This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 017311 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS TO USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON PHUM PK AORC UN
SUBJECT: SIX WEEKS AFTER PAKISTAN'S EARTHQUAKE:  ASSESSING 
THE UN'S PERFORMANCE 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
 
¶1.   With few exceptions, UN agencies were inadequate to the 
task in the weeks immediately following Pakistan's 
earthquake.  In some cases they remain so.  Certainly the 
challenges have been great, involving overwhelming needs, 
difficult terrain, multiple donors and the need to work 
closely with Pakistani leaders and agencies that were 
initially uncertain and uncoordinated.  That said, some UN 
agencies have been remarkably slow to adapt, despite the 
obvious urgency as winter conditions set in.  Because these 
agencies are responsible for coordinating donor activities in 
their sectors, these shortcomings have had a cascading impact 
on the effectiveness of other relief operations operating in 
affected sectors.  NGOs working in the field have been 
frustrated by sometimes interminable discussions on minutiae 
and have pushed hard for better UN leadership. 
 
Overall Assessment 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  This cable is based on observations in Islamabad and the 
field by Embassy staff and USAID Disaster Assistance Response 
Team (DART) and reflects numerous meetings with UN 
representatives and NGO implementing partners. 
 
¶3.  The UN was late in appreciating that a second disaster 
was looming after the initial search and rescue phase -- 
specifically that hundreds of thousands, if not millions 
would require shelter assistance to survive the harsh 
Himalayan winter.  In contrast to many NGOs, the UN was slow 
to provide funding and deploy qualified personnel and assets 
in response this threat.  One UN employee characterized the 
UN response to date as a "disgusting operation" and a 
"pathetic show."  His view, almost one month after the 
earthquake, was that UN agencies did not generally send their 
best people.  The UN also had initial difficulties in dealing 
with Pakistani authorities, though coordination improved 
after the GOP established the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) 
as the coordination entity for disaster response.  While the 
performance of UN agencies improved over time, their failures 
in the early weeks suggest they are not equipped to deal with 
crises like this one, where lives depend on a rapid response. 
 
 
¶4.  The UN and its defenders assert that UN agencies were 
inadequately funded and that performance improved as funds 
came in.  There is some truth to this, but we note that on 
October 12 (four days after the earthquake) the U.S. 
disbursed two million dollars each to UNICEF and WHO, three 
million to IOM and almost four million to WFP ($3.5 million 
for air operations and $300,000 for the Joint Logistics 
Center).   U.S. NGOs that were provided similar sums a few 
days later have much more to show for their efforts in terms 
of impact on the ground.  (Though in fairness, these NGOs 
were able to focus more exclusively on relief delivery and in 
some cases had more latent in-country capacity.) 
 
¶5.  Beginning at para 10 below, we rank the key UN agencies 
on their performance over the first month following the 
disaster, with the strongest performers first and the weakest 
last.   We acknowledge an inherent degree of unfairness in 
this ranking as UN agencies are not funded equally; it is 
probably no coincidence that WHO and UNICEF, the best funded 
agencies, get the best marks.  Moreover, the varying sectors 
in which UN agencies operate also vary in complexity. 
 
Donor Coordination 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  The UN was quick to assume leadership of Islamabad-based 
"clusters" that seek to coordinate emergency response in 
various sectors.  However, in most sectors there have been 
too few qualified UN personnel on the ground to provide 
effective leadership, and little vertical coordination 
between the clusters in Islamabad and corresponding ones in 
the field.  As such, the overall effectiveness of the UN, 
both in field operations and in providing technical advice to 
NGOs and the GOP, has been limited.  There has been a general 
disconnect between Pakistani Government and NGO activities, 
and while the UN is not entirely responsible, more effective 
UN coordination could have helped considerably.  USAID NGO 
implementing partners are fairly unanimous in their concern 
with the poor performance (and in some cases, total absence) 
of the UN in humanitarian relief efforts. 
 
¶7.  The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) has been heading donor coordination meetings 
in Islamabad since the day after the earthquake.   In early 
November (following guidance provided by US and UK reps) OCHA 
dispatched a Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Kevin Kennedy, to 
more effectively pull together the efforts of different 
agencies.  Kennedy, a former U.S. Marine officer with 
extensive disaster coordination experience, has been a 
welcome addition, and recognizes the leading role the 
Pakistani military must play.  His initial assessment was 
that coordination in Islamabad lagged well behind 
coordination in the field and indications are that he has 
already reduced the disparity in the weeks since he arrived. 
 
¶8.  In the field, UN Disaster Assistance Coordination (UNDAC) 
teams were sent to coordinate the initial donor response. 
The U.S. Forward Operating Base in Mansehra gives UNDAC good 
marks for its work in the NWFP.  OCHA is now assuming this 
coordination function from UNDAC and the transition seems to 
be proceeding smoothly.  However, while the UN's coordination 
efforts in the field under UNDAC and OCHA seem to be 
reasonably strong, they have not succeeded in improving the 
implementation record of other UN agencies. 
 
¶9.  Soon after the operation began, the UN established a HIC 
(Humanitarian Information Center), collocated with OCHA at 
the UNICEF building in Islamabad.  The HIC has provided some 
useful maps and contact information, but has generally been 
in a passive mode, receiving information from clusters and 
NGOs rather than proactively seeking information on 
concentrations of vulnerable people and field conditions. 
HIC staff in Pakistan were largely trained in an operations 
model for working in slow-onset, complex humanitarian 
disaster and have not yet adjusted to the need to work in the 
compressed time scale of a natural disaster. 
 
WHO 
--- 
 
¶10.  The World Health Organization (WHO) could have done more 
to promptly address dangerously unsanitary conditions in 
Muzzafarabad camps, but overall it gets good marks, both in 
coordinating the health cluster and in addressing needs on 
the ground.  WHO continues to provide disease surveillance 
through 29 reporting sites, diligently quashing unconfirmed 
rumors of epidemic outbreaks while continuing to monitor for 
important indicative diseases such as cholera.  It has helped 
restart health facilities that were damaged by the 
earthquake, through provision of tents, mobile units, 
medicines and medical supplies, and conducted with UNICEF a 
mass measles vaccination campaign for those between 6 months 
to 15 years old.  No massive outbreak has broken out in any 
of the camps or settlements, indicating that the vaccination 
has been generally successful. 
 
¶11.  WHO was the first and only UN agency to deploy to 
hard-hit Balakot, where it has been a continuing presence for 
over two weeks now, coordinating with the NGOs and monitoring 
health trends in the area.   Under WHO leadership, the health 
cluster group in Mansehra is working well together to cover 
health needs and gaps in assistance for the affected 
population, and is trying to increase collaboration between 
emergency care and medical practitioners who will eventually 
take over the long-term care for these patients. 
 
UNICEF 
------ 
 
¶12.  NGO representatives throughout the affected area say 
UNICEF is performing reasonably well as the lead agency for 
water and sanitation, protection, education and nutrition. 
UNICEF has done an adequate job in the water and sanitation 
area, developing  a comprehensive relief strategy involving 
four major interventions, including hygiene kits for rural 
populations, basic interventions for residents of spontaneous 
camps in urban areas (chlorine tablets, simple pit latrines, 
hygiene kits, rudimentary waste collection), interventions in 
planned camps (potable water sources on site, pour flush 
latrines, washing areas, hygiene kits, waste collection), and 
standard hygiene education programs for all affected 
populations.  In Muzaffarabad, UNICEF has been aggressive in 
addressing the shortage of latrine slabs, purchasing plywood 
for the U.S. Navy Seabees projects, procuring locally 
manufactured sheet metal slabs, obtaining plastic slabs from 
Dubai, and arranging for local production of plywood slabs. 
The story is not as favorable in the NWFP, where its 
sanitation efforts have lagged.  (In Shangla District's Mehra 
camp, which houses 6,200 people, UNICEF has built only 20 pit 
latrines.) It has been less effective in coordinating the 
work of other NGOs in the field, which has led to a 
duplication of effort in several camps.  A lack of UNICEF 
leadership has also sometimes allowed Pakistan's Department 
of Water and Sanitation to steer donor funding toward a 
wishlist of long-standing water projects at the expense of 
crucial hygiene and sanitation efforts. 
 
¶13.  UNICEF seems to be doing better in coordinating and 
implementing protection, education and nutrition programs  It 
has helped restart schools that were damaged by the 
earthquake by providing large tents and school supplies and 
working with NGOs to set up child-friendly spaces in camps. 
It has also offered psychological support to those 
traumatized by the disaster and disseminated health messages 
throughout the communities.  In addition, UNICEF working with 
WFP has distributed high energy biscuits to some 25,000 
children through the school system, and has completed a 
nutrition survey training this month.  Assessments from the 
field suggest that UNICEF logistics personnel have been 
effective and energetic. 
 
