This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 
TELEMETRY ISSUES, NOVEMBER 8, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 231077 
     ¶B. JCIC-XXV-043 (03 GENEVA 3025) 
     ¶C. JCIC-XXVI-038 (04 GENEVA 2967) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-044. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 8, 2005 
                Time:  10:15 - 11:30 A.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
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SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A working group meeting was held at the U.S. Mission 
on November 8, 2005, to discuss Russian concerns with U.S. 
telemetry information provided for a Peacekeeper (PK) 
flight-test of March 12, 2003, and Trident flight-test 
maneuvers.  The Russian Delegation complained about the 
inability of Russian telemetry experts to convert the digital 
data from the U.S. PK flight-test into "video" code.  The 
Russians indicated they had a problem with the timing 
references provided by the U.S.  Additionally, the Russians 
raised, once again, the U.S. practice of Trident II 
flight-tests and their assertion that the U.S. is testing the 
missile with more reentry vehicle (RV) dispensing operations 
than the number of warheads attributed to it.  The U.S. 
Delegation responded that it had heard nothing new in today's 
presentation and, as the U.S had stated in the past, the U.S. 
is in full compliance with the Treaty, and has fulfilled all 
its obligations. 
 
----------------------- 
PEACEKEEPER FLIGHT- 
TEST OF MARCH 12, 2003, 
TELEMETRY RECORDINGS 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) At a working group meeting, held at the U.S. Mission 
on November 8, 2005, Razumov began by raising the issue of 
the U.S. PK ICBM flight-test of March 12, 2003.  He stated 
that the Russians were still unable to play back telemetric 
data broadcast on frequency 2344.5 MHz recorded on tape 18. 
Russia still believed that the U.S. had used a new method of 
recording data, as stated in the Russian Non-Paper dated June 
30, 2003 (REF A).  He said that Russia understood the reason 
for the U.S. failure to respond to the question during 
JCIC-XXV because of the short notice in which the U.S. had 
received the non-paper.  Subsequently, during JCIC-XXVI, the 
U.S. Delegation responded to the question, but only to state 
that the U.S. was in complete compliance with the Treaty (REF 
B).  Razumov stated that Russia was not accusing the U.S. of 
violating the Treaty, but that it just wanted clarification 
on how to convert the digital data into "video" code so it 
could assess the telemetric information in question.  (Begin 
comment:  U.S. Delegation understood that Russia was 
referring to conversion of data to "digital" data and the use 
of the term video code was an error in translation.  End 
comment.)  As previously stated by the Russian Delegation, 
they still sought an answer to the question:  "Does the 
Russian Federation need new equipment in addition to the 
Metrum 64 to read the information provided?"  Razumov stated 
he understood that the Treaty provided for the Parties to 
determine their own recording practices, but said the other 
side must be able to play back the recordings.  He attempted 
to discuss the definition of telemetric recording practices 
as stipulated in the Treaty.  He acknowledged the 
long-standing differences in the Parties' interpretations of 
what constitutes "playback."  He added that Russia's experts 
needed assistance in converting the digital data into what he 
termed as "video" code. 
¶5.  (S) Mullins thanked Razumov for his comments and asked 
whether there were any comments from the other Parties. 
Shevtsov remarked that Russia was justified in their 
concerns.  He saw the need for a bilateral discussion on the 
matter in an effort to resolve this situation.  He recalled 
how the Russian Federation assisted U.S. efforts to 
understand the new recording media (compact discs) used by 
Russia.  He stated how Russia had provided everything the 
United States needed for the new method of reading recorded 
telemetric data. 
 
¶6.  (S) Mullins thanked Shevtsov for his comments, and asked 
Razumov to clarify whether Russia had an issue with the 
timing references provided by the United States.  Razumov 
replied yes, there was a problem.  It had taken Russia over a 
year to process the data provided, but it was still unable to 
assess the telemetric information because it could not link 
the telemetric information to the time reference, so there 
must have been a problem with the timing reference.  He 
stated that, given the fact that Russian experts were unable 
to fully play back the telemetry, the U.S. must have used a 
new method to encode the timing reference.  Mullins replied 
that Russia had received a full recording, and that it was 
everything that the United States also had.  Razumov agreed, 
but said Russian experts still could not read it. 
 
