This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  DUSHANBE 001840 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON, ACHURCH, AND ACUMMINGS 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN, EURACE - DMARTIN 
CBP/INA FOR PWARKER AND BPICKETT 
USDOE/NNSA FOR TPERRY 
DOC FOR PETERSEN - BEARD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM TI
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ISTANBUL CENTRAL ASIA TECHNICAL WORKSHOP 
TO PREVENT THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS 
 
¶1.  The goal of the workshop was to build a partnership between 
technical advisors and export control agencies on a regional 
level.  The objectives were to find regional common ground 
against smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and propose 
projects to support the primary goal. 
 
¶2.  Regional Cooperation:  It was recognized that some borders 
will not need radiation monitors depending on what their 
neighboring country has installed.  The effectiveness of 
radiation monitoring depends on the regional "protective net" 
established within several countries not just on one countries 
ability to protect its border.  Combined training and equipping 
with common type equipment will save money and be more 
effective.  Regional cooperation is extremely important in 
identifying potential sources and users (information sharing). 
Central Asia is seen as the transit ground; drugs north and WMD 
south. 
 
¶3.  Conference Conclusion:  The conference wrap-up was scheduled 
for two hours with the goal being the production of a single 
document, signed by all parties, agreeing on steps needed to get 
to the next level.  Unfortunately, this was not as simple a task 
as it seemed.  The group, which agreed on several issues during 
discussion, could not agree on very much when it came to a 
written agreement (what a surprise).  The Turkmens agreed to 
publish the results of the conference but not the names of who 
attended (this took 20 minutes).  All participants expressed an 
interest in expansion of cooperation in the area of radiation 
monitoring but argued for 45 minutes on terminology (the 
difference between a control and a monitor).  All had earlier 
agreed on information sharing but all balked at the creation of 
a website which would contain unclassified information on 
systems and procedures.  The Turkmens and the Kazakhs said the 
website would be an information center for terrorists to learn 
how to defeat their systems.  All countries gave several 
examples on how they share intelligence to combat illicit 
narcotics trafficking, but none were willing to share technology 
and tactics to defeat proliferation of WMD.  Some things they 
did all agree on were the use of a "risk based approach to 
prioritize efforts and the development of mobile response 
teams".  (COMMENT: It was very interesting to see members from 
all the Central Asian countries together in one room addressing 
a common problem.  There were some very strong personalities, a 
strong sense of country pride, some minor barbs thrown at the 
other countries, but in the end, some consensus was reached. 
Regional cooperation is possible on certain issues; however we 
have a long way to go to find true regional cooperation.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
¶4.  CURRENT STATUS REPORTS BY COUNTRY: 
 
(A)  Uzbekistan:  Viewed as a transit country with established 
and developed major transit routes.  Their top priority is to 
control and eliminate the smuggling of drugs and WMD materials. 
The Uzbeks consider themselves a leader in Central Asia when it 
comes to installation of portal monitoring equipment (85 per 
cent funded by U.S. dollars) but also realize that it is 
impossible to install monitors at all potential border crossing 
points.  They see the need for a joint initiative and regional 
cooperation and view smuggling of WMD as a serious issue.  They 
currently have 11 monitors in place with eight more by 2006, 11 
more by 2007, for a proposed total of 100 by projects end.  They 
have established a centralized information and dispatch center 
staffed by both customs and radioactive material technical 
experts.  They regulate movement of WMD in accordance with 
several international regimes which includes monitoring the 
internal movement of "legal" radioactive materials.  Their 
military doctrine prohibits the production and possession of 
WMD.  Uzbekistan is looking for new approaches to solve 
smuggling of WMD that would also compliment efforts to combat 
illicit narcotics trafficking.  They have designed their own 
monitors using a new approach (Z detectors shielded from each 
 
other) which are still in the infant stage but have produced 
peak data points.  They feel that continuous, explicit training 
is required for customs and border guard units and proposed a 
three level training plan.  Level one is basic training for 
customs and border guards, level two is supervisory training, 
and level three integrates university level training for customs 
candidates. 
 
