This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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FM AMEMBASSY GABORONE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2668
AMEMBASSY GABORONE 
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T  GABORONE 001656 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2015 
TAGS: MARR PREL SENV US ZI BC SADC POL MIL
SUBJECT: BOTSWANA'S VP ON SADC, ZIMBABWE, CRIME, TERRORISM, 
MILITARY ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Katherine H. Canavan for Reasons 
1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary. Ambassador Kate Canavan's introductory 
call with Botswana's Vice President Lt. Gen. Seretse Khama 
Ian Khama November 8 highlighted environmental cooperation, 
counter-terrorism, Zimbabwe, crime, and military issues. 
Ambassador informed VP Khama of Botswana's acceptance for 
the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) program, 
discussed our anti-crime and money-laundering programs, and 
asked Khama's views on how the U.S. might strengthen 
relations with SADC in view of constraints involving 
Zimbabwe. Khama said all regional leaders are concerned 
about Zimbabwe and urged the U.S. and U.K. to engage with 
Zimbabwe at an appropriate level in order to break the 
impasse.  The Ambassador also enlisted Khama's assistance 
in obtaining Botswana's agreement to participate with the 
U.S. in a fully-funded March-April airlift of troops from 
Rwanda to Darfur.  Khama, while explaining Botswana's 
history of participation in peace-keeping operations 
(PKOs), asked for more details and promised to raise this 
with President Mogae. Mission is optimistic that Khama will 
do this, since our proposal matches criteria previously 
set forth in conversations with President Mogae, VP Khama, 
and Foreign Minister Merafhe. VP Khama was exceptionally 
open, friendly, and engaging during the meeting.  End 
Summary. 
 
TFCA, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Ambassador lauded Botswana's acceptance as the 
first African country to be accepted for the TFCA and 
advised Khama that she had just written to the Minister of 
Finance about the program, She told Khama the program would 
permit Botswana to spend up to its $7.4 million debt on 
conservation initiatives.  Khama thanked the Ambassador, 
saying he had toured some of the country's drought-stricken 
game reserves recently to ascertain how to deliver water to 
animals.  He said these funds would be enormously helpful. 
 
¶3.  (C)  The Ambassador also highlighted our 
counter-terrorism assistance to Botswana, namely the 
training offered by the International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA), our Treasury Department's money-laundering 
program, and a $75,000 grant to the Botswana Defence Force 
(BDF). She asked how the U.S. might assist further.  Khama 
replied that Botswana was both advantaged and 
disadvantaged.  While Botswana appreciated not having been 
a terrorist target, it also needed to avoid the danger of 
becoming complacent.  Botswana's counter-terrorist capacity 
remained weak, preventing the country from being able to 
respond quickly. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Khama called intelligence-gathering a priority. 
Botswana, he said, still sought a dedicated intelligence 
service since the police alone could not handle it.  Khama 
mentioned the Haroon Rashid Aswat case, saying Botswana had 
been prepared to arrest him and hand him over to the U.S.  He 
added that Botswana would always be happy to "hasten the 
departure of such people."  The Ambassador detailed for 
Khama the various resources the U.S. could use to assist 
Botswana in expanding its counter-terrorist capacity.  In 
turn, Khama mentioned the proposal to set up the CT office 
would come before the cabinet "soon." 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  As the Ambassador noted the rise in crime, Khama 
said Botswana hoped to hire 1000 additional special 
constables 
to address that problem, putting more police on the street. 
He blamed illegal Zimbabwean immigrants for the increase. 
He mentioned the use of the military to supplement the 
police in fighting crime. He credited these additional 
efforts in halting hijackings, indicating that much of it 
is perpetrated by gangs, and drops off as the gangs are 
broken up. 
 
ZIMBABWE 
 
¶6.  (C)  The discussion turned to Zimbabwe, as the 
Ambassador thanked Khama for Botswana's standing firm 
against Zimbabwe pressure to halt medium wave broadcasts 
from the International Broadcasting Bureau station in 
Selebi-Phikwe to Zimbabwe.  Khama said that Botswana 
reminded Zimbabwe that its government had been consulted 
about the IBB agreement from the outset.  Indeed, the 
broadcasts had helped to combat apartheid.  Khama added 
that Zimbabwe had not understood that the IBB transmitted 
broadcasts which originated in Washington, thinking 
that they came from Botswana. 
 
¶7.  (C)  On President Mugabe, Khama said he had a way of 
manipulating situations in his favor.  For example, on the 
farm seizures, Mugabe reminded people of past injustice, 
that 5% of the population had taken 80% of the land. 
No one, said Khama, faulted the principle of returning 
land, just the way Mugabe did it.  Moreover, when 
protests came mainly from Europe and the United States, 
Mugabe argued that these countries were interested only 
in whites.  So, countries ignored his undemocratic 
practices and (reluctantly) stood with him.  The Ambassador 
commented that the black Zimbabweans who were dispossessed 
in the land seizures could have kept the economy moving. 
Khama agreed that the first to receive farms were ZANU-PF 
cronies.  Khama also noted Mugabe's skill in associating 
the opposition MDC with Tony Blair. He added, however, that 
Zimbabweans had only to weigh their lifestyle and suffering 
with "brainwashing from the government." 
 
ENGAGING SADC 
 
¶8.  (C)  Having been charged with strengthening relations 
with SADC, the Ambassador noted that relations were 
somewhat moribund owing to the Zimbabwe problem.  She said 
regional organizations could be a good source of 
development.  Now that Botswana was chairing SADC and a new 
Secretary-General was in place, perhaps we could revive the 
 
SIPDIS 
relationship beyond the technical cooperation already in 
place.  The U.S., she emphasized, did not want to be held 
hostage to Zimbabwe. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Khama replied that people did not understand why 
the other 12 SADC countries had to suffer because of 
Zimbabwe.  He pointed out that, while Botswana's population 
tended to be somewhat hostile to the Zimbabwe government 
because of all the problems created for them by the 
troubles in Zimbabwe, people in other countries often 
sympathized with the GOZ and pressured their governments 
accordingly.  This pressure discouraged their leaders from 
speaking out even though they privately disagreed with 
Mugabe's policies and tactics. 
 
¶10.  (C)  To break the impasse, Khama suggested the U.S. 
and U.K. open channels to reverse the false impression 
propagated by Mugabe.  Why not call Mugabe's bluff, he 
said, and talk frankly to the leadership?  Khama also 
suggested we ask to address SADC meetings and recommended 
bringing in a UN mediator to pressure Mugabe (comment: he 
did not mention Zimbabwe's reaction to the report of the 
recent emissary on food issues.  end comment).   The 
Ambassador expressed appreciation for his suggestions 
and assured Khama his message would be passed.  On aid 
to SADC, she said the U.S. would be seeking to partner 
with other donors.  Khama added that his own comments 
reflected those of regional leaders and suggested the 
Ambassador engage President Mogae on this issue again. 
The Ambassador replied that the U.S. still provided 
humanitarian assistance to Zimbabwe.  She underscored 
the importance of SADC to U.S. relations with the entire 
region, especially since some issues could be better 
handled regionally. 
 
11.(C)  Khama mentioned the success the U.S. had in 
the past with Congressional or other non-executive 
branch delegations in speaking to countries such 
as Zimbabwe. In particular, he noted that these 
delegations frequently consisted of individuals 
of differing genders, racial backgrounds, and 
religions.  As such, governments might more 
readily accept them and their views. 
 
BOTSWANA TO PARTICIPATE IN AIRLIFT? 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  When the Ambassador shifted the discussion to 
C-130s, VP said he knew what was coming, but in fact, he 
was surprised to learn that the U.S. could completely 
support and fund Botswana's participation with the U.S. in 
a March-April mission to airlift troops from Rwanda to 
Darfur.  The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. would lead 
the mission and pay all operating expenses.  She mentioned 
that visiting U.S. contractors had commented that never 
had they seen aircraft as well-maintained as Botswana's 
C-130s. She asked the VP for Botswana's participation. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  The VP asked the Ambassador for further details 
and promised to raise the issue with President Mogae.  The 
Ambassador thanked Khama and said the details would come in 
a formal request, probably from EUCOM. She added how much 
she'd been impressed with Botswana's leadership in PKO 
training and understood the difficulties that long 
deployments presented for Botswana. She again expressed 
her thanks for Botswana's skilled intervention during 
her tenure as Ambassador to Lesotho. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Lesotho was not the problem, said Khama.  Rather, 
it 
was Botswana's experiences with "mission creep" in Somalia 
and Mozambique that has led Botswana to be so cautious. 
Botswana had gone to Somalia with UNOSOM 1, but then the UN 
took over and instituted "less robust" rules of engagement 
(ROE), allowing locals to retain their weapons.  He said the 
best way to avoid getting killed is to not get shot at, and 
the best way to avoid that is not to allow the wrong people 
to have weapons. The U.S. recommended that Botswana, as the 
most professional contingent, be given responsibility for 
Baardheere.  Khama personally visited Somalia seven times, 
telling his troops to continue to adhere to the stricter ROE 
as practiced under U.S. leadership to avoid problems. It 
worked, said Khama, since Botswana lost no one.  Moreover, 
Botswana's troops focused on a "hearts and minds" approach, 
interacting with the local population at all levels.  It was 
one of the "best things they ever did," said Khama, although 
the initial three months deployment turned into two years. 
Then, Botswana was asked to send half its troops to 
Mozambique 
where one year became two. Subsequently, he had to send the 
troops 
back to Baardheere and also to take over the areas previously 
held by departed Italian troops. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Khama underscored his point by saying that, while 
Botswana had no C-130s then, it seeks to avoid involvement 
at the outset in open-ended missions with high costs, where 
no ceasefire is in place among the factions, and where 
peacekeepers are taken hostage, as in Darfur today.  With 
HIV/AIDS, drought, and other priorities, in a democracy 
where people can freely voice their opinions, Botswana 
could expect questions if it participated in such 
missions.  He indicated that missions in the subregion, such 
as Lesotho, were still in the realm of possibility.  In 
closing his comments on our request for C-130 
support, Khama opined that "our pilots would love to do 
it."  Ambassador also raised the issue in a later 
conversation with Foreign Minister Merafhe the same day. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶16.  (C)  This is the warmest we have seen Khama in a long 
time.  The half hour courtesy call turned into a one hour 
meeting during which he clearly spoke from the heart about 
issues important to Botswana, namely the Zimbabwe problem 
and Botswana's peacekeeping past.  As a former Chief of 
Staff of the Botswana Defence Force, his experiences match 
his concerns about deploying Botswana troops in PKOs. 
Based on past discussions with Botswana's leaders about 
what kind of PKOs would be acceptable, our request for 
the C-130s, with full up-front payment, complies with 
virtually all of their previously-stated criteria. 
Accordingly, post is optimistic that this request will 
receive serious consideration, although it is premature 
to speak of certain concurrence. 
 
CANAVAN 
 
 
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