This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 016850 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS MOPS ECON PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE:  KAGHAN AND ALLAI VALLEYS 
 
¶1. Summary: A team from the Embassy's Forward Operating Base 
in Mansehra (Officer-in-Charge (OIC), USAID/DART Field 
Officer, U.S. Military Liaison Officer) and representatives 
of five USAID-funded NGOs visited the Northern Kaghan and 
Allai Valleys on November 9.  In both areas, Pakistan 
military commanders are strongly encouraging villagers to 
relocate for the winter to facilitate assistance efforts.  In 
northern Kaghan, where most families migrate south to Balakot 
annually, this advice is being followed.  In Allai, however, 
most people appear reluctant to leave and will continue to 
require significant assistance.  Alternative shelter programs 
will be critical to survival in Allai during the winter 
months.  Geological activity in Allai remains a significant 
concern and rumors of volcanic activity continue to persist. 
Villagers appear grateful for USG assistance and have a 
generally positive view of Pakistan army efforts.  They are, 
however, resentful at the provincial government and many 
political parties for their perceived lack of response.  End 
Summary. 
 
Kaghan Valley 
------------- 
 
¶2. The northern end of the Kaghan Valley centered around the 
town of Narang was completely isolated by landslides that 
destroyed the area's one access road.  Resupply of this area 
of Kaghan has been limited to helicopter support flights from 
the Pakistan militar.  The road opened for the first time to 
light vehicle traffic on the morning of the delegation's 
arrival.  According to local villagers, the area around 
Narang has traditionally been seen as having too harsh a 
climate for winter settlement.  Most villagers spend 8 months 
of the year in Narang engaged in both agriculture and the 
tourist industry and then move down the valley to Balakot for 
the winter after the final potato harvest.  Prior to the 
earthquake most families had temporary shelter for themselves 
and their livestock in Balakot.  This is now destroyed. 
 
¶3.  Villagers told us that, as in previous years, only about 
25 people will remain in the Narang area during the winter. 
Most will stay in the tourist hotels, which did not appear to 
sustain significant damage during the earthquake.  Foodstocks 
in the village are sufficient for these remaining 
individuals.  Those intending to leave the village will do so 
in about 12 days, after the harvest is in.  There is a 
serious concern among villagers that the tent camp being 
established in Jaba Farms (where the army is encouraging 
villagers to go) lacks sufficient tents, facilities for 
livestock, and education for children.  The private schools 
in Balakot in which parents usually enrolled their children 
are now piles of rubble.  This migratory pattern contrasts 
with the southern Kaghan Valley, where at least half the 
population has told NGOs that they intend to remain in place 
for the winter.  Based on this information, U.S.-funded NGOs 
intend to continue to focus their supply efforts in southern 
Kaghan operating out of 
Paras. 
 
Allai Valley 
------------ 
 
¶4.  FOB Team visited two sites in the Allai Valley: the 
Rashang Union Council and the town of Bana, the center of 
relief operations.  Military officials present in both 
locations were adamant that villagers had to leave the valley 
to survive.  They were strongly encouraging villagers to 
migrate south to the tent city being established in Marai, 
Shangla District.  For a variety of reasons, villagers seemed 
reluctant to make this transition.  Those we spoke with cited 
concern for their property, safety of their domestic animals, 
historical ties to their villages, and suspicion about 
conditions in the camps.  Military officials, in cooperation 
with NGOs, faced an uphill battle addressing these concerns. 
Even the most optimistic officials that we spoke with 
estimated that only half the area's population of 60,000 
would move south. Based on movement to date (the harvest in 
Allai is essentially finished), the final numbers departing 
may be far lower. 
 
¶5.  The major need in the Allai Valley appears to be shelter. 
 Insufficient numbers of winterized tents have arrived, 
although shipments by helicopter (essential due to blocked 
roads in many areas) continue to arrive.  Military and NGO 
representatives were skeptical that even properly winterized 
tents would be sufficient to allow individuals to survive in 
the harsh winter climate of the area.  In addition, transport 
of such tents before the weather shifts appears a near 
impossible task.  As an alternative, NGOs strongly pushed for 
funding of alternative shelter programs.  These would provide 
construction kits and advice to enable villagers to rebuild 
appropriate accommodation using materials from their 
collapsed houses.  Villagers seemed open to the idea and were 
already recovering stones, timber, and corrugated sheeting 
from their collapsed properties, most of which could easily 
be reused.  Foodstocks in Allai appear in relatively good 
shape, despite some damage from the earthquake, although no 
comprehensive study is available.  Prepositioning of food is 
still a welcome activity, although some of it may go unused. 
Villagers continued to report smoke and fire coming from some 
mountains in Allai.  Military commander in Rashang reported 
that Battela Mountain was a particular concern. 
 
Political Perceptions 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  Villagers were uniformly positive about the USG role. 
Many had received supplies from U.S. military and INL 
helicopters and clearly believed that we were going to assist 
long-term.  The active presence of U.S.-funded NGOs in the 
Allai Valley further enhances this positive view.  Similarly, 
villagers were grateful to the Pakistan Army for its role in 
facilitating assistance.  Soldiers were often the first 
relief personnel on the ground and had delivered a great deal 
to the local populace.  The only tinge of resentment was 
towards the consistent messages requesting villagers to leave 
their homes.  The provincial government was routinely 
criticized for its virtually invisibility.    Villagers 
claimed that, although provincial ministers and officials had 
visited, they had done nothing to provide needed relief. 
Asked about the political parties, there was great resentment 
towards the Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan People's Party, 
Awami National Party, and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman. 
 Village elders 
claimed none of them had done anything to help and were only 
interested in votes.  Frequent contrasts were made with 
Jamaat-i-Islami, whose on-the-ground relief camps appear to 
have done a great deal to improve its image. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7.  The northern Kaghan Valley appears unique in the area, as 
it already has a long history of winter migration to the 
south.  We do not believe that other areas will follow this 
pattern.  Particularly in the Allai Valley, in-place 
assistance will be critical through the winter months and 
must include an immediate emphasis on alternative shelter 
that can be developed in relatively short order.  Food 
supplies in these areas will need to be monitored by 
on-the-ground personnel and logistical plans will need to be 
developed to distribute on an as-needed basis. 
 
¶8. Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on behalf of 
FOB Mansehra. 
CROCKER