This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON 
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED SS-25 RVOSI PROCEDURES AND NEW VEHICLES AT 
SS-25 BASES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005 
 
REF: GENEVA 2690 (JCIC-XXVII-035) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-041. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  November 3, 2005 
                Time:  11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (U) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian 
Mission on November 3, 2005, to discuss the Russian-proposed 
SS-25 road-mobile ICBM RV on-site inspection (RVOSI) 
demonstration, and the new vehicles which the Russian 
Federation informally announced will soon be at SS-25 
road-mobile ICBM bases.  All Parties except Kazakhstan were 
represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) On the Russian-proposed RVOSI demonstration, the U.S. 
Delegation stressed the need for relevance between the 
demonstration and future inspections.  The Russian Delegation 
said that, during the demonstration, measurements would be 
made of the outer diameter of two rings, and the inner 
diameter of the aft ring.  The inner diameter of the forward 
ring will be covered.  U.S. inspectors would be permitted to 
make these same measurements during follow-on RVOSIs. 
Moreover, it would be clear where the aft ring was attached 
to the front section.  The U.S. Delegation also asked a 
series of questions related to the logistics of the 
demonstration as well as questions on the status of 
participants.  The Russian Delegation suggested the team 
composition should be similar to an inspection team.  The 
Russian Delegation clarified that they would select the base 
for the demonstration, but the U.S. team would select the re 
stricted area as well as the launcher. 
 
¶5.  (S) With respect to the new vehicles at SS-25 bases, the 
U.S. Delegation asked how the United States would distinguish 
these vehicles from launchers during cooperative measures. 
The Russian Delegation acknowledged that answers to questions 
related to the number of vehicles and where they would be 
located were still unknown and, if problems arose, the issue 
could be discussed in the JCIC.  These vehicles were .78 
meters shorter than SS-25 launchers, had the jack points cut 
off and there was no missile launch canister.  They would 
begin appearing in the Spring of 2006. 
 
------------------------- 
SS-25 RVOSI DEMONSTRATION 
MODELED AFTER TRIDENT 
DEMONSTRATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) At a working group meeting at the Russian Mission on 
November 3, 2005, Buttrick began the meeting by stating that 
it was obvious that a great deal of work had been done in 
Moscow and at the road-mobile ICBM bases.  He explained that 
the U.S. Delegation needed to ask some clarifying questions 
concerning the presentation made by the Russian Delegation at 
a previous meeting (REFTEL).  Buttrick noted Russia's 
explanation that the demonstration was modeled after the 
Trident RVOSI demonstration and stated that demonstrations 
appeared to go a long way towards helping to resolve issues 
and hopefully will.  Buttrick emphasized that the Trident 
RVOSI demonstration proved the relevance between the 
demonstration and what would be seen by inspectors in the 
course of future RV inspections. 
 
------------------ 
WHAT MEASUREMENTS 
WILL BE PERMITTED? 
------------------ 
¶7.  (S) Buttrick asked whether U.S. inspectors on SS-25 
RVOSIs would be permitted to make the same measurements of 
the diameters of the RV cover's forward and aft attachment 
rings that were made during the demonstration to confirm that 
the rings are the same size as those that would be used in 
the demonstration.  He also asked Fedorchenko to explain 
exactly which measurements would be made during the 
demonstration.  Fedorchenko explained that, after observers 
viewed the front section with the standard RVOSI cover, 
Russian escorts would remove the forward and aft rings from 
the front section and place them on the ground one on top of 
the other.  He stated that it would be obvious that the rings 
have the same outer diameter.  Then measurements, as 
described in the Russian briefing, would be made. 
Measurements would be made of the outer diameters of the 
attachment rings.  Observers would also ascertain visually 
that the spokes of the forward attachment ring connecting the 
aft ring to the forward ring are longer than the spokes of 
the aft attachment ring connecting the aft ring to the 
forward ring.  Measurements would be taken of the inner 
diameter of the aft ring; however, the inner diameter of the 
forward ring would be covered.  Buttrick asked whether the 
length of the spokes would be provided.  Fedorchenko 
responded that the length of the spokes could be determined 
by subtracting the inner diameter from the outer diameter. 
Buttrick asked whether measurements would be made in the 
second phase of the demonstration of the sock-like cover on 
the front section, as was done during the first phase with 
the large, barrel-shaped RVOSI cover.  Fedorchenko replied 
that the procedure in the briefing is an additional 
procedure.  The current procedure calls for measurement of 
the assembled soft cover.  The length that will be measured 
is 3.2 meters. 
 