WFP 
--- 
 
¶14.  The World Food Program (WFP), which chairs the logistics 
and food/transportation clusters, has a poor, but improving 
record.  On the logistics front, its initial efforts were 
weak but improved dramatically after the arrival of one of 
its most able people, Amer Daoudi, Chief of its Logistics 
Service in Rome.  WFP's role in this cluster is complex, in 
that it can directly task the UN Humanitarian Air Service 
(UNHAS) which operates the helicopters leased by the UN, but 
not the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC), an interagency 
body funded by separate contributions that oversees schedules 
and coordinates all modes of transport (ground, fixed wing 
aircraft, and helicopters). 
 
¶15.  Field assessments of WFP's performance in the food 
cluster do not paint a favorable picture.  It has been slow 
in gathering information on where the NGOs are working and 
areas that are not being served.    NGOs have bitterly 
complained about the lack of coordination resulting in 
duplication of food distributions and competition for food 
supplies among NGOS.  While some of this can be blamed on 
NGOs, strong WFP leadership would certainly have led to a 
more effective and timely distribution of food resources. 
 
UNJLC 
----- 
 
¶16.  The performance of the UN Joint Logistics Center in 
coordinating transportation has been mixed.  Early in the 
operation there were a significant logistical problems in 
managing air cargoes arriving at Islamabad Airport.  These 
problems have receded somewhat with improved inventorying of 
incoming goods.  The most complex challenges in the logistics 
field have related to use of helicopter assets where UNJLC is 
not yet up to the task of coping with the numerous actors 
involved.  UNJLC is tasking not only the UNHAS helicopters, 
but also British helicopters, while the U.S. military is 
receiving helicopter taskings from the Pakistani military. 
As a result, too many missions have been flown to sites that 
were accessible by road, resulting in longer wait times for 
some NGO cargo that did actually need to move by air. In some 
cases UN pilots did not have proper maps or grid coordinates 
and were hampered by limited English language facility. 
 
¶17.  The WFP's Amer Daoudi was instrumental in the recent 
establishment of a Joint Air Operations Center, in which the 
Pakistani military, UN, US, and other militaries would divide 
up necessary helicopter missions to avoid duplication and 
ensure all areas are reached. 
 
UNHCR 
----- 
 
¶18.  UNHCR is responsible for the camp management cluster, 
and of all the UN agencies, it has probably been the weakest 
performer.  In part this is because it conceives its role as 
planning and training -- equipping others to administer 
camps.  It has not adjusted easily to the existing emergency 
situation where lives are at stake and there is no time to 
train others to do the work.  (By the third week UNHCR had 
over 20 people working on earthquake relief in the NWFP, but 
the affected area in the NWFP is very large.)    In addition, 
UNHCR has been hampered by a lack of qualified personnel, 
effective leadership and limited resources on the ground. 
During a number of visits to the field, DART personnel 
encountered no UNHCR presence whatsoever, including in major 
tented camps.  Pakistani military representatives made 
reference to UNHCR driving through their areas of operation, 
talking briefly with them, and then leaving with no follow-up 
visits.   One DART field officer had a discussion with a 
UNHCR representative who was, nearly a month into the 
operation, unsure of the exact mandate of his agency, and the 
degree to which it should be involved in camp design and 
management.  Other UN representatives pointed out the need to 
push UNHCR to take a more active role in this area. 
 
¶19.  In fairness, part of the difficulty was that UNHCR had 
to wait until the army and the government's Federal Relief 
Commission (FRC) provided sites.  The very rugged terrain of 
the affected area offers few flat areas, and some suitable 
sites are not available. Once sites were identified, the army 
often pitched tents without consulting anyone, making it 
necessary for UNHCR to work with the military to reconfigure 
the camp to make it meet appropriate standards for displaced 
people.   As with other UN agencies, UNHCR's early 
performance suffered because no government entity was 
speaking authoritatively for the GOP on relief plans.  The UN 
also had to adjust when the FRC made major changes to the 
shelter plan.   (Performance has improved recently as UNHCR 
has fielded additional staff, allowing it to dispatch quick 
impact teams to fix water, sanitation and other problems in 
camps.) 
 
IOM 
--- 
¶20.  The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has 
failed to offer effective leadership for the critical shelter 
cluster.  It has adopted a facilitative, rather than a 
leadership role and was slow to establish effective avenues 
of cooperation with the GOP.  IOM has devoted considerable 
time and human and financial resources to field operations 
focused on the movement of supplies, which has diverted 
attention from the important task of strategically managing 
the Shelter Cluster.   NGOs in the NWFP complain that IOM 
employees are ineffectual and spend too much time collating 
databases instead of addressing urgent needs. 
 
 
 
CROCKER