposing his policy agenda. 
 
------------------------ 
GOP OPPOSITION TO CHAVEZ 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  President Alejandro Toledo, in private comments to 
USG officials, has made it clear that he, along with 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, are the South American 
leaders most opposed to Chavez's ideology, initiatives and 
methods.  Publicly, Toledo has not hesitated to stand up to 
Chavez's antics in international fora, such as the South 
American Community of Nations Summit (Ref C).  The GOP 
promotes free markets, foreign direct investment, a free 
trade agreement with the U.S., and private-sector-led growth. 
 Consequently, it rejects Chavez's statist prescriptions for 
national and regional development, as evidenced by Peru's 
dismissive response towards the Petroandina initiative (Ref 
B). 
 
------------------------- 
A HOSTILE POLITICAL CLASS 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Peru's political class largely shares the Toledo 
Government's hostility towards Chavez and his "Bolivarian" 
revolution. The center-right rejects his left-wing politics 
and statist economics, which they equate with the disastrous 
policies implemented by the 1968-75 leftist military Velasco 
regime. The center-left rejects Chavez's authoritarianism and 
militarism, his human rights violations, and his undermining 
of democratic institutions. APRA, the populist major 
opposition party, rejects his pretensions to regional 
leadership and "Bolivarianism," which conflicts with 
Aprismo's own pretensions to be a regional political 
ideology. 
 
¶6.  (C)  For all of that, there is a risk that both APRA and 
the Fujimoristas may try to improve the electoral prospects 
of Humala.  Alan Garcia and Alberto Fujimori  enjoy a solid 
base of passionate supporters (15 to 25 percent range) but 
face even larger and equally passionate negatives among the 
electorate.  The support gives them good prospects of making 
it to the second round of presidential elections (Fujimori by 
means of a stand-in candidate) but the negatives set them up 
to lose in a two candidate race against less disliked 
opponents like Valentine Paniagua or Lourdes Flores.  Humala, 
who generates even higher negatives than Garcia or Fujimori, 
would be the perfect opponent in a second round contest. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
ISSUES THAT COST CHAVEZ SUPPORT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Anti-Americanism:  Recent INR polling show that Peru 
and Colombia, where 70 percent of the population has a 
favorable view of the United States, are the most 
pro-American countries in all of South America.  Chavez, 
attacks on President Bush resonate with many Peruvians, who 
are critical of perceived U.S. unilateralism.  His attacks on 
the United States, however, do not.  Most elements of U.S. 
policy in Peru (anti-terrorism, democracy, human rights, 
honesty in government, job creation through trade) touch a 
deep and sympathetic chord with Peruvians except those on the 
farthest right and left.  Even many Peruvians who are 
critical of our anti-narcotics policies (the most 
controversial element of our bilateral relationship) fear the 
narco-terrorist link and value the U.S. assistance 
commitment. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Free Trade:  Support for a U.S.-Peruvian FTA has 
declined from nearly 70 percent to the mid 50s as GOP 
negotiators have complained about US inflexibility while free 
trade opponents mobilized.  Still, hard-core opponents of a 
trade agreement number less than a quarter of the population. 
 Chavez, anti-FTA and anti-FTAA message has not caught on 
well in a country where even most free trade critics 
acknowledge that preferential access to the U.S. market has 
driven Peru,s export-led economy.  Acknowledging the 
popularity of trade with the United States, Peru,s motley 
coalition of FTA opponents changed their slogan a few months 
ago from &No to the FTA8 to a more nuanced, &FTA:  Not 
Like This8 (TLC: Asi No). 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Economic Model:  Chavez, attacks on 
neo-liberalism play well to his narrow red-brown base, but 
meets with indifference or antipathy from the broader public. 
 Peruvians have fairly fresh memories of hyper-inflation and 
a sclerotic statist economy.  Orthodox policies have brought 
Peru record low levels of inflation, steadily declining 
interest rates, and the best economic growth record in 
decades.  Venezuelan purchases of government debt evoke no 
interest in a country with record reserves and which is close 
to winning investment grade status.  The Venezuelan proposal 
for Andean energy integration met with similar Peruvian 
opposition because it was predicated upon increasing the role 
of state companies in the sector.  Prime Minister Kuczynski 
recently remarked privately that the Toledo government has 
succeeded in de-politicizing the economic model.  In fact, 
parties from the right to center-left have embraced the 
present macroeconomic approach.  In the same way, however, 
that many Peruvians complain that economic growth is not 
trickling down to the general populace, so Chavez has won 
points for his programs to fight illiteracy and provide 
broader medical care. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Democracy:  Chavez, traction with the left is hurt 
by the fact that he reminds Peruvians of Fujimori's 
authoritarianism.  The owner of leading leftist newspaper La 
Republica (which is leading the charge against the FTA) has 
told the Ambassador that Chavez, efforts to control the 
press are a defining issue for him.  The local and very 
influential Inter-American Press Society (SIP) chapter is 
actively critical of Chavez.  Many of Peru,s leading 
journalists are left of center, but their recent struggle 
against Montesinos, control of the press has colored their 
attitude toward Chavez.  The anti-democratic tint of Chavez, 
allies in this country offend even regular critics of the 
U.S. among the democratic left.  Despite a lack of sympathy 
for Chavez among media owners and editors, he does make good 
copy.  Most papers have a quarter to half a page every Monday 
quoting his colorful attacks during "Alo Presidente" of the 
day before against regional leaders or their policies. 
 
------------------------------------- 
ISSUES AND MEASURES TO COUNTER CHAVEZ 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  In sum, we have a positive basis in Peru that we 
can build on to effectively counter Chavez's influence here 
and in regional organizations. We propose to: 
 
--  encourage President Toledo, Prime Minister Kuczynski and 
other GOP officials to maintain their general policy of 
engagement, containment and damage control, while being 
prepared to ratchet-up protests should evidence be uncovered 
tying Chavez to political subversion or terrorism. 
 
--  urge Peruvian officials, business leaders and media 
opinion-makers to speak out in favor of the GOP's 
economic/trade policies and against the economic/trade 
policies advocated by Chavez. 
 
--  emphasize to Peruvian officials that they need to address 
the dichotomy between their desire for Free Trade Agreements 
with the U.S. and the EU on the one hand, and Venezuela's 
approach to regional development in the CAN and CASA; sooner 
or later the GOP will have to make a choice between the two. 
 
--  work with media contacts to publicize any evidence of 
Chavez's interference in internal political affairs (such as 
by funding extremist parties or promoting subversive 
activities), anti-democratic actions taken by Chavez in 
Venezuela (particularly against the press), and any evidence 
of Chavez's support for terrorist organizations in Colombia 
and elsewhere. 
 
--  encourage our pro-democracy NGO, human rights and labor 
contacts to publicly criticize the GOV's anti-democratic 
actions, human rights violations, and anti-labor policies by 
providing them with information on Chavez's activities, as 
well as by promoting their engagement with Venezuelan 
counterparts suffering from GOV persecution. 
STRUBLE 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================