----------------------- 
DOES THE DEMONSTRATION 
TRANSLATE INTO IMPROVED 
INSPECTOR CONFIDENCE? 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Buttrick stated that what was needed for an effective 
demonstration was to provide the observers with facts from 
the demonstration that could be used by inspectors during 
subsequent RVOSIs to ensure that there were no more than the 
attributed number of RVs on the SS-25 ICBMs.  For example, 
during the Trident RVOSI demonstration, the U.S. demonstrated 
that the Trident RVOSI hardcover was placed on the missile 
the same way during each RVOSI.  This was the same cover that 
inspectors see at each RVOSI.  Russian inspectors were 
allowed to measure any dimension of the hardcover.  During 
the Trident demonstration, the RVOSI hardcover was lowered 
onto the missile and showed observers that there was a 
consistent distance between the top of the cover's spoke and 
the top of the third-stage rocket motor.  Buttrick followed 
this description by asking Fedorchenko how Russia will prove 
that the SS-25 RV cover would be placed on the missile in the 
same configuration during every subsequent RVOSI, and whether 
escorts would be able to provide proof that the cover was 
being presented for inspection the same way each time. 
Fedorchenko differentiated SS-25 RVOSIs from Trident RVOSIs, 
in that Russia had allowed RV soft cover measurements which 
were not required by the Treaty.  He stated that U.S. 
inspectors will be permitted to measure the aft ring's inner 
diameter and this would provide inspectors with the assurance 
that this is the same sized ring and that it is mounted in 
the same manner as in the demonstration.  He further stated 
that all RVs have the same conical shape and that, when the 
cover goes on an RV, it fits in the same place as in the 
demonstration.  He again invited the United States to the 
demonstration.  Singer asked Fedorchenko whether inspectors 
will also be able to measure the inner diameter of the aft 
ring during an RVOSI.  Fedorchenko assured the U.S. 
Delegation that all measurements done during the 
demonstration will be available during an SS-25 RVOSI. 
Singer asked whether inspectors would be given the 
opportunity to measure the distance between the aft and 
forward attachment rings while the cover was on the missile. 
Fedorchenko replied that they did not envision that. 
 
------------------ 
COMPOSITION OF THE 
OBSERVATION TEAM 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) Smith began a series of questions about the specifics 
of the observation team.  He asked what the diplomatic status 
of the U.S. observation team would be while in Russia.  Smith 
recalled that, during the demonstration of Russia's new 
radiation detection equipment (RDE) in Moscow, the U.S. 
observation team was comprised of various individuals who 
were not on the Treaty's inspector list.  Fedorchenko 
responded by asking whether the United States wanted to 
include people who were not on the inspector list.  Smith 
explained that the United States would like to have the 
flexibility to build the team based on personnel 
availability.  Fedorchenko responded that these were two 
different kinds of demonstrations.  The RDE demonstration was 
in Moscow, not at a Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) base. 
Smith continued by asking why Russia was limiting the number 
of observers to ten individuals, stating that the United 
States envisioned a mix of expertise on the observation team, 
such as linguists, individuals with inspection experience, as 
well as members of the JCIC Delegation.  Fedorchenko replied 
by asking how many individuals the United States wanted to 
have on the team.  Smith explained that it would be more 
useful to have about 15 observers.  Fedorchenko responded 
that space limitations in the demonstration building would be 
the same, and that the figure of ten observers, to include 
linguists, was from the Treaty.  To gain further 
clarification on the planned status of observers, Smith asked 
whether the observers would be afforded the same privileges 
as inspectors, such as diplomatic status and emergency 
medical care.  Fedorchenko responded that this is why Russia 
would prefer observers to be on the inspector list and have 
START visas.  He stated that he wanted to make the 
demonstration as close as possible to the inspection regime. 
The only difference was the proposal for the United States to 
provide notification of the observation team's arrival with a 
NRRC Notification Format 144 instead of a Format 116 as is 
the requirement for notification of inspection team arrivals. 
 He  explained that using the Format 144 would not reduce the 
United State's inspection quota.  He stated that for the 
Russian bases the demonstration would be like an inspection, 
and for Russia's financial accounting the demonstration would 
also be treated like an inspection.  He asserted that that 
only the Russian military leadership was aware of the 
demonstration, not the SRF.  Buttrick asked whether other 
Parties would be present during the demonstration. 
Fedorchenko responded that he did not find it necessary, 
stating the other Parties did not enjoy the right to 
inspections at Russian bases. 
 