(B)  Kazakhstan:  The Kazakh strategy for combating WMD 
trafficking is a strong customs control.  They currently have 
167 legal border crossing points, controlled by 16 regional 
customs offices, which they consider a comprehensive customs 
system.  They have enacted several new laws on radioactive 
materials control, most of which were driven by WMD agreements 
signed by the government.  They claim to comply with all 
international standards and that their laws are written using 
international regime control lists.  Several controls of varying 
degrees are in place throughout the country.  Aspect monitors 
(Russian design) are used at the primary crossing points (major 
road, rail, and airports) with portable monitors used at minor 
ports and "green border" areas.  Portable monitors consist of 
ionizers, spectrometers, and radiation pagers.  All data 
collected is first evaluated by customs then sent to the 
"experts" for review if deemed necessary by customs.  Customs 
also has "mobile labs" which they can dispatch to any area 
reporting an anomaly.  The Kazakh's also agree that information 
must be shared in order to effectively combat illicit 
trafficking of WMD.  They currently cooperate with neighboring 
countries and the Russian Federation. They have a system in 
place to get all collected information to one control server. 
Most of the Kazakh effort with respect to WMD trafficking is 
financed by Kazakhstan, with only approximately 10 percent 
financed by the U.S. (a fact they are very proud of).  They 
currently have a 10-hour training course in place which follows 
a step by step process from introduction and identification to 
advanced operation of monitoring equipment.  Supervisors are 
offered advanced courses in "new developments". 
 
(C)  Kyrgyzstan:  The Kyrgyz were very involved with the former 
Soviet Union Nuclear program with regard to mining of 
radioactive materials.  All of the mines with the exception of 
Karabela have been closed leaving piles and tailings that pose a 
radioactive hazard and need to be cleaned up.  In 1999 
Kyrgyzstan began revising laws on the regulation of radioactive 
materials, which involved several agencies.  From these 
revisions a list of controlled products was compiled and 
enacted; which has resulted in several vehicles traveling from 
China being turned back at the border.  In 2003 IAEA spearheaded 
a joint seminar that produced an agreement that included 
equipment donations to Kyrgyz Customs.  There are several EXBS 
technical programs ongoing, including capacity building projects 
providing communications, transportation, inspection/detection 
equipment, and computer support.  The Kyrgyz enjoy a close 
relationship with the U.S. Department of State and wish to 
continue and build on that relationship.  Portal monitors are 
currently being installed at some ports with the help of the 
EXBS program.  In March of 2005, Second Line of Defense (SLD) 
had a meeting that included the Department of Energy, Department 
of Defense and the Kyrgyz Government.  As a result of this 
meeting the Kyrgyz Government is currently working on a WMD 
agreement that should be completed and signed soon.  The Kyrgyz 
delegation sees information sharing as a very important step in 
combating WMD trafficking and supports regional cooperation. 
They also agree that regional training events and exercises 
would be very beneficial. 
 
(D)  Tajikistan:  The Tajik delegate started by saying, 
"Tajikistan agreed that Uzbekistan was a good place to start a 
pilot program on radiation monitoring because it helped to 
strengthen the Tajik border as well, forming a 'shield' for the 
Tajik border with Uzbekistan".  He went on to say that "we 
should concentrate on securing the outer borders of Central 
 
Asia; this would be cheaper and at the same time provide the 
desired results".  (COMMENT:  The Uzbek delegation was surprised 
at this proposal since it would result in no need for monitoring 
on their borders and they consider themselves the leader in 
Central Asia when it comes to radiation monitoring. END COMMENT) 
Tajikistan has recently revised laws on dual use, narcotics, and 
radioactive materials but they are still in the implementation 
stage.  The law states that customs has the lead on radioactive 
materials import and export however the Academy of Sciences has 
the lead on radioactive materials in country.  Tajikistan feels 
there is a need to unite regional efforts in the areas of export 
control and dual use legislation.  They see a need for a 
regional advisory center to coordinate efforts throughout 
Central Asia to include training and equipping with common types 
of detection.  Tajikistan admits that several areas of their 
border are very transparent and detection capability is limited. 
 They request help on the Afghan and Chinese borders but feel 
the current efforts of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan adequately 
protect their common borders.  Due to limited infrastructure 
there are really no established major routes as there are in 
other CA countries.  Tajikistan currently deploys radiation 
pagers for detection of radioactive materials and feels that 
installation of permanent portal monitors, while effective, 
would be a hit and miss proposition at best (due to terrain and 
infrastructure constraints). 
 
(E)  Turkmenistan:  Turkmenistan is no different than the other 
CIS countries; it has signed the WMD agreement and will not 
facilitate the production of any new weapons.  It pays attention 
to all international standards and cooperate with the IAEA with 
respect to signed agreements on the regulation of nuclear 
materials.  Turkmen laws have four provisions with respect to 
WMD; 1.) Support combating of proliferation of WMD, 2.) Combat 
illicit trafficking of any material that causes international 
hazards and support all international efforts, 3.) Deny 
over-flight of aircraft carrying WMD components (PSI agreement), 
4.) Support additional steps on implementation of 
nonproliferation efforts.  As of April of 2005 all major border 
crossings have radioactive material monitoring devices in place, 
this includes five crossing points with Iran, one with 
Afghanistan, one with Uzbekistan, and one Caspian seaport.  The 
Turkmen delegate stated, "You can all sleep well at night 
because our borders are locked down tight".  In 2006 they will 
be opening a new "state of the art" border crossing and 
deploying a mobile X-ray van.  (COMMENT: All radiation 
monitoring projects in Turkmenistan are 100 percent funded by 
the U.S., a fact the Turkmen delegate seemed very proud of.  END 
COMMENT)  Turkmenistan sees the value in regional information 
sharing but on a limited basis within the customs community 
only. 
 
