This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HO CHI MINH CITY 001155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PREL PGOV PINR VM HUMANR DPOL
SUBJECT: MEDIA, DISSIDENTS AND THE PARTY: DILEMAS AND POLITICAL 
TENSIONS IN VIETNAM 
 
REF:  A) Hanoi 2068; B) HCMC 1151 
 
¶1. (U) This is a joint Hanoi-HCMC cable. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  Vastly differing media treatment of dissident 
Hoang Minh Chinh in Hanoi and HCMC newspapers underscores the 
differences between conservatives and reformers within the Party 
in advance of the 10th Party Congress.  Soon after Chinh made 
critical remarks in the United States of Vietnam's human rights 
record and Communist ideology, Hanoi media launched a scathing 
series of attacks against the dissident.  In contrast, HCMC media 
avoided the story completely until the Party demanded that they 
follow suit.  While a senior HCMC media contact believes that 
Chinh can return home safely, Ministry of Public Security contacts 
in Hanoi are neither optimistic about Chinh's future in Vietnam, 
nor about other dissidents that follow suit.  End Summary. 
 
Contrasting Media Treatment of Hoang Minh Chinh 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Soon after dissident Hoang Minh Chinh made a series of 
public appearances in the United States in October criticizing 
Vietnam's human rights record and Communist ideology, the HCMC 
editions of Hanoi-based newspapers launched a campaign attacking 
Chinh and defending orthodox Communist Party dogma.  Calling Chinh 
a "rambling old man," one typical editorial in Nhan Dan -- the 
Party mouthpiece -- vigorously defended "the vitality of Marxism, 
with its noble, humane ideals, and with dialectical materialism at 
its core, [which] has survived the challenge of time."  Another 
November 4 article in Nhan Dan entitled "Traitor Unmasked," 
attacked Chinh for his support during the Cold War of "peaceful 
coexistence" with the United States, for supporting the "enemies 
of Marxism-Leninism," and for "embracing the feet of the 
invaders."  By our count, since mid-October, there have been at 
least 17 anti-Chinh articles and editorials appearing in HCMC 
emanating from Hanoi-based media outlets.  (Per ref A, Chinh, the 
former Director of the Marxist-Leninist Institute until 1967, 
traveled to the U.S. in early October for medical treatment.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) There were no articles in leading HCMC dailies for at 
least the first week of the anti-Chinh campaign.  Two media 
contacts told us that HCMC's leading dailies made a calculated 
decision to remain silent.  One press contact added that, although 
he did not agree with everything Chinh said, there were elements 
of his discourse that were reasonable.  In any case, the contact 
did not think it "unreasonable" that Chinh be allowed to say 
whatever he wished to say, so long as he did not encourage 
violence.  A long-time Embassy contact, Senior Colonel Tran Nhung 
(protect) of the Quan Doi Nhan Dan ("People's Army"), said that, 
"One has to respect Chinh for maintaining his views in spite of 
everything he has been through." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Another HCMC media contact reported that on or about 
October 27, the Party's Central Department for Ideology and 
Culture ordered the formation of a special group of columnists to 
prepare articles discrediting Chinh and defending Marxism- 
Leninism.  Immediately thereafter, HCMC's leading dailies Thanh 
Nien and Tuoi Tre began running a number articles critical of 
Chinh.  A Deputy Managing Editor told us that HCMC newspapers were 
told that it was "their political duty" to run the Chinh stories. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In contrast to their Hanoi-based colleagues, HCMC's major 
dailies ran only five articles on Chinh.  They also were milder in 
tone and, in some cases, less prominently placed.  Tuoi Tre, 
perhaps HCMC's most reform-oriented newspaper, ran only one 
article, placed on the penultimate page to the October 30 edition. 
 
Can Chinh Return to Vietnam? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) During a recent meeting, a senior editor of one of HCMC's 
newspapers said that tensions and jockeying for position within 
the Party ahead of the 10th Party Congress helped explain the 
intense campaign against the dissident.  Chinh was a target that 
conservatives could exploit.  Nonetheless, our contact was 
optimistic that the Party would not order arrest Chinh should he 
return.  While this undoubtedly would not have been the case even 
a few years ago, today most Party leaders seem to understand that 
arresting Chinh would only raise the dissident's profile.  They 
also appreciate that his arrest would cause unnecessary tension 
with the United States.  Other Embassy contacts have not been as 
optimistic about Chinh's future in Vietnam.  "Chinh has broken a 
lot of laws over there," one Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
told a Hanoi PolOff at an informal dinner.  "It would be better if 
he doesn't come back to Vietnam."  One of the other MPS officials 
at the dinner, after a few glasses of wine, noted that Chinh's 
comments (and those of CPV dissident novelist Duong Thu Huong, 
whose criticism of the Vietnamese regime while visiting France 
made the New York Times' front page) were so public that "if they 
return, the GVN will be in a very bad position."  The MPS 
officials, who are from the office that would likely order such an 
arrest if it occurred, said that MPS would be under a great deal 
of pressure from conservatives to arrest both dissidents upon 
their return to Vietnam.  They stopped short, however, of stating 
categorically that they would be arrested. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER DISSIDENTS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The MPS officials stressed that they had anticipated 
Chinh's high-profile attacks before granting him permission to 
travel, but had let him go anyway.  "We told the Embassy 
explicitly that this would happen," a Senior Colonel told PolOff. 
"But we let him go anyway.  This should be considered when 
evaluating Vietnam's human rights record."  After a long and 
dramatic pause to light a cigarette, he added, "this is probably 
what we should expect if we allow Nguyen Dan Que (another high 
profile, dissident) to travel to the United States, isn't it?" 
PolOff shrugged.  "In that case," the MPS official continued, "if 
he goes, he had better not come back."  For his part, Que told 
Embassy and ConGenOffs in mid-October that he is watching the 
outcome of the Chinh case carefully before he decides whether to 
pursue his travel plans to the United States. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: Hoang Minh Chinh and Duong Thu Huong present a 
dilemma for the GVN in general and the MPS General Department of 
Security (charged with keeping dissidents under control) in 
particular: getting them out of Vietnam eliminates a local 
headache, but the dissidents' public denunciations of the regime 
make it very difficult to allow them back into Vietnam.  As the 
MPS officials pointed out, Vietnamese law outlaws the 
international public criticism these dissidents have engaged in. 
To let them return to Vietnam, and not arrest them, would be a 
very public decision not to apply these laws.  If it were possible 
to shield them from arrest and prosecution (in defiance of the 
hard-line voices who have been so prolific in recent weeks), it 
would then set a precedent that would be hard to overturn.  We 
would certainly welcome such a development as an enormous 
improvement in the climate for freedom of expression in Vietnam, 
but we would be surprised to see such a radical change in a 
society that is so dedicated to incremental political reform.  For 
our part, we will continue to urge our GVN interlocutors to 
exercise restraint, underlining that the GVN will do itself no 
favors internationally by arresting Chinh or forcing him into 
exile.  End Comment. 
 
WINNICK