--------------- 
WHEN AND WHERE? 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Buttrick stated that he understood from the briefing 
that the selection of the demonstration's base would be based 
on the time of year; however, for U.S. planning purposes, he 
wanted to know whether the Russian Federation had an 
approximate date for the demonstration to take place. 
Fedorchenko responded by reminding the delegation that the 
Trident RVOSI demonstration was proposed in 2000 and was only 
conducted this year.  However, he said that Russia was ready 
to conduct the demonstration in the near future.  He stated 
that he needed first to view the demonstration himself and 
report the results to his leadership who would make the 
decision.  He stated that his leaders were skeptical so there 
was no date set and it would depend on how soon the United 
States accepts the demonstration proposal.  Fedorchenko 
stated that the point of entry (POE) would be Moscow to 
facilitate the processing of the demonstration observers; 
adding the base selection would depend on the SRF. 
 
--------- 
HOW LONG? 
--------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Buttrick stated he understood that the duration of 
the visit in Russia would depend on the base and the travel 
time to the base, however, how long would the demonstration 
last?  Fedorchenko reiterated that the demonstration had two 
phases.  He said that RVOSIs at road-mobile bases go quickly, 
but there will be an additional phase for the demonstration 
and it would require preparation.  He stated that he was not 
sure how long the preparation would take, but possibly 10-16 
additional hours for base personnel.  He said that the team 
would probably be at the base for two  days.  Buttrick 
verified with Fedorchenko that the United States would select 
the re stricted area from within the base chosen by the 
Russian Federation. 
 
----------- 
THE PROCESS 
----------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Fortier asked whether observers would have 
continuous observation of the launcher during preparation for 
phase two of the demonstration as is done during a RVOSI.  He 
noted that inspectors during RVOSIs were normally located at 
the rear of the launcher.  Fedorchenko stated that all 
operations will be conducted under observation of the U.S. 
team.  Fortier asked Fedorchenko to clarify whether the 
observation is for the duration of the demonstration. 
Fedorchenko responded that they would conduct all actions as 
in a normal inspection.  Responding to this statement, 
Fortier asked whether the sock-like device to be used during 
the second phase would be available for inspection also. 
Fedorchenko replied that it would be in the room, but there 
was no need to examine it. 
--------------------- 
KARUSEL RDE REVISITED 
--------------------- 
¶13.  (S) Rumohr remarked that the Russian Federation removed 
their "poke" proposal from the table, but kept open the 
Karusel RDE as a proposal.  He asked whether the Russians saw 
the RDE as being a confidence-building proposal to augment 
the new RVOSI proposal.  The United States was not clear what 
the value added would be from RDE.   Fedorchenko responded 
that many in the Russian Federation believe it is the best 
method and should be used.  He added that it detects the 
number of RVs remotely, is highly precise, and simplifies 
RVOSIs.  He stated that he believed it has a bright future. 
Buttrick thanked him for the explanation, saying it was 
important that the U.S. Delegation understood the new RVOSI 
proposal clearly in order to accurately characterize it to 
Washington. 
 
--------------- 
UKRAINE'S VIEWS 
--------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Shevtsov stated that he believed the demonstration 
would be very useful and worth accepting without prejudice, 
as was the case with the Trident Demonstration.  He said that 
having two or three additional observers on the team was not 
a problem.  As for the other Parties' participation, he said 
they needed to discuss this because a JCIC document may be 
produced as a result of the demonstration.  Finally, Shevtsov 
asserted that the Karusel RDE is a universal approach for 
counting RVs. 
 
