This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 ISLAMABAD 016474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID 
USAID/W FOR A/AID ANDREW NATSIOS, JBRAUSE 
DCHA/OFDA KISAACS, GGOTTLIEB, MMARX, RTHAYER, BDEEMER 
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA 
SOUTH ASIA RESPONSE MANAGEMENT TEAM 
SOUTH ASIA EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE 
DCHA/FFP FOR LAUREN LANDIS 
ANE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR MARK WARD 
BANGKOK FOR OFDA SENIOR REGIONAL ADVISOR TOM DOLAN 
KATHMANDU FOR OFDA REGIONAL ADVISOR WILLIAM BERGER 
ROME PASS FODAG 
GENEVA FOR RMA AND NKYLOH 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
EUCOM FOR POLA/J3/J4/J5 
BRUSSELS FOR USAID PLERNER 
NEW YORK FOR TMALY 
SECDEF FOR SOLIC/PKHA, USDP/J3 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC FOR J3/J4/J5 
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE FOR J3/J5 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID AEMR ASEC MASS ECON KMDR KPAO OIIP OPRC PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN - EARTHQUAKE:  USAID/DART SITUATION REPORT 
12: FIELD ASSESSMENT OF BATAGRAM 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  From October 30 to 31, the USAID Disaster Assistance 
Response Team (USAID/DART) Economic and Livelihoods Advisor 
(ELO), Program Officer (PO), Water and Sanitation Officer 
(WSO), Shelter and Settlements Advisor (SSA), Earthquake 
Expert (EE), Military Liaison Officer (MLO), Field Officer 
(FO), and U.S. Army Engineer conducted a multi-sectoral 
assessment in Batagram District to better understand 
conditions and the response of the donor community.  This 
cable summarizes the results of their assessment and 
analysis, and it provides recommendations for action. 
 
----------------- 
Batagram District 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  In Batagram District, the USAID/DART performed building 
assessments in order to devise an effective earthquake 
mitigation strategy.  The USAID/DART EE and SSA observed 
that approximately 65 percent of the buildings are stone 
masonry, 15 percent are reinforced concrete frame, 15 
percent are brick masonry, and 5 percent are other types, 
including adobe.  Nearly one hundred percent of the building 
stock is non-engineered, was built with poor quality 
materials, and demonstrates poor workmanship.  Most 
buildings are two to three stories, but some are four 
stories. 
 
¶3.  According to the USAID/DART EE and SSA, buildings in 
Batagram District manifest a number of major deficiencies. 
In general, buildings lack integrity between structural 
elements; the wall-to-wall, wall-to-roof, and column-to-beam 
connections are not structurally sound.  Reinforcement 
detailing such as splicing, 90-degree bends in stirrups, 
large spacing of stirrups, and inadequate reinforcement bars 
in columns and beams, is a major problem.  Measures for 
improving earthquake resistance are basic and simple, and 
local masons, technicians, and engineers can learn such 
methods. 
 
¶4.  The USAID/DART EE and SSA reported that some of the 
families affected in the Allai Valley have traveled to other 
settlements where they are temporarily living with relatives 
in a hosting arrangement.  Others have obtained shelter 
materials (primarily tents) and returned to upland villages, 
a small number have moved to informal camps, and some 
affected people have moved into a newly-established 
government of Pakistan (GOP) camp.  An unknown portion of 
those who remain will encounter difficulties obtaining 
adequate food during the winter.  It is uncertain whether 
camp size will increase as winter sets in.  In general, 
people prefer to stay near their homes, especially when 
their livestock and belongings remain in their home area. 
 
¶5.  The USAID/DART EE, SSA, and WSO paid a visit to the 
Batagram office of the Sarhad Rural Support Program (SRSP). 
Following the earthquake, SRSP began implementing relief 
programming.  SRSP has established 42 tented villages in the 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), including seven tented 
villages in Batagram District.  SRSP has not yet erected a 
tented village in Allai Valley.  Each of SRSP's tented 
villages serves an average of 30 families.  To date, SRSP 
has served 9,000 people NWFP.  SRSP works with World Vision 
(WV), the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), and Mercy Corps. 
SRSP is distributing family kits, which include tents, 
blankets, a tarpaulin, utensils, and other supplies, 
provided by UNICEF.  SRSP/Batagram employs one engineer and 
six humanitarian aid workers. 
 
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Jessul 
------ 
 
¶6.  After the office visit, the SRSP staff joined the 
USAID/DART EE, SSA, and WSO on a visit to the tent village 
in Jessul, which SRSP has developed for 25 families.  The 
USAID/DART EE and SSA observed damaged houses and other 
building structures and met with people affected by the 
earthquake.  Affected people in Jessul stated that their 
first priority is finding a job and their second is 
repairing and rebuilding their houses.  Currently, the tents 
in Jessul are pitched in the upland agricultural land. 
People are using the same traditional water sources that 
they were using prior to the earthquake, and they are using 
drainage ditches next to fields for sanitation.  These 
practices, coupled with the small number of households 
occupying tents in the village, minimize the need for water 
and sanitation interventions.  Beginning in March, the 
affected population will need the land on which the tents 
are pitched for sowing crops.  Therefore, it is imperative 
to facilitate seismic-resistant construction training 
immediately to ensure that imminent repair and rebuilding 
activities do not reflect past building practices.  This 
could be achieved through a cash-for-training (CFT) program 
that would rapidly expand knowledge of seismic-resistance 
construction among local masons, carpenters, and building 
professionals. 
 
¶7.  Cognizant of the need to commence with agricultural 
activities at the outset of spring, people are beginning to 
repair and rebuild their houses, to the extent possible, in 
hopes of beginning full reconstruction in the spring.  Those 
interviewed remarked that they were waiting for aftershocks 
to subside before beginning to rebuild their homes.  They 
expressed the hope that the GOP would help them reconstruct 
through loans, compensation, or other mechanisms.  They plan 
to begin repair activities in approximately two weeks. 
 
----- 
Mehra 
----- 
 
¶8.  The USAID/DART MLO and the U.S. Army Engineer traveled 
with representatives from the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) to the Mehra site, approximately 40 
kilometers (km) northwest of Batagram, on the banks of the 
Indus River and just off the Karakorum highway.  At this 
site, the GOP military proposes to build a tented camp to 
house 40,000 to 50,000 people.  The USAID/DART team observed 
very little earthquake-related damage along the Karakorum 
highway, with the exception of one small village, about half 
of which had slid down a slope.  Survivors from this village 
are living in tents in their fields along the river.  Road 
damage to Karakorum highway is minimal. 
 
¶9.  At Mehra, the team spoke with the Pakistani colonel 
responsible for establishing the tented camp.  He stated 
that the GOP intends for people living at higher elevations 
to move to the camp, which is well below the snow line, 
before winter begins.  Although the slope of the tent site 
is not too steep, and the camp has access to water, the site 
is not large enough to meet Sphere Project Guidelines (SPG) 
for the projected population.  Currently, 1,000 people are 
at the site and are receiving support from local non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs).  The OCHA representative 
stated that up to 70 percent of the total local population 
of 140,000 to 190,000 people may move down from the 
mountains.  Representatives of local NGOs, however, believe 
that many of these people will likely stay with relatives or 
in other villages. 
 
¶10.  GOP military representatives at Mehra told the 
USAID/DART that the GOP military has a few hundred tents but 
needs 6,000 to 7,000 tents for this tent city.  The GOP 
military plans to divide the camp into six to eight sectors, 
to correspond with existing villages, and proposes to build 
a helipad to facilitate movement of supplies to the camp. 
The OCHA representative stated that OCHA plans to remain 
closely involved in the planning process, providing the GOP 
military with advice and coordination with NGO partners as 
needed.  GOP military representatives at Mehra are aware of 
their knowledge gaps, and appear willing to work with OCHA 
on camp establishment and management. 
 
------------------------ 
Technical Considerations 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  The site for the proposed 40,000-person GOP camp near 
the Allai Valley is significantly smaller than SPG would 
suggest.  A 40,000-person camp requires 1.8 million square 
meters of space, whereas the current useable camp area may 
be less than 100,000 square meters, according to a 
representative of OCHA.  Many people leaving the valley are 
staying with family and friends, or they are obtaining 
shelter materials and then returning to upland villages. 
Others would remain in a lowland shelter of some kind only 
until aftershocks subside. [Comment. At this time, 
aftershocks continue.  End comment.]  Most people 
interviewed suggested that social and cultural concerns 
would undermine occupancy in a camp setting, indicating that 
people will probably not remain in the GOP camp through the 
winter. 
 
¶12.  Many people suggested that as an alternative to tents, 
which people are willing to accept in lieu of alternative 
shelter options, they could utilize corrugated galvanized 
iron (CGI) sheets and a small package of tools and household 
items in order to create a habitable space from salvaged 
building materials, and cover it with a solid, weatherproof 
roof.  Of note, all people interviewed preferred CGI sheets 
over tents, stating that they could re-use the CGI sheets as 
part of a more permanent shelter solution in the spring. 
This finding suggests the need for the design of 
transitional shelter packages featuring CGI sheets, which 
can bridge the gap between relief and reconstruction 
activities.  These packages could be supplemented with 
straightforward information on seismic-resistant 
construction measures that could be featured in the CFT 
program discussed above.  Such an effort would promote the 
broader objective of quote Building Back Better, Safer, and 
Faster end quote. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Save the Children Food Distribution 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  The USAID/DART FO and ELO visited a Save the Children 
(SC) distribution activity.  The distribution included 
sleeping bags, tents, and a one-week supply of food rations 
for one family.  Using effective local community organizers, 
SC distributed these baskets at a location approximately 45 
minutes outside the town boundary.  The USAID/DART witnessed 
a well-organized distribution at which needy families, who 
were previously identified and provided with a coupon by 
local leaders, came to redeem the coupon for the relief 
package.  The USAID/DART heard reports that the recipients 
appreciated this orderly system, and the system allowed SC 
to systematically and efficiently cover their target area. 
 
¶14.  This system of distribution gives SC strong relations 
with their beneficiaries and a solid network of capable 
leaders.  It therefore provides them with a solid platform 
on which they can carry out the rest of the USAID/OFDA grant 
in shelter, cash-for-work (CFW), education, and 
psychological and social work with youth.  SC proposes to 
carry out these activities in Batagram and in Bana village 
in the Allai valley.  Though SC is still in the beginning 
stages of implementation of this grant, the USAID/DART was 
impressed with the plans and preparations for the execution 
of grant activities. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
USAID/DART Meeting With OCHA Representative 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  Upon the arrival of the USAID/DART, Edward Pearn of the 
OCHA Field Camp briefed the team.  On October 30, the U.N. 
had begun holding general donor coordination meetings, and 
recently the U.N. began holding health cluster meetings with 
the NGOs and other humanitarian relief agencies operating in 
Batagram District.  The USAID/DART attended the general 
donor coordination meeting and listened to progress reports 
from organizations working in various sectors, including 
organizations involved in the camp initiated by the GOP 
military at Mehra. 
 
¶16.  [Comment:  Regarding U.N. coordination efforts, the 
USAID/DART noted that nearly one month after the earthquake, 
the U.N. is just beginning to coordinate relief efforts in 
this area.  At present, only three U.N. representatives work 
in this camp.  In addition, local and international NGOs 
have stated that establishing camps as proposed by the GOP 
may not be the best approach to address the shelter crisis 
for those in the Allai valley who reportedly prefer to stay 
in their home areas.  Many international agencies recognize 
that the establishment of centralized camps should be used 
as a back-up to other shelter options.  In summary, to date, 
the U.N. has not effectively carried out its responsibility 
of coordinating the relief efforts, and the U.N. may be 
supporting a potentially ineffective shelter solution.  End 
comment.] 
 
------------------------------- 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  Based on its assessment, the USAID/DART concluded the 
following: 
 
-- The U.N. is slow in starting its task of coordinating 
relief activities in Batagram District. 
 
-- SC appears to be doing well distributing commodities 
provided by the U.S. military.  SC appears to be on track 
for effective implementation of its USAID/OFDA grant. 
 
-- NGOs question the priority of establishing temporary 
camps. 
 
-- The camp proposed at Mehra could not house as large a 
population as proposed and comply with SPG.  The tent 
village at Jessul that was spontaneously established does 
not currently comply with SPG, although there are no major 
water and sanitation problems now. 
 
¶18.  Based on its conclusions, the USAID/DART recommends the 
following: 
 
-- CFW and CFT programs should be implemented in villages 
similar to Jessul.  Villages like Jessul are ideal settings 
for these types of programs. 
 
-- Under the umbrella management of local organizations such 
as Rural Support Program Network (RSPN), SRSP would be an 
effective implementing partner for CFW or CFT programs and 
shelter activities. 
 
-- Relief programs should address the need to enhance the 
knowledge and capacity of those engaged in construction of 
earthquake-resistant structures.  This type of program 
should begin immediately, as people are attempting to repair 
and rebuild houses. 
 
-- As a complement to CFT programs to build capacity to 
engage in seismic-resistant construction practices, USAID- 
funded programs should raise earthquake awareness among the 
general population through public information campaigns. 
 
CROCKER