This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 016577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT - PLEASE PASS TO USAID 
KABUL -- PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: EAID MASS MOPS PGOV PK PTER ECON PREF ASEC
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE:  A VISIT TO BATTGRAM 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Patricia A. Butenis, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Forward Operating Base Mansehra Officer-in-Charge 
and Econoffs visited Battgram district on November 5. 
Settlement patterns have complicated relief as damage is 
spread across mountain villages with low population 
densities.  Interlocutors were concerned for villages in the 
Allai tehsil, many of which have been established at high 
elevations and would become isolated by winter snow beginning 
in 15 to 20 days.  The Pakistan military is encouraging the 
relocation of these villages to a relief camp established at 
Meira on November 2.  Military officials aim to resettle 
40,000 to 50,000 people. Around 2500 have arrived with 
approximately 50 families (average size of 8-10 people) 
coming to the camp daily.  Uncertainty persists as to the 
number who will eventually resettle in Meira, as many may 
choose to remain in their mountain villages.  Police and 
military officials reported that some landlords were 
instructing tenant farmers not to leave their allotted land 
on threat of eviction.  Approximately 30% of the mountain 
population is estimated to be in this situation. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Pakistan military established the Meira camp 
adjacent to an earlier facility constructed by the al-Rashid 
Trust (a Department of Treasury designated person of interest 
for sanctions purposes), a frequently observed pattern in 
both Mansehra and Battgram districts.  According to camp 
supervisor LTC Farz, the military has informed al-Rashid that 
it will be taking over the al-Rashid facility on November 6. 
Al-Rashid has reportedly accepted the decision. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Political parties and their affiliated relief 
organizations were much in evidence.  Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) 
through both its al-Khidmat charitable trust and its 
student-wing Islami Jamaat Talaba (IJT) is the most visible. 
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman's (JUI-F's) al-Khair trust 
has a much smaller presence despite its reported domination 
of the Battgram political scene.  Local officials claimed 
that neither the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) nor the Awami 
National Party (ANP) were present in relief efforts. 
Surprisingly, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which has 
no political base in Battgram, had established one fairly 
large relief camp in the district. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Unlike in neighboring Mansehra District, 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD - the parent organization of the 
designated foreign terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyaba) 
was not visibly present in Battgram.  The Battgram city 
police commander told OIC that he had strict orders to 
prevent JUD or any banned organization from taking part in 
relief efforts.  His forces have already prevented JUD from 
establishing an adjunct relief camp to their tent village 
across the district border in Mansehra. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The Battgram district administration was 
criticized for failure to engage in relief operations.  The 
local police chief claimed the mayor, a wealthy landowner 
elected with JUI-F and PML support had "fled" the district to 
Islamabad after accusations of selling donated relief goods. 
The military reported better coordination at the thesil and 
union council level.  Individual relief coordination 
commissions for each thesil and union council had been formed 
consisting of military officials, the elected union and 
thesil nazims, and their defeated opponents from the 2007 
election.  The military reported excellent cooperation in 
determining relief priorities and missions through this 
system, which it intended to continue through reconstruction. 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Comment:  The Balakot relief experience is clearly a 
mixed bag.  Uncertainty over villagers' intentions during the 
upcoming winter have made comprehensive planning virtually 
impossible.  The district government's inability to engage on 
relief operations has forced the military to develop a work 
around involving other levels of local government.  While 
cumbersome in its operation, the e yse does eem to 
involve local leaders in planning and could prove valuable in 
reconstruction.  JUD's exclusion from Battgram is welcome, 
although the proliferation of relief camps to match the 
dispersed nature of the population may well allow them to 
operate without detection. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Embassy Islamabad is transmitting this cable on 
behalf of FOB Mansehra. 
 
 
 
CROCKER