------------- 
THE NEXT STEP 
------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Following up on Shevtsov's question, during the 
break between issue discussions, Kottmyer asked Fedorchenko 
whether the Russian Federation thought that the proposal 
should be recorded in some fashion, if the Parties ultimately 
decided that it would resolve the issue.  Fedorchenko replied 
that the Parties could consider recording it in a coordinated 
plenary statement, as in the case of the Trident RVOSI issue. 
 
---------------------- 
NEW VEHICLES AT SS-25 
ROAD-MOBILE ICBM BASES 
---------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Buttrick began discussions regarding the information 
Russia presented at the November 1, 2005 Heads of Delegation 
(HOD) meeting on new vehicles that will appear at SS-25 
road-mobile ICBM bases (REFTEL).  Buttrick said that the 
United States appreciated the goodwill statement Russia 
provided on this issue, and acknowledged the U.S. 
understanding that the new vehicles Russia referred to would 
be former SS-25 ICBM road-mobile launchers that had been 
eliminated in accordance with the Treaty and were no longer 
accountable.  (Begin comment:  Per REFTEL, these vehicles 
will be used by Russia to ensure the safety and security of 
roads to be transited by SS-25 road-mobile ICBM launchers. 
End comment.) 
 
¶17.  (S) Buttrick asked how many vehicles Russia planned to 
have at each SS-25 road-mobile ICBM base, how many total 
vehicles Russia planned to use, and where Russia planned to 
locate these vehicles within the re stricted areas of 
road-mobile ICBM bases.  Fedorchenko replied that he did not 
know the specific plans for the provision of these vehicles 
to Russian bases.  He stated that the vehicles exist already 
at the Conversion or Elimination Facility at Piban'shur and 
would be sent to SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases in early 2006. 
However, he stated that the Russian Delegation did not know 
at this time exactly where they would be sent and which re 
stricted areas they would be located in.  Buttrick responded 
that it would be helpful if Russia provided that information 
in the future. 
 
¶18.  (S) Buttrick questioned why the Russian Delegation 
stated, in its November 1, 2005 presentation of this issue, 
that it would be difficult to identify these vehicles using 
national technical means (NTM).  Buttrick further asked how 
the United States would distinguish these vehicles from SS-25 
road-mobile launchers, particularly during cooperative 
measures when launchers were removed from their fixed 
structures. 
 
¶19.  (S) Fedorchenko responded that the issue would be 
discussed in the JCIC if there proved to be a problem. 
Regarding potential difficulties arising from the NTM ability 
to distinguish these vehicles, Fedorchenko commented that he 
was not aware of U.S. NTM capability, so the previous comment 
about it potentially being a problem was a guess.  He stated 
that if, during the course of an inspection, U.S. inspectors 
found such a vehicle they could take photographs to help 
address potential problems.  He noted that the vehicles had 
certain features that distinguished them from SS-25 
road-mobile launchers: 
 
    -- The vehicles are 78 centimeters shorter; 
 
    -- The jack points have been cut off; 
 
    -- There is no missile canister; and 
 
    -- There are concrete blocks instead of a launcher 
mechanism. 
 
Fedorchenko noted that he did not know the shape of the 
concrete blocks, and suggested the blocks might be loaded at 
the ICBM bases. 
 
¶20.  (S) Buttrick asked for clarification as to when Russia 
would begin using these vehicles, to which Fedorchenko 
replied "Spring of 2006."  Buttrick asked whether the 
vehicles would be based on Version A launchers, Version B 
launchers, or both.  Fedorchenko replied that he did not know 
and it would not make a difference; Russia probably would use 
whichever vehicles worked, and since the launchers were 
considered eliminated anyway, it did not matter.  Buttrick 
thanked the Russian Delegation again for the information and 
stated he would convey the information to Washington for 
review. 
 
¶21.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶22.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Maj Mitchner 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Mr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
 
Russia 
 
Col Fedorchenko 
Col Yegorov 
Col Kamenskiy 
Mr. Kashirin 
Col Razumov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Osetrov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Stefanovich 
Mr. Shabalin 
Mr. Venevtsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Col Taran 
 
¶23.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley