This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001815 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENCY COUNSELOR ON EAST SITUATION 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1. (C) I met one-on-one with Presidency Ambassador at Large 
Antoine Ghonda on Friday October 28 to review events 
subsequent to the recent Tripartite Plus meeting in Kampala. 
Regarding the situation in the east, Ghonda expressed some 
dismay about the apparent lack of USG understanding over GDRC 
sensitivities regarding proposed joint operations with the 
Ugandan and Rwanda armies. 
 
¶2. (C) I told Ghonda I would speak frankly as a friend.  The 
GDRC de facto position is not tenable.  Following years of 
war and occupation, I could understand the sensitivity of 
Transition government agreement to Ugandan or Rwandan forces 
on DRC territory.  Ghonda interjected that is especially the 
case in the months running up to elections, given strong 
popular emotions on this subject.  I added, however, that up 
to now the GDRC was not doing anything else.  Hence, relative 
to any military pressure, the position seemed to be, "we 
don,t accept this idea, but we are not doing anything else 
ourselves."   I also noted that whatever hopes may be 
attached to restarting the Rome process, or Col. Amani,s 
moves to promote peaceful voluntary and peaceful repatriation 
to Rwanda, I personally had no doubt that military pressure 
is needed to achieve results with the FDLR, and likely other 
"negative forces" as well.  Ghonda agreed, and said he better 
understood the concerns being expressed. 
 
¶3. (C) Providing further back-up to my statements, I showed 
Ghonda a copy of the "annotated" agenda we had used for the 
previous day,s meeting of the Mixed Commission on Security, 
chaired by Vice President Ruberwa.  The "annotated" agenda 
included specific concerns and items for action.  I told 
Ghonda the meeting had lasted over three hours.  We had 
discussed in considerable detail numerous problems, and I 
pointed out to Ghonda items on the agenda regarding the lack 
of timely deployments of integrated and trained brigades to 
operational areas in North and South Kivu, the severe 
problems of pay, food, and other support to deployed FARDC 
units, and current blockages getting troops to integration 
centers to start the next phase of integrated brigade 
training.  Ghonda, who has not previously pursued details of 
the internal security portfolio ceding that to Special 
Security Counselor Samba Kaputo,s office, appeared surprised 
by the extent and nature of some of the detailed problems. 
He asked to make a copy of the document, which he did, and 
said that it and our discussion would be helpful in his 
discussions with President Kabila. 
 
¶4. (C) I also asked Ghonda about his candid assessment of the 
likelihood of Angolan intervention in eastern DRC.  Ghonda 
had traveled to Luanda just before the Tripartite meeting, 
and my understanding was that a desired Angolan role in 
eastern Congo was part of his agenda.  He affirmed it was, 
but admitted that it is not clear the Angolans are  ready to 
commit.   He said at minimum it appears the Angolans want 
another African country involved, and the Congolese have 
identified South Africa as the best prospect.  Ghonda 
confidentially reported that the Congolese earlier had 
 
SIPDIS 
misgivings about such a South African role in eastern DRC, 
but were now ready to accept it.  I asked if South Africa was 
ready and able to take on such a mission, given for example 
the potential problem of SADF troop availability given 
current deployments and commitments.  Ghonda said he was not 
sure. 
 
¶5. (C) I asked Ghonda if the perceived Angolan desire for a 
partner was in fact in terms of military capability, or 
basically political cover.  If the former, there are only a 
relative handful of African armies able to do much.  If the 
underlying issue is political, however, the solution is 
easier.  The long-discussed Benin battalion, for example, 
could conceivably be dedicated to this mission vice its 
proposed addition to MONUC (Note: The Belgian government has 
reportedly long been preparing the Benin battalion for a 
MONCU deployment.  End note).  Alternatively, a battalion or 
two might be found from other countries who might not bring a 
major military capability to the table, but could provide an 
African Union or at least broader African cover to an Angolan 
mission.  Much as the 2003 Operation Artemis in Ituri 
District was billed as a European Union operation but was 
really French-led, something similar might be done in eastern 
Congo - if the basic problem impeding Angolan willingness is 
political.  Ghonda took some notes and indicated the idea was 
worth pursuing. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Separately there are press reports and other 
information starting October 31 of a FARDC-led operation, 
coordinated with (and supported by) MONUC, in North Kivu 
targeting "negative forces"  around Virunga Park.  The 
operation reportedly involves elements of the newly-deployed 
Fifth Integrated Brigade, the first integrated FARDC unit 
deployed to either North or South Kivu.  We will be providing 
septel reporting of that development. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: My discussion with Ghonda was open and frank, 
and I sought to reinforce the message that the GDRC must take 
meaningful action itself relative to military operations in 
the east, as well as in terms of support for its troops. 
Ghonda seemed to take the message on board, but decisions in 
the Transition Government are never easy, and very rarely 
rapidly implemented.  Nonetheless, the report of the 5th 
Integrated operation is encouraging.  I have no basis for 
assessing potential Angolan willingness to deploy troops for 
operations against the FDLR or other forces in eastern Congo 
and defer to Embassy Luanda.  Clearly, however, the Congolese 
are hopeful of getting help from the Angolans.  If in fact 
some relatively minor additional African country contribution 
could provide sufficient political cover to tip the balance 
on an Angolan decision, that seems a lot easier to achieve 
than a second major military component of a prospective 
African force.  We will continue to follow-up on the report 
of the North Kivu operation, and indeed continue to press for 
further integrated brigade deployments, support, and FARDC 
operations in both South and North Kivu as well.  End comment. 
 
MEECE