This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 GENEVA 002748 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON TRIDENT 
RVOSI AND TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS, NOVEMBER 7, 2005 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 2719 (JCIC-XXVII-039) 
 
     ¶B. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-042. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 7, 2005 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (U) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on November 7, 2005, to further discuss outstanding 
issues on the draft Coordinated Plenary Statement on Trident 
RVOSI and the draft Plenary Statement for Inspections of 
Tridents in Containers. 
 
4..  (S) On the Trident II RVOSI issue, the Russians offered 
specific language which would permit each of the two 
subgroups to observe a single measurement.  The U.S. agreed 
to take the language of the proposal back to the delegation 
for consideration and discuss it further at the Heads of 
Delegation meeting later that day. 
 
¶5.  (S) After considerable discussions regarding Tridents in 
Containers, the Russian and the U.S. Delegations agreed that 
only two issues remained unresolved:  whether two missiles 
(both a Trident I and Trident II) would be removed from their 
containers under the policy arrangement vice only one each 
Treaty year, and the advance removal of specific hatches on 
Trident liners and loading tubes prior to the beginning of 
each data update inspection. 
 
------------- 
TRIDENT RVOSI 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Fedorchenko opened the Working Group meeting on 
outstanding Trident issues at the Russian Mission on November 
7, 2005, and recounted that the U.S. and Russia were in 
agreement on all RVOSI issues except with regard to the 
number of measurements to be taken with the measuring device. 
 He further stated that Russia remained flexible and said he 
had two options to present to solve this issue.  Russia's 
first option, Option 1, was to have each group observe 
facility personnel take successive measurements (two 
measurements per group).  Each group's measurements were to 
be averaged, and then those two averages were to be compared 
and averaged between the two groups for the official 
measurement.  Mullins stated that he wanted to hear Option 2. 
 Option 1 was essentially the same proposal Russia made last 
week which the U.S. did not accept.  The principal issue 
between the U.S. and Russia was the number of measurements to 
be taken. 
 
¶7.  (S) Fedorchenko then read Option 2, which stated that 
each group would observe as facility personnel take one 
measurement to determine length.  If the difference between 
those two measurements did not exceed 3 cm, the measurements 
would be averaged for the official measurement.  The proposal 
went on to attempt to define a process for continuing to take 
measurements in the event the first two measurements differed 
by more than 3 cm.  Following a break for the U.S. Delegation 
to discuss the proposal, Mullins asked for clarification.  If 
the measurements were within the tolerance (benchmark  /- 3 
cm), did this option consider the average of these two 
measurements official?  To which Fedorchenko stated "yes." 
Mullins asked for the specific wording for Option 2 so that 
the U.S. Delegation could take it back and study it further 
and, hopefully, have a response for the scheduled Heads of 
Delegation (HOD) meeting later in the day.  Fedorchenko 
stated that Russia would provide the language, and said that 
it was time to move on to the Tridents in Container issue. 
 
¶8.  (S) Shevtsov added that he understood this to be an issue 
that could be brought to conclusion and said it would be a 
shame if the issue was not resolved because too much 
attention had been paid to this issue.  Fedorchenko commented 
that it was in everyone's interest to solve this, to which 
Grinevich added he believed there was a high possibility of 
solving this issue. 
 
-------------------- 
FEDORCHENKO MENTIONS 
KARTALY CLOSURE 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Before discussing the Trident agenda topics, 
Fedorchenko reiterated that Russia wanted to close the 
Kartaly site boundary reduction issue during this JCIC 
session.  Mullins again stated that the U.S. position was to 
initial the S-Series Joint Statement (JS) after conducting 
the close-out inspection.  In response to Fedorchenko's 
earlier comment (REF A) that he could not imagine what a JS 
would look like under the U.S. approach, Mullins stated that 
a notional illustration of what such a more simple S-Series 
JS might look like would be provided.  Fedorchenko indicated 
that he now understood the U.S. approach and believed that it 
could satisfy Russia's concerns.  Fedorchenko suggested that 
a simple S-Series JS could be initialed at the next session, 
to which Mullins stated it also could be initialed in 
capitals before the next JCIC session, if needed. 
 
Begin text: 
 
                                          JCIC-XXVII 
                                          Draft Text 
                                          November 3, 2005 
 
          Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
               Joint Statement Number S-(BLANK) 
 
              On Changes to the Boundary of the 
        Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs 
 
     The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into 
account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base 
for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint 
Statement, agree on the following: 
 
     (1)  The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site 
diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is 
attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. 
 
     (2)  The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint 
Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram 
of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall not be subject 
to inspection unless such portions are included within the 
boundary of any inspection site. 
     (3)  The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM 
Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on 
the date specified in the notification provided by the 
Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section 
I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or 
the date such notification is provided by the Russian 
Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint 
Statement, whichever is latest. 
 