¶5.  U.S. PRESENTATIONS: 
 
(A)  Dr. Ken Sale, Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, gave a 
presentation on the U.S. perspective of WMD enforcement on U.S. 
borders.  He stated the strategy was to have "smarter borders" 
which involves pushing borders outward and relying on 
international cooperation.  The highest payoff in border 
management is not in the equipment, it's in the people 
coordinating and cooperating with each other.  Radioactive 
materials, some of which are legal, are small and easily 
shielded from monitors.  For this reason the United States needs 
more technical cooperation to help detect methods of 
transportation and end users.  It is imperative that all 
personnel involved have a complete understanding of detection 
systems and their limitations.  The focus is changing to 
detection and training that must be comprehensive and 
compatible.  There are several new detection devices being 
developed and deployed, to include the "ARAM system", a portable 
system being used by the California Highway Patrol that has 
produced positive results.  The United States needs to cooperate 
locally and internationally as a team in order to combat the 
 
threat of WMD, which potentially threatens all countries. 
 
(B)  Major Chip Parker, CENTCOM J5 Disaster Preparedness, gave a 
CENTCOM Strategy briefing which proposed a Regional Disaster 
Preparedness Center for Central Asia.  This concept was first 
introduced by CENTCOM in Africa which now has 11 nations 
participating.  It is not a U.S. centric program; it relies on 
regional cooperation in order to work.  CENTCOM considers 
Central Asia a very strategically important region and feels 
there is a willingness within the individual states to cooperate 
with each other.  The proposed center would promote information 
sharing on experiences and best practices as well as facilitate 
regional training in legal, response, and equipment aspects. 
CENTCOM will be visiting all the CA countries in the next couple 
of months to discuss this concept with the respective ministries. 
 
 ¶6.  WORKING GROUP TOPICS AND RESULTS: 
 
The delegates were separated into two working groups for the 
morning session, then shuffled and formed two new working groups 
for the afternoon session. 
 
(A)  Group I - Portal Monitors.  This group evaluated the 
current status of the portal monitors currently being used and 
made recommendations on further procurement.  The consensus of 
the group was that there are several different types in use and 
all have pluses and minuses.  The need to integrate technical 
experts into the detection process was split, some feel the 
customs personnel can evaluate the data and don't need technical 
experts unless asked for, others agreed that the monitoring 
staff should include full time technical experts to evaluate 
data.  The need to standardize equipment and terminology was 
agreed upon by all parties.  Standardized training and joint 
exercises was also well received. 
 
(B)  Group II - Alternatives Detection Systems.  This group 
looked at alternatives to portal monitors where portal monitors 
weren't feasible (ie. Small crossings and infrastructure limited 
crossings).  Several ideas were tossed around but the group came 
up with three priorities for implementation.  1.) Increased 
awareness training for customs and border guards.  2.) 
Development of a list of sources and container types to include 
visual aids that can be maintained at all posts and easily 
updated when required.  3.)  Deployment of mobile groups 
consisting of multi-agencies within the country.  Coordinate 
efforts to ensure mobile groups from one country aren't working 
the same areas as the neighboring country, thus providing a 
larger coverage area. 
 
(C)  Group III - Training, standards and exercises.  This group 
discussed training programs, the standards utilized by each 
country, and exercises conducted (both internal and cross 
border).  Training was an easy subject because everyone agrees 
that training is important and should be standardized as much as 
possible to include regional training.  However, standards were 
another story.  Each country agrees they are committed to 
enforcing international standards however each country also has 
its own laws and views of what international standards are. 
Each country wants to hold on to the "individuality" of its 
customs system and authority.  Cross border cooperation is 
currently happening at the working level (ports and border 
forces) but not at the capitol level.  All countries stated that 
they work well with their counterparts across the border and all 
are committed to enforcing common laws when it comes to illicit 
trafficking.  The consensus on regional exercises was positive 
with joint training as a favorable by-product. 
 
(D)  Group IV - Regional Advisory Council.  This topic was not 
well received at all.  All countries stated that they already 
have regional customs meetings and that don't see any value in 
this concept.  When it was explained to them that the concept 
was to integrate the "technical experts" with the "enforcement 
 
agencies" they felt this wasn't necessary.  Turkmenistan was 
adamantly against the proposal followed closely by Kazakhstan. 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were open to discussion 
but were shut down by very strong personalities of the Turkmen 
and Kazakh delegates.  Bottom line, there will be no regional 
advisory council. 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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