This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 002683 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
JCS FOR J5/DDINMA AND J5/IN 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP AND OSD/ACP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5GP AND DIRSSP 
DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LUTI 
DIA FOR RAR-3 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII:  (U) TAYLOR-BORYAK DINNER, OCTOBER 30, 
2005 
 
REF: 03 GENEVA 2757 (JCIC-XXV-055) 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-032. 
 
¶2.  Meeting Date:  October 30, 2005 
            Time:  7:00 - 8:15 P.M. 
           Place:  Restaurant Le Creux-de-Genthod 
    Participants: 
 
U.S.               Russia 
 
Mr. Taylor         Mr. Boryak 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶3.  (S) U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor hosted a dinner for 
Russian JCIC Representative Boryak on October 30, 2005, prior 
to the opening of Part II of JCIC-XXVII, scheduled to begin 
October 31, 2005. 
 
¶4.  (S) Taylor emphasized that he intended to continue the 
good work began by Dr. George Look in focusing the work on 
those issues where the Parties could move forward.  Much 
groundwork had been laid in Part I and two long-standing 
issues -- Trident RVOSI and Tridents in Containers -- were 
very close to resolution.  In addition, the Parties had been 
able to exchange draft JCIC Joint Statements on Confirming 
First Stages of SS-25s that had been damaged (burned without 
nozzles) during the intersession and this issue was ready to 
be completed.  Taylor provided a draft agenda for the week 
which focused on the work during the first three days. 
Boryak said that Russia would have something to present on 
both Trident issues and the confirmation measurement for 
damaged SS-25 first stages.  Boryak asked whether the United 
States would have any response to Russian proposals on Castor 
¶120.  Taylor emphasized that the United States had nothing to 
add and that our time could be better spent on the issues the 
Parties were in agreement on.  Boryak agreed that the Parties 
should focus our efforts, but said Russia had its views, as 
did the United States, on certain issues and he was not 
certain he could turn back the desire of his delegation to 
raise these issues. 
 
--------------------------------- 
PREVIOUS WORK PATTERN TO CONTINUE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Boryak opened the conversation by welcoming Taylor to 
the work of the JCIC, noting that he recalled working 
together on the SVC and, more recently, on the BIC.  Boryak 
said he was pleased with the constructive approach that Dr. 
Look had taken concerning the issues and hoped this would 
continue.  Taylor assured him that he intended to continue 
the good work that Look had begun in revitalizing the JCIC. 
In this regard, Taylor was proposing that the Parties take up 
the Trident RVOSI and containers issue along with the SS-25 
first stage measurement (damaged first stages) during the 
first HOD in order that these issues could quickly be 
referred to the Conforming Group. 
 
¶6.  (S) Boryak stated that Russia would have something to 
present on Trident RVOSI and a response to our paper on 
Tridents in containers.  The Trident RVOSI statement was very 
close to resolution and Boryak was hopeful this long-standing 
issue would be resolved.  With regard to the Tridents in 
containers issue, he said he was very pleased that the United 
States had accepted Russia's proposal and that this issue was 
close to resolution also. 
 
--------------------- 
OLD ISSUES DIE SLOWLY 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Boryak next raised Castor 120 and Peacekeeper (PK) 
and asked whether the United States would have anything new 
to say on either of these issues.  Taylor said that the 
United States had not changed its position and any discussion 
of these issues would likely cover the same ground as before. 
 Boryak acknowledged that on several issues Russia had its 
position and that these were unlikely to be resolved. 
 
¶8.  (S) Taylor asked Boryak whether Russia would accept the 
U.S. offer to visit the Vandenberg silo.  Boryak would not 
commit to a yes or no answer, rather saying that Russia would 
say what it had to say about U.S. actions at Vandenberg. 
Going more into detail, Boryak questioned Taylor on how the 
United States could defend its actions by saying the launcher 
was now part of a space launch facility when it did not use 
ICBMs or SLBMs to launch objects into space.  This was not in 
accordance with how an SLF was defined in the Treaty.  Taylor 
explained that the Treaty did not prohibit such activity. 
The launchers were still accountable under the Treaty as ICBM 
launchers. 
 
¶9.  (S) Boryak raised the issue of the Bulava flight test, 
saying that there was still much work that needed to be done, 
however, Russia was not in a position to provide any 
information on throw-weight or attribution.  This would be a 
topic for future meetings.  Taylor said that the fact that we 
had worked hard to bring this missile under the Treaty now 
seemed to be turned on its head since we had a deployed 
missile without any attribution. 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor turned the conversation to the two Trident 
issues, saying that he was hopeful these long-standing issues 
could be resolved this session.  Boryak agreed that the 
Parties were very close on both.  Russia would be providing 
papers on both issues.  In addition, Russia was hopeful the 
agreement on SS-25 measurement of damaged first stages could 
be completed soon also.  Taylor said that, with the 
completion of the confirmation of the measurement, we were 
prepared to conclude the Joint Statement. 
 
¶11.   (S) Boryak concluded the conversation by asking whether 
any special message was intended to be conveyed by the recent 
publication of the U.S. Report on Arms Control Compliance. 
There had been much discussion in Moscow over the U.S. 
decision to include the details of our negotiations and 
Boryak questioned whether Taylor felt this violated the 
confidentiality of the START Treaty. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶12.  (S) Taylor explained that the issues reflected in the 
recent Compliance Report were not unfamiliar to Russia, as 
DAS Karin Look had made a special trip to Geneva to consult 
with the Russian Delegation on these issues in August 2003 
(REFTEL).  As for a special message, the United States was 
fulfilling its obligation to the Congress to report as fully 
as possible on compliance issues including those pertaining 
to Russia's implementation of START. 
 
¶13.  (S) Boryak wondered why the United States said it was 
compliant with all aspects of the Treaty, but that it had a 
problem with Russian implementation.  He asserted that Taylor 
was fully aware Russia had concerns about the U.S. 
implementation of START.  Boryak said he did not want to have 
an extended debate but this was an interesting question to 
think about.  Nonetheless, Boryak closed by saying he was 
hopeful for success this session. 
 
¶14.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley