This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 017384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE: THE SITUATION IN KOHISTAN 
 
 
 ¶1. Summary:  Southern Kohistan fared somewhat better than 
neighboring provinces during the October 8 earthquake with 
only two subdistricts affected and comparatively less damage. 
 In terms of assistance, however, the 50-55% of the affected 
areas, population left homeless have fared far worse.  Only 
limited assistance has reached the area and corruption at the 
local and provincial government level has diverted needed 
resources.  International and national NGOs are entirely 
absent in the district,s Pattan subdistrict, and even the 
Islamist parties, which enjoy broad support in the district, 
have not initiated relief camps.  The Pakistan army is 
cognizant of the lack of aid, and has promised to divert 
additional resources, particularly shelter, to the area. 
Officials, however, stress that their impact will be limited 
without additional support from the UN and international 
NGOs.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  OIC, Emboff, and A/RSO visited the Pattan subdistrict in 
southern Kohistan on November 15 to review damage and assess 
relief and recovery operations in the area.  The earthquake 
in southern Kohistan was relatively less severe than in other 
areas of NWFP.  Most damage that we observed was caused by 
landslides that were triggered by the initial quake as 
opposed to the outright collapse of buildings that we have 
witnessed elsewhere.  While deaths were reportedly minimal 
(locals who are familiar with landslides took evasive action 
in the minutes after the quake which probably saved lives), 
injuries, particularly broken bones and contusions from 
falling rock were frequently observed.  Between 25,000 and 
30,000 people (50-55% of the populations) were left homeless 
by the earthquake/landslide and significant damage was caused 
to the limited road network and electricity/communication 
infrastructure. 
 
¶3.  Locals in Pattan subdistrict identified shelter as their 
priority need.  Absent assistance, they claimed that it will 
be impossible for many to survive the upcoming winter.  In 
their view, between 4000 and 5000 winterized tents or 
alternative shelters would be necessary to meet the need in 
this area.  Only a few hundred tents had arrived in the 
subdistrict.  Locals expressed a willingness to build 
alternative shelter if provided with needed tools, but were 
very concerned that it would be impossible to complete such 
shelters before significant snowfall began in the area. 
 
¶4.  The equitable distribution of the limited available 
supplies within Kohistan was a significant concern.  Military 
relief flights have been turning over all goods to the local 
governments for distribution (in contrast to other areas 
where direct distribution by the military is the norm). 
Local military commanders attributed this decision to a lack 
of personnel to handle distributions unilaterally.  According 
to locals, the district, subdistrict, and union council 
nazims have been distributing supplies based on political and 
family affiliation rather than need.  For example, close 
relatives of the district nazim had been provided with 
several roles of plastic sheeting despite having suffered no 
damage to their houses.  That sheeting was now for sale in 
the local market.  In addition, locals claimed that the 
Provincial Revenue Minister had been channeling all 
provincial (and to the extent that he could) federal relief 
goods towards Palas subdistrict (his home constituency). 
They adamantly maintained that conditions 
in that subdistrict were far better than in theirs (due to 
time constraints, OIC could not visit Palas). 
 
¶5.  Despite their concerns over distribution, locals were 
effusive in their praise for relief flights organized by the 
Pakistani and American militaries ) their only source of 
assistance to date.  In contrast, they were dismissive of UN 
entities and NGOs who they maintained had not been seen in 
the region.  OIC observed that northern Shangla and Kohistan 
were virtually devoid of the presence of any NGOs and IOs (in 
contrast to other areas where they are much in evidence). 
Similarly, locals were disappointed by the absence of relief 
efforts from Islamist parties in the district.  Neither JI 
nor JUI-F had relief camps in the Pattan subdistrict despite 
steadfast political support for these parties from locals. 
Locals claimed to be reevaluating whether these parties 
merited their support in future. 
 
¶6.  The Pakistan military was aware of the serious deficit in 
relief supplies reaching southern Kohistan.  OIC spoke with 
NWFP Chief of Relief Operations, Maj. Gen. Shakil who was 
visiting the district by helicopter on the same day.  Shakil 
admitted that supplies had been inadequate, largely because 
the military had not previously obtained a clear picture of 
need in the area.  Shakil instructed his officers to send six 
relief flights per day to Pattan over the following week. 
Military officials in Mansehra claimed that a portion of 
those were sent but that they included largely food and NFIs 
not shelter.  Shakil stressed that absent an IO/NGO presence 
in the district, the army would be hard-pressed to meet the 
significant needs in the area. 
 
¶7.  Comment: Due to the comparatively less damage in 
Kohistan, NGOs and IOs have yet to focus on this area.  While 
we agree that needs are unquestionably greater in other areas 
of the NWFP, complete neglect of this area is of significant 
concern, especially given the typically harsh winters and a 
lack of viable alternatives for most of the population.  The 
Pakistan military seems genuine in its desire to assist, but 
is also cognizant that its resources are limited and cannot 
meet the needs without outside assistance.  Nepotism has 
certainly complicated relief efforts in the area, but is 
likely an outgrowth of limited resources and may well 
evaporate with significant relief supplies.  We believe that 
additional focus on Kohistan needs to be a priority for the 
international community.  End Comment. 
 
¶8. Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on behalf of 
FOB Mansehra. 
CROCKER