This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 GENEVA 002750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) RUSSIAN-HOSTED RECEPTION, 
NOVEMBER 8, AND NEXT SESSION DISCUSSION AT CLOSING PLENARY 
MEETING, NOVEMBER 9, 2005 
 
REF: GENEVA 2749 (JCIC-XXVII-046) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-033. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 8, 2005 
               Event:  Russian-Hosted Reception 
                Time:  6:30 P.M. - 8:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
                       AND 
 
        Meeting Date:  November 9, 2005 
               Event:  Closing Plenary Meeting 
                Time:  9:30 - 10:30 A.M. 
        Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) During a Russian-hosted reception on November 8, 
2005, U.S. JCIC Delegation members engaged the other Parties' 
Delegation members on various topics under discussion in the 
JCIC.  Topics included:  potential dates for the next 
inspections at U.S. Navy sites; Tridents in containers; the 
possibility of a Minuteman III demo; SS-25 first stage rocket 
motors at the Bershet' C or E facility; SS-25 
launch-associated support vehicles; RSM-56 attribution; 
Ukrainian CTR issues; Belarusian comments on U.S. voting at 
UN First Committee meeting; and thoughts on timing for the 
next JCIC session.  Specific conversations are reported below. 
 
¶4.  (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on 
November 9, 2005, the delegations also briefly discussed 
timing for the next session of the JCIC, also reported below. 
 The Ukrainians suggested the session should be no shorter 
than two weeks and held in May.  Belarus indicated that May 
was problematic.  The U.S. said timing and duration should be 
discussed in diplomatic channels.  Russia indicated that 
timing and duration should be based on substance and 
prospects for resolution of issues. 
 
-------------------------- 
NEXT NAVY FACILITY VISITS? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko when the Navy should 
expect a visit now that the Trident II RVOSI issue has been 
resolved.  Fedorchenko stated that he personally plans to 
visit Silverdale in one week.  (Begin comment:  This implies 
the week of November 14, 2005, or possibly November 21, 2005. 
 End comment.)  Fedorchenko also stated his deputy, Captain 
Kuzmin, or an associate would visit Kings Bay shortly 
thereafter suggesting "then we can all start the new year 
with a clear mind." 
 
--------------------- 
TRIDENT IN CONTAINERS 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Feliciano asked Fedorchenko what, in his mind, would 
make him happy with respect to the Trident II Loading Tubes. 
Feliciano also asked whether Fedorchenko really wanted to be 
able to request the removal of a Trident I and Trident II 
from the containers within the same Treaty year.  Fedorchenko 
stated "as I've told you before, if the U.S. would just make 
a statement in the agreement to the effect that Trident I is 
in the process of being decommissioned and the U.S. would 
like to focus on Trident II, then we would be fine with it." 
Fedorchenko emphasized, "we know darn well that the U.S. will 
no longer deploy Trident I and we know it will take some time 
to eliminate all of them.  So the U.S. should make a similar 
statement as it did with the Trident II RVOSI issue.  That is 
to say, the U.S. wanted to focus on the Trident II RVOSI 
because the Trident I was no longer being deployed." 
------------------- 
MINUTEMAN III DEMO? 
------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Fedorchenko mentioned to Deihl and Feliciano that 
Russia was still not happy with Minuteman III RVOSI 
procedures, in that Russian inspectors remained concerned 
that they cannot confirm that there are no RVs under the 
"skirt" area of the missile during viewing.  He stated that a 
demonstration should be conducted similar to Trident to ease 
Russian concerns.  He further stated that the verification 
could be done more effectively if the front section was 
positioned horizontally so inspectors could see all the way 
around it.  Fedorchenko did not state that Russia would make 
this an issue in the future. 
 
------------------------- 
SS-25 FIRST STAGE 
ROCKET MOTORS AT BERSHET' 
C OR E FACILITY 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Kuehne and Buttrick thanked Fedorchenko for the 
clarifications provided by the Russian Delegation on the 
issues resulting from the August 2005 data update inspection 
at the Bershet' Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Facility. 
Fedorchenko stated that Russia was still working on how to 
resolve the issue related to permitting U.S. inspectors to 
view and measure the containers for SS-25 first-stage rocket 
motors that were stored within the boundaries of the Bershet' 
C or E Facility while awaiting propellant removal.  Kuehne 
and Buttrick suggested, that if Russia could remove the SS-25 
first-stage containers from within the boundary of the site 
diagram, the problem would be solved.  Kuehne said that, 
since the SS-25 first stages were attributed to the Votkinsk 
C or E Facility, the Treaty permits these SS-25 first-stage 
motors to be outside the boundaries of a declared facility 
because the stages would be at an allowed location, other 
than the C or E Facility, awaiting propellant removal. 
Fedorchenko said that he understood, but since there are a 
limited number of secure and safe buildings to store rocket 
motors at Bershet', they must also store the SS-25 ICBM 
containers in the same buildings with SS-24 ICBMs that are 
attributed to Bershet'.  Fedorchenko said that if the United 
States could provide funds for a new building, Kuehne and 
Buttrick's suggestion would work, but Russia has limited 
funds.  Therefore, Russia must find alternative solutions to 
address this problem during future data update inspections at 
Bershet'. 
 