..... (United States of America) 
..... (Republic of Belarus) 
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
..... (Russian Federation) 
..... (Ukraine) 
 
End text. 
 
---------------------- 
TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS 
---------------------- 
 
 
¶10.  (S) On the issue of Tridents in Containers, Fedorchenko 
stated that the Russian Delegation was interested in hearing 
the U.S. response on the Russian proposal delivered the 
previous Friday, November 4, 2005.  Text of Russian proposal 
follows: 
 
Begin text: 
 
                              Official Translation 
 
                              JCIC-XXVII 
                              Draft Proposed by the 
                              Russian Side 
                              November 4, 2005 
 
       Statement of Policy by (the Republic of Belarus, 
      the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, 
     Ukraine) Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in 
      Liners and Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes During 
                   Data Update Inspections 
 
     (Name of Party) makes the following statement concerning 
its plans with respect to inspection of Trident I SLBMs in 
liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading tubes during data 
update inspections. 
 
     Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by 
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which 
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I 
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading 
tube, (name of Party) will instruct its inspectors, during 
all future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the 
date of this statement, at Strategic Weapons Facility 
Pacific, Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic 
Weapons Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, 
to use the Trident Reference Aid in conjunction with the 
indirect measurement procedures set forth in JCIC Joint 
Statement 25 and viewing procedures set forth in the 
Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for a Trident I 
and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner or loading 
tube, respectively. 
     (Name of Party), as a matter of policy, understands that 
the inspection teams may request a verification removal of an 
SLBM of each of these types from its liner or loading tube no 
more than once each year. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States 
of America that safety and security considerations and time 
constraints during data update inspections at Silverdale 
Submarine Base and Kings Bay Submarine Base will not permit 
all the access hatches that were opened during the June 2000 
demonstrations to be opened on all liners and loading tubes 
containing SLBMs.  (Name of Party) understands that some 
access hatches opened for the June 2000 demonstrations will 
already be removed by that time to permit the viewing of 
unique features of the missiles to confirm their type. 
 
     As a practical approach to confirming the type of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during future inspections, (name of Party) will 
instruct its inspectors to use the following procedures: 
 
     -  At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a 
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay 
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any 
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list 
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the 
in-country escort. 
 
     -  These two liners or loading tubes will have the same 
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 
2000 demonstrations. 
 
     For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes 
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at 
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or 
loading tube, respectively.  The inspection team, as 
necessary during the inspection, may request all access 
hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be 
removed from these liners or loading tubes. 
 
     The United States of America will respond to any such 
requests to remove these access hatches from particular 
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not 
deviate from established safety and security procedures. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes the statement by the United States 
of America that inspection time constraints may limit the 
number of additional access hatches that can be removed 
during an inspection. 
 
     (Name of Party) understands that the United States of 
America will be prepared to implement the above procedures 
for each data update inspection that is conducted at the 
Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base 
beginning 30 days from the date of this statement. 
 
     (Name of Party) notes that this statement of policy, and 
the statements of policy made by the other Parties on this 
matter, will enter into force 30 days after completion of the 
first data update inspection that is conducted at the Kings 
Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale Submarine Base after the 
date of this statement, provided that, during those 30 days, 
no party raises questions through diplomatic channels that: 
 
     1) were recorded in the report for that inspection; 
 
     2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm 
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements 
of policy; and, 
 
     3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection. 
     (Name of Party) understands that the use of the Trident 
Reference Aid, the indirect measurement procedures set forth 
in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the viewing procedures set 
forth in the Inspection Protocol in no way impinge on the 
inspection team's right to request the removal of a Trident 
SLBM from its liner or loading tube if the inspection team is 
unable to confirm the missile type by viewing and measuring 
the missile in its liner or loading tube in conjunction with 
the additional procedures set forth above. 
 
    Statement of Policy by the United States of America 
   Concerning Inspection of Trident I SLBMs in Liners and 
            Trident II SLBMs in Loading Tubes 
              During Data Update Inspections 
 
     The United States of America makes the following 
statement concerning its plans with respect to inspection of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during data update inspections. 
 
     Based on the results of the demonstrations provided by 
the United States of America on June 13-16, 2000, which 
illustrated the unique relationship between the Trident I 
SLBM and its liner and the Trident II SLBM and its loading 
tube, the United States of America expects that, during all 
future data update inspections beginning 30 days from the 
date of this statement at Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, 
Submarine Base Silverdale, Washington, and Strategic Weapons 
Facility Atlantic, Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, 
inspection teams will use the Trident Reference Aid in 
conjunction with the indirect measurement procedures set 
forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25 and viewing procedures set 
forth in the Inspection Protocol to confirm missile type for 
a Trident I and Trident II SLBM with the missile in its liner 
or loading tube, respectively. 
 
     The United States of America understands that the 
inspection teams may request a verification removal of an 
SLBM of each of these types from its liner or loading tube no 
more than once each year. 
 
     The United States of America notes that safety and 
security considerations and time constraints during data 
update inspections at Silverdale and Kings Bay Submarine 
Bases will not permit all the access hatches that were opened 
during the June 2000 demonstrations to be opened on all 
liners and loading tubes containing SLBMs.  The United States 
of America also notes that some access hatches opened for the 
June 2000 demonstrations will already be removed by that time 
to permit the viewing of unique features of the missiles to 
confirm their type. 
 
     As a practical approach to confirming the type of 
Trident I SLBMs in liners and Trident II SLBMs in loading 
tubes during future inspections, the United States of America 
will use the following procedures: 
 
     -  At the conclusion of pre-inspection procedures for a 
data update inspection at the Silverdale and Kings Bay 
Submarine Bases, the inspection team will randomly select any 
two liners or loading tubes containing missiles from a list 
of all missiles in liners or loading tubes provided by the 
in-country escort. 
     -  These two liners or loading tubes will have the same 
hatches removed as the liners or loading tubes in the June 
2000 demonstrations. 
     For any other missiles in liners or loading tubes 
located at the inspected facility, each of them will have at 
least one end hatch removed from each end of the liner or 
loading tube, respectively.  The inspection team, as 
necessary during the inspection, may request all access 
hatches removed for the June 2000 demonstrations to be 
removed from these liners or loading tubes. 
 
     The United States of America will respond to any such 
requests to remove these access hatches from particular 
liners or loading tubes in a timely manner, but will not 
deviate from established safety and security procedures. 
 
     The United States of America notes that inspection time 
constraints may limit the number of additional access hatches 
that can be removed during an inspection. 
 
     The United States of America will be prepared to 
implement the above procedures for each data update 
inspection that is conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base 
or Silverdale Submarine Base beginning 30 days from the date 
of this statement. 
 
     The United States of America notes that this statement 
of policy, and the statements of policy made by the other 
Parties on this matter, will enter into force 30 days after 
completion of the first data update inspection that is 
conducted at the Kings Bay Submarine Base or Silverdale 
Submarine Base after the date of this statement, provided 
that, during those 30 days, no Party raises questions through 
diplomatic channels that: 
 
     1) were recorded in the report for that inspection; 
 
     2) addressed the ability of inspectors to confirm 
missile type using the procedures contained in the statements 
of policy; and, 
 
     3) were not resolved on-site during the inspection. 
 
     The United States of America understands that the use of 
the Trident Reference Aid, the indirect measurement 
procedures set forth in JCIC Joint Statement 25, and the 
viewing procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocol in no 
way impinge on the inspection team's right to request the 
removal of a Trident SLBM from its liner or loading tube if 
the inspection team is unable to confirm the missile type by 
viewing and measuring of the missile in its liner or loading 
tube in conjunction with the additional procedures set forth 
above. 
 
End text. 
 
¶11.  (S) Mullins stated the revised Russian text was not 
helpful and that the Parties were now farther apart.  Mullins 
further stated that the United States had four issues with 
regard to the Russian proposal and he would address them in 
order. 
 
¶12.  (S) The first issue was Russia's inclusion of language 
specifying that two missiles be removed vice the U.S. 
proposal of only one missile to be removed each Treaty year. 
Mullins stated that the U.S. maintains that there should be 
no need for Russia to request more than one missile to be 
removed under this policy arrangement.  He stated that the 
U.S. has made it clear, and that Russia understands, that the 
U.S. acknowledges Russia's right to request a missile be 
removed if an inspector is unable to determine the type of 
missile after using the prescribed procedures.  Mullins then 
addressed the second issue. 
 
----------------------- 
"VERIFICATION" REMOVAL; 
HATCHES; AND TREATY 
BASIS FOR PROCEDURES 
----------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Mullins questioned Russia's inclusion of the words 
"verification removal" to describe this new proposed policy 
pull.  Mullins stated that there is no such type of removal 
and the U.S. has no intention of creating such a distinction. 
 Mullins further stated that the removal of a missile from a 
container addressed in this Statement of Policy is simply a 
removal and should be called such. 
 
¶14.  (S) Mullins pointed out that the latest Russian text 
still specified the hatches to be removed during data update 
inspections.  He stated that the United States did not 
believe specific hatches needed to be identified in the 
policy statement.  Mullins reiterated that it was in the 
United States' best interest to ensure that hatches were 
removed to allow Russian inspectors to properly identify the 
missile contained within and, thus, specific hatches did not 
need to be identified in the policy statement. 
 
¶15.  (S) Mullins also questioned Russia's proposed movement 
of an entire paragraph within the text.  On the original U.S. 
proposed draft (REF A), the paragraph in question was located 
on the first page as the third paragraph.  On the Russian 
proposal, the paragraph was moved to the final paragraph of 
the document.  Mullins explained that the United States 
believed this paragraph should remain at the beginning of the 
document, because it establishes the Treaty basis upon which 
these supplemental measures of the policy statement are 
proposed.  Mullins concluded by stating that this issue was 
important and the U.S. would like to work with the other 
Parties to bring this to closure. 
 
-------------------- 
FEDORCHENKO RESPONDS 
-------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Fedorchenko addressed each issue raised by the U.S. 
He stated first that Russia should have the opportunity to 
request removal of one each of the Trident I and Trident II 
because both missiles are in the U.S. inventory.  He stated 
that some progress could be made, in that the Parties could 
make an agreement on the Trident II only, provided that the 
U.S. would provide information on the future of the Trident I 
missiles.  Fedorchenko addressed the use of the word 
"verification inspection" and stated Russia was simply trying 
to distinguish this type of removal.  He stated that if this 
were the only obstacle to resolving this issue, Russia would 
remove this proposed wording.  Fedorchenko addressed the 
third issue, removal of hatches.  He stated that, since this 
was a statement of policy, Russia felt it should be specific 
and the description was needed to bring clarity to the 
policy.  Fedorchenko then addressed the last issue of the 
paragraph move.  He stated that Russia believed this 
paragraph could be removed completely; that it simply 
reiterated a Treaty right.  However, he explained that it did 
establish the relationship between the new proposed policy 
right and a Treaty right.  Mullins asked for clarification of 
why Russia felt this paragraph could be excluded, to which 
Fedorchenko stated, because the right to remove a missile for 
confirmation of missile type is already prescribed in the 
Inspection Protocol of the Treaty and no one has questioned 
or challenged this right.  He further stated that the last 
few words of the paragraph could be kept, as they set up this 
new proposed policy.  Mullins stated that he understood and 
would take this issue back to the U.S. Delegation. 
¶17.  (S) Mullins returned to the hatch removal issue, stating 
that he understood Russia's desire for clarification on U.S. 
procedures, but the U.S. did not feel this was necessary 
because it remained in the United States' best interest to 
have sufficient hatches removed to allow Russian inspectors 
to verify content.  Mullins stated that the U.S. did not want 
to tie the hands of the Navy to the removal of specific 
hatches, as each facility may operate differently. 
Fedorchenko stated that, since there were other 
insurmountable disagreements with this policy, Russia would 
take this issue back for consideration during the 
intersession.  Mullins replied that the U.S. would take this 
back also, but added that, back in 2000, Russia was satisfied 
with the results of the Trident I demonstration, so during 
the intersession the U.S. would concentrate on Trident II, 
specifically with respect to hatch removal. 
 
¶18.  (S) Mullins then addressed the use of the term 
"verification removal."  Mullins stated that, since 
Fedorchenko said Russia did not see this as a point of 
contention, he assumed this was no longer a show-stopper. 
Fedorchenko stated that Russia could easily agree to the 
deletion of the word "verification," thus bringing closure to 
this particular point.  However, Fedorchenko proceeded to 
explain a "nuance" with regard to the terminology.  He stated 
that the proposed text for the Parties, other than the U.S., 
could stand without this term since it stated "as a matter of 
policy."  Deletion of the term, "verificiation removal," from 
the U.S. text, on the other hand, would be more painful from 
the Russian perspective since the U.S. text does not include 
the same phrasing. 
 
¶19.  (S) Mullins addressed the issue of requesting removal of 
one versus two missiles per Treaty year.  Mullins refocused 
the discussion to the point that, in 2000, both Parties felt 
that the Trident I issue was resolved, even though the 
Parties did not complete any statement of specific policy on 
Trident I.  This, along with the fact that Trident I missiles 
were no longer deployed and were leaving the inventory, 
should ease the other Parties' minds and, thus, there should 
be no need to ever request removal of a Trident I in the 
future.  Concluding, Mullins stated that the U.S. would 
consider this issue in Washington during the intersession. 
Two substantive issues remained:  The number of missiles 
subject to removal (either only Trident II or one of each 
type, Trident I and II), and which hatches, if any, that 
should be specified in the agreement for removal.  Shevtsov 
spoke up and recommended deleting the term "verification" 
from the draft statements, focusing efforts on Trident II 
removal, deleting the paragraph in question (which Russia 
moved to the end), and not including specific hatches to 
remove for Trident verification but rather just stating in 
the policy "as done in the demonstration." 
 
¶20.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
    -- Working Paper containing "Option 2" wording for 
Trident RVOSI, unofficial English translation from Russian, 
undated. 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Mulllins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Deihl 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Smith 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Col Razumov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Lt Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Fokin (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
 
¶22.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley