This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002682 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VCI, ISN, EUR AND S/NIS 
DOE FOR NA-24 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PARM KACT US RS UP BO KZ START JCIC INF
SUBJECT:  JCIC-XXVII:  (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A 
DRAFT JCIC JOINT STATEMENT ON SS-25 ICBM FIRST STAGES 
BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED; SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATION 
PROCEDURES IN VOTKINSK; KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM REDUCTION; 
U.S. PROPOSALS ON TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES; AND TRIDENT 
 
SLBMS IN CONTAINERS, OCTOBER 31, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 135913 (JCIC-DIP-05-012) 
     ¶B. STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017) 
     ¶C. STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014) 
     ¶D. STATE 194955 
 
Classified By:  Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-034. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 31, 2005 
                Time:  3:00 - 4:35 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the 
U.S. Mission on October 31, 2005, to discuss a draft Joint 
Statement on confirming SS-25 ICBM first stages which had 
been burned (end domes burned out) without nozzles attached 
(REF A); SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures in Votkinsk; 
Russian-proposed reductions to the Kartaly Site Diagram; U.S. 
proposals for Trident RVOSI procedures (REF B); and 
inspections of Trident SLBMs in containers (REF C).  All 
Parties were represented. 
 
¶4.  (S) On the issue of confirming SS-25s with shortened 
first stages, the United States provided a U.S.-Proposed 
Joint Draft Text (JDT) and suggested that the document be 
referred to the Conforming Working Group.  With respect to 
Trident RVOSIs and Tridents in containers, the Russians 
stated they would provide the Russian response to the U.S. 
proposals later during the session.  On reducing the Kartaly 
site diagram, the Russian Delegation stated that Russia had 
met all Treaty requirements to eliminate the facility, 
including sending a NRRC notification (REF D).  The U.S. 
Delegation stated that the United States would study the 
Kartaly issue and respond at a later meeting.  With respect 
to SS-25 ICBM eliminations, the Russian Federation restated 
its position that Russia was not required to eliminate the 
section of the missile which the United States had identified 
as being part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism 
(SCDM).  The U.S. Delegation said it would provide a detailed 
presentation at a later meeting. 
 
------------------- 
MAKING PROGRESS ON 
BURNED SS-25 STAGES 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Boryak opened the first meeting of Part II of 
JCIC-XXVII.  He said that, on the issue of confirming type of 
first stages of SS-25 missiles which were damaged due to 
being burned without nozzles, all Parties were in agreement 
that, due to the significant intersession work accomplished, 
this issue would hopefully come to resolution during this 
part of JCIC-XXVII.  Taylor tabled a U.S.-Proposed JDT (text 
is in para 6 below) that had incorporated U.S. changes to 
Russia's proposed text.  He explained that the section on 
confirming accuracy of the length measurement (6.5 meters) 
had been removed because confirmation had already taken place 
during the course of an elimination inspection.  All Parties 
agreed to forward the JDT to the Conforming Working Group. 
 
¶6.  (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed JDT): 
                                        Draft 
                                        JCIC-XXVII 
                                        U.S.-Proposed 
                                        Joint Draft Text 
                                        October 31, 2005 
          JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION 
                JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER (blank) 
 
         ON FIRST STAGES OF SS-25 ICBMs BURNED WITHOUT 
                       NOZZLES ATTACHED 
 
     The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as 
the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, 
or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages 
without nozzles attached of SS-25 ICBMs, that have had their 
end domes burned out as a result of having had fuel removed 
by burning the stages without their nozzles attached, may be 
located at conversion or elimination facilities. 
 
     The Parties understand that the photographs of the first 
stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such 
configuration, and declared data on the length of such a 
first stage, which were provided to the other Parties by the 
Russian Federation at JCIC-XXVII, may be used by the 
inspecting Party during data update inspections or conversion 
or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming 
this type of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities. 
 
     The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the 
first stage without nozzle attached of the SS-25 ICBM, in 
such configuration, declared for such first stages, is the 
distance between the extreme points of the cylindrical 
portion of the motor case of that stage, without taking into 
account protruding elements attached to the motor case. 
 
     The Parties understand that no later than five days 
after entry into force of this Joint Statement, the Russian 
Federation will provide texts of footnotes specifying the 
length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached 
of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, in a notification 
provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the 
Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.  In this 
connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be 
superscripted after the first mention of the first stage 
length for the SS-25 ICBM in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F 
to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of 
the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. 
 
     The Parties agree that the inspecting Party shall have 
the right during such inspections to confirm the type of ICBM 
by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of a 
first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such 
configuration. 
 
.... (Republic of Belarus) 
.... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
.... (Russian Federation) 
.... (Ukraine) 
.... (United States of America) 
End text. 
 
-------------------- 
NO PROGRESS ON SS-25 
ICBM ELIMINATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) With respect to SS-25 elimination inspections at 
Votkinsk, Fedorchenko discussed the problems encountered 
during the first two elimination inspections.  He also 
restated Russia's belief that 11 SS-25 ICBMs had been 
eliminated at Votkinsk.  He noted that this was contrary to 
the U.S. view.  The item, which the United States stated was 
part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM), is 
not part of the SCDM, has never been declared as part of the 
SCDM, and is not required to be eliminated.  He indicated 
that the "compartment case" of the part of the missile that 
the United States believed was part of the SCDM was, in fact, 
part of the structure of the guidance and control devices, 
and cannot be dismantled without destruction of the devices. 
He requested that the United States respond by instructing 
its inspectors to confirm the elimination of SS-25 mobile 
ICBMs even if the guidance and control compartment is not 
eliminated.  Taylor stated that the Russian position would be 
studied and the U.S. Delegation would provide a response at a 
later time. 
 
-------------------------- 
KARTALY REDUCED SITE 
DIAGRAM AND BASE CLOSE-OUT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Fedorchenko led the discussion on reducing the 
boundary of the Kartaly Site Diagram.  He stated that there 
were many changes to the facility since the first part of 
JCIC-XXVII.  He said all silo launchers, including the silo 
training launcher, had been eliminated, and there was no more 
equipment to support silo operations at the base.  He stated 
that, under START, the site was considered to be eliminated 
as affirmed in the notification sent on October 21, 2005 (REF 
D) notifying the United States of that fact.  He concluded by 
stating that the only inspection the United States may do 
from now until December 20, 2005 is a close-out inspection. 
Boryak provided a Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement 
on the reduction of the Kartaly Site Diagram.  (Begin 
comment:  The Russian Federation had previously provided a 
draft of a Joint S-Series document which significantly 
reduced the inspectable area of the site for the United 
States to review.  End comment.)  The Russian Federation 
proposed that the text be clarified by excluding references 
to inspections under paragraph 3 of Article XI and, instead, 
refer to inspections under paragraph 9 of Article XI.  Taylor 
responded that the United States would study the issue and 
reply at a later meeting. 
 
¶9.  (S) Begin text (Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint 
Statement): 
 
                                    Official Translation 
 
                                    JCIC-XXVII 
                                    Draft Proposed by the 
                                    Russian Side 
                                    October 31, 2005 
 
          Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
               Joint Statement Number S-(blank) 
              On Changes to the Boundary of the 
         Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs 
 
     The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into 
account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base 
for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint 
Statement, agree on the following: 
 
     (1)  The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site 
diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is 
attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement. 
 
     (2)  The site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, shall be used only 
for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of this Joint 
Statement. 
 
     (3)  The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo 
Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint 
Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram 
of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall be subject to 
inspection using the appropriate procedures only during the 
inspection conducted at this facility under paragraph 9 of 
Article XI of the Treaty.  Subsequently, the portions to be 
excluded shall not be subject to inspection if they are not 
included (sic) within the boundary of any inspection site. 
 
     (4)  The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM 
Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on 
the date specified in the notification provided by the 
Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section 
I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or 
the date such notification is provided by the Russian 
Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint 
Statement, whichever is latest. 
 
..... (United States of America) 
..... (Republic of Belarus) 
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan) 
..... (Russian Federation) 
..... (Ukraine) 
 
                           Annex A 
 
        Information Provided by the Russian Federation 
              on Changes to the Boundary of the 
         Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs 
 
     The Russian Federation: 
 
     (1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data 
Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements 
set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX 
of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or 
Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met 
with respect to the portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for 
Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the 
boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility; 
 
     (2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the 
Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that 
were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing 
site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of 
ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, pursuant to subparagraph 
9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of 
Understanding and that will be excluded from within the 
boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, 
are unchanged but will no longer be used for items of 
inspection as of March 1, 2002; 
 
     (3) beginning October 21, 2005, considers the 
above-mentioned facility to have been eliminated (No. RNC/STR 
05-375/009 of October 21, 2005, gave notice thereof) and to 
be subject to inspection under paragraph 9 of Article XI of 
the Treaty. 
 
(Begin comment:  Attached to the Russian-Proposed S-Series 
Joint Statement is a site diagram for the facility dated 
March 1, 2002.  End comment.) 
 
End text. 
 
------------------------ 
TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES 
NEARING RESOLUTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S) Taylor stated he was pleased to receive the Russian 
comments on the U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement 
on new Trident RVOSI procedures during the intersession.  He 
noted the recent U.S. response to Russia's proposed changes 
and provided a copy of the U.S. proposal from REF A.  He said 
that he viewed the issue as being very close to resolution 
and he looked forward to the other Parties' responses, 
hopefully early in the week, and hoped to move the draft 
Coordinated Plenary Statement to conforming as soon as 
possible.  Boryak said that the Russian Delegation would 
respond to this issue later in the week.  Shevtsov agreed 
with moving the draft coordinated plenary statement to the 
Conforming Working Group.  Boryak stated that the Russians 
would be prepared to return to this later during the session. 
 
---------------------- 
TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Taylor stated that the Trident in Containers issue 
was a long-standing one that he hoped to move to the 
Conforming Working Group as soon as possible.  He provided 
the other Parties with the U.S. proposal from REF B.  He 
referenced the Russian proposal, to open one container per 
Treaty year, and said that if this would resolve this issue 
the United States would incorporate it into current 
procedures.  Boryak was pleased that the proposals were 
closer and noted that Russia had studied the U.S. position. 
He hoped to provide the Russian response as soon as possible, 
and stated that it may be appropriate to pursue this further 
in a working group meeting on November 2.  Responding to a 
question from Fedorchenko, about the need to include Trident 
I SLBMs in containers in the U.S.-proposed policy documents, 
Mullins stated that there was the potential to see a Trident 
I SLBM in a container during Data Update Inspections, since 
the last submarine attributed with Trident I SLBMs was just 
unloaded.  He stated that the United States was not prepared 
at this time to remove all Trident I references from the 
U.S.-Proposed Trident in Containers Policy Statement. 
 
¶12.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
    -- U.S.-Proposed JDT for a Joint Statement on First 
Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated 
October 31, 2005; 
 
    -- U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement for RVOSI 
for Trident II, dated October 11, 2005 (from DIP-017); and 
 
    -- U.S.-Proposed Statement of Policy for Inspections T-I 
and T-II, dated September 9, 2005 (from DIP-014). 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Kartaly Site Diagram dated March 1, 2002, attached to 
October 31, 2005 Russian-Proposed S-Series Document; and 
 
    -- Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement on Changes 
to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Bases for Silo Launchers 
of ICBMs, dated October 31, 2005. 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Mullins 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Diehl 
Mr. Dunn 
LCDR Feliciano 
Mr. Fortier 
Mr. Hay 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Kottmyer 
Mr. Kuehne 
Mr. Miller 
Maj Mitchner 
Col Rumohr 
Mr. Singer 
Col Smith 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Vogel 
Dr. Zimmerman 
Lt Col Zoubek 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
Belarus 
 
Mr. Grinevich 
Kazakhstan 
 
Mr. Baisuanov 
Russia 
Mr. Boryak 
Mr. Yegorov 
Gen Maj Artyukhin 
Col Fedorchenko 
Mr. Istratov 
Mr. Kamenskiy 
Mr. Kashirin 
Ms. Kotkova 
Amb Masterkov 
Mr. Mezhennyy 
Lt Col Novikov 
Col Osetrov 
Col Razumov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Ms. Sorokina 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Ms. Vodopolova 
Mr. Zaytsev 
Mr. Gusev (Int) 
 
Ukraine 
 
Dr. Shevtsov 
Mr. Dotsenko 
Mr. Fedotov 
Col Taran 
 
¶14.  (U) Taylor sends. 
Moley