----------------------- 
SS-25 LAUNCH ASSOCIATED 
SUPPORT VEHICLES 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Buttrick stated to Fedorchenko that he personally 
hoped that Russia would reconsider withdrawing its proposal 
for placing a distinguishing mark on declared SS-25 
launch-associated support vehicles (LASVs).  Buttrick said 
that the U.S. and Russian Delegations had worked hard on the 
issue for several years and that it was his view that this 
issue was worth pursuing further.  Buttrick said that there 
were some positive outcomes as a result of Russia's proposal; 
Russia now declares LASVs during pre-inspection briefings. 
Fedorchenko agreed, but stated that U.S. inspector comments 
during recent data update inspections had given reason for 
Russia's leadership to reconsider the utility of continuing 
to place marks on LASVs, if U.S. inspectors continued to make 
the same comments in inspection reports that all SS-25 LASVs 
were not being declared at the bases.  Fedorchenko stated 
emphatically that Russia was declaring all of the SS-25 LASVs 
during inspections.  He said that Russia could not understand 
why the U.S. did not believe that all SS-25 LASVs were being 
declared since they had placed the distinguishing mark on all 
of those vehicles that provide direct support for ICBM 
launches.  Buttrick said he had discussed this issue with 
other members of the U.S. Delegation and that the Delegation 
plans to review this issue in Washington as soon as it 
returns.  In the meantime, Buttrick said that he hoped the 
Parties could continue to work the issue, and that it was 
premature to "start over" on this issue.  Fedorchenko said 
that he had also discussed this issue with the Russian 
Delegation.  As a result of the discussion, they had sent a 
letter back to Moscow informing the Russian leadership that 
the United States was willing to continue to work the 
proposal.  Fedorchenko stated that he was confident that 
Russia would continue to place the distinguishing marks on 
the LASVs, but it was incumbent upon the United States to 
address the issue by informing its inspectors not to make the 
same write-up in the inspection reports.  Buttrick asked 
Fedorchenko, if the U.S. were to accept the approach to the 
LASVs, would Russia replace the paper distinguishing marks on 
the LASVs with a mark that would be more permanent. 
Fedorchenko said that it was Russia's intention to make the 
marks more permanent, but the next steps and the decision for 
Russia to move forward would be based on a positive U.S. 
response to the approach. 
 
----------------------------- 
RYZHKOV COMMENTS ON TRIDENT 
ISSUES,RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND 
RUSSIA'S SS-25 DEMO PROPOSAL 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor welcomed Ryzhkov to the work of the JCIC, 
saying it seemed that when he arrived solutions to problems 
were not far behind.  Ryzhkov demurred, saying that the 
ground work had been laid and he happened on the scene by 
chance.  He said it had been a protracted struggle in the 
Russian interagency coming to closure on the Trident RVOSI 
and Trident in Containers issues and reason had won out on 
the RVOSI issue.  As for the container issue, it was his hope 
that it could be resolved at the next session.  When 
questioned about the attribution and throw-weight data for 
the RSM-56 SLBM, Ryzhkov said that the necessary information 
was available but it too was caught up in an interagency 
struggle.  However, he felt certain that the necessary data 
would be provided by Christmas.  Taylor said that the RVOSI 
proposal by Russia was well-received by the U.S. Delegation 
and he hoped that a formal response on Russia's proposal 
would be forthcoming soon.  Ryzhkov said that the proposal 
was a radical one and one that many in the Russian 
interagency had objected too.  It was based on the work done 
by the United States for the Trident RVOSI and, remembering 
Dr. Look's comment that sometimes the Parties must look at 
problems from many viewpoints and in relation to other 
issues, Russia had adopted this concept.  Ryzhkov said he was 
glad the two Parties were beginning to work more 
cooperatively and perhaps the U.S. could focus on ways to 
resolve Russia's concerns for MM III RVOSIs next. 
 