¶7.  (S) Mullins stated that he would need to take Russia's 
concerns about timing data back to Washington.  He also 
acknowledged the requirement for the other Parties to be able 
to play back the telemetric information, but the Treaty did 
not require the Parties to provide analytical equipment. 
Razumov, seeking further clarification asked, "What mode was 
used -- was it pre-detection or post-detection?  Do you 
modulate the data or apply other algorithms to it?  Does 
Russia need additional equipment to process this 
information?"  Mullins replied, "Not for playback."  Razumov 
asked whether the U.S. had any plans to use this recording 
method in the future.  Mullins stated that it was possible, 
and asked the reason for the question.  "We need it to verify 
the Treaty," replied Razumov. 
 
------------------ 
TRIDENT II FLIGHT- 
TEST PRACTICES 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S) Razumov discussed the U.S. practice of Trident II 
flight-tests.  He acknowledged that this topic had been 
talked about in the past at length.  To highlight Russia's 
concerns, he showed Mullins a table of Russia's analysis of 
dispensing maneuvers from Trident flight-tests which, he 
said, showed that the U.S. engaged in more RV dispensing 
operations than the number of warheads that are attributed to 
the missile.  (Begin comment:  This table is an update to the 
one previously provided in REF C, but includes additional 
flight data information for tests between February 26, 2004, 
and March 2, 2005.  As the table cannot be put into a 
readable format for this cable, it will be E-mailed to the 
State Department separately for dissemination upon request. 
End comment.)  Razumov asked the U.S. to bring its practices 
into compliance with the Treaty as the U.S. had done during 
the flight-tests between 2004 and 2005.  (Begin comment: 
Russia has stated that it did not see any extra dispensing 
operations than the attributed number of warheads to the 
missile on the flight-tests conducted during this time.  End 
comment.)  In response, Mullins stated that the U.S. was in 
compliance and did not engage in the practice of testing 
missiles with more RVs than the number of warheads attributed 
to them. 
¶9.  (S) Shevtsov stated the importance and relevance of this 
portion of the Treaty.  Although the intent of the Treaty was 
to permit verification of compliance, he understood that 
advancements in technology could make it impossible to 
distinguish dispensing operations from other maneuvers.  He 
associated this situation with that of the proposed plenary 
statement of Trident II RVOSI procedures, saying that maybe 
this issue was not so important, without prejudice to Treaty 
provisions, of course.  But, he said Ukraine supported the 
Russian position regarding this issue.  He stated that, in 
his technical expert opinion, he did not see the need for nor 
understand the U.S. requirement for accomplishing extra 
procedures during flight-tests.  He asked the U.S. to "just 
not do it." 
 
¶10.  (S) Mullins responded that the U.S. had not changed its 
testing practices, and was in complete compliance with the 
Treaty.  He directed Razumov back to the Treaty definition of 
"procedures for dispensing RVs," which included a maneuver to 
an aim point and a release command for one or more RVs, 
whether or not an RV is actually released.  He stated that, 
as told to the Parties in the past, the U.S. practice of 
conducting extra SCDM maneuvers was for range safety and test 
observation purposes.  Mullins noted the only new idea 
presented was by Shevtsov's comment that the Treaty provision 
seemed to have lost its practical importance given that 
missile systems have become more sophisticated. 
 
¶11.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Reference Data on the Number of Dispensing Maneuvers 
during Launches of U.S. SLBMs for the Period 1995 - 2005, 
dated November 8, 2005 (E-mailed to State/VCI) 
 
¶12.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Maj Mitchner 
Mr. Singer 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Lt Col Zoubek 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Col Razumov 
Lt Col Novikov 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
Mr. Dotsenko 
MGEN Fedotov 
 
¶13.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Cassel