---------------------- 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
ON RUSSIA'S SS-25 
DEMONSTRATION PROPOSAL 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Venevtsov asked Taylor whether there was anything in 
the SS-25 RVOSI proposal that the U.S. had questions about. 
Taylor said that the U.S. Delegation was pleased with the 
initiative Russia had shown in the proposal and would work to 
get a U.S. response as quickly as possible once he returned 
to Washington.  Questions that the Delegation had raised 
involved how the measurements taken during the demonstration 
would be applied to later RVOSIs.  Additionally, measurements 
of the rings, their placement during the demonstration, and 
measurements of the positions of the rings were all 
important.  Taylor asked Boryak whether he had witnessed the 
demonstration.  Boryak said that he had not, since the demo 
was a virtual demonstration at this point.  Details of the 
procedures were still being worked out.  Taylor asked how 
long it would take before the demo was ready to be conducted. 
 Boryak said that, after the U.S. indicated it would accept 
the offer to attend the demo, it would be approximately 30 
days. 
 
-------------------------- 
UKRAINIAN ISSUES REVISITED 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Shevtsov said that he appreciated the opportunity to 
hold bilateral discussions and hoped that Buttrick would 
relay the information from the meeting held that afternoon 
(REFTEL).  Taylor acknowledged that indeed Buttrick had 
informed him of the meeting.  Taylor emphasized that he 
appreciated Ukraine's concerns, however, the JCIC was not the 
appropriate forum for discussion of the CTR issues that 
Shevtsov had raised.  However, the U.S. Delegation would see 
that the information was provided to the Department of 
Defense and the CTR office.  Shevtsov said he felt that the 
Commission should return to the old way of doing business, 
with having two sessions a year rather than two parts to a 
session.  They should be longer so that the Parties could 
have an effective dialogue on the issues.  With the short 
sessions, Ukraine could only present its proposal on 
Pavlograd and the United States did not have an opportunity 
to respond.  Taylor reminded Shevtsov that, when the Parties 
use the intersessional period to the maximum, Parties were 
prepared to respond.  As for the issue that Ukraine had 
placed on the agenda, there had been no such communication as 
to the proposal nor to the details of the issue.  Thus, the 
U.S. could not be expected to respond this session. 
 
----------------- 
MASTERKOV ASKS 
ABOUT JCIC-XXVIII 
----------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Masterkov asked Taylor when he thought the next 
session should be held.  Taylor said that Washington had not 
considered any dates at this point.  The work of the 
just-concluded session would first be analyzed and then 
discussions during the intersession would dictate the timing, 
agenda and duration of the next session. 
 
----------------------- 
BELARUS DISSATISFACTION 
WITH U.S.VOTING AT UN 
FIRST COMMITTEE MEETING 
----------------------- 
¶14.  (S) Baichorov stated to Mitchner and Deihl that he had 
just returned from New York where he attended the UN First 
Committee (Disarmament and International Security) meetings. 
He mentioned that Conference on Disarmament (CD) Ambassador 
Sanders was the U.S. representative.  He expressed 
frustration with the United States, noting that, with the 
exception of the United States, all countries, including the 
United States' "very best allies England and France," 
approved a Belarus proposal to ban all new types of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems.  Deihl asked 
why he felt the United States did not support the agreement. 
He replied that Sanders had stated that the United States had 
no information on any development of new systems or types of 
WMD at this time and that this type of agreement was 
unnecessary. 
 
-------------------------- 
CLOSING PLENARY DISCUSSION 
OF DATES FOR NEXT SESSION 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) At the conclusion of the closing plenary meeting on 
November 9, 2005, the delegations briefly discussed plans for 
the next session of the JCIC.  Shevtsov proposed that the 
Parties return to two sessions per year, two weeks each in 
May and October.  Baichorov responded that next May does not 
appear to be a good month for the JCIC, as there are already 
other negotiations planned for that time that will require 
the presence of some of the Parties' delegation members, 
including heads of delegation.  Baychorov suggested April may 
be better.  Taylor stated that the timing, duration and 
agenda of future sessions is an issue more appropriate for 
the intersessional dialogue.  Boryak then concluded that 
questions of timing and duration should be based on the 
substance of the issues to be addressed and the prospects for 
resolution of outstanding issues.  He agreed that the Parties 
should consider these questions during the intersession and 
communicate through diplomatic channels. 
 
¶16.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Cassel