This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUSHANBE 001805 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/10/2015 
TAGS: KDEM PREL PGOV TI
SUBJECT: TIPS FROM THE MFA ON HOW TO FIGHT THE WAR OVER NGO'S IN 
TAJIKISTAN 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tom Armbruster, DCM, Dushanbe, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  DCM had a long talk with MFA North America Chief 
Ismatullo Nasredinov on November 10 on the growing pressure on 
U.S. and other Western NGO's.  The DCM said Tajikistan appeared 
to be taking a step backwards by not providing registration, 
visas, or other support for NGO's like the Rotary Club and CADA, 
two of the latest targets for harassment.  Further, Tajikistan 
cannot expect international businesses to establish in 
Tajikistan if NGO's are under pressure.  Nor can the Embassy 
advocate more foreign investment if the mission is tied up with 
defending beleaguered NGO's.  Nasredinov, a young official just 
back from the United States, offered a number of helpful 
observations. 
 
¶2.  (C) Nasredinov suggested that the Ambassador approach the 
Foreign Minister about hosting a roundtable discussion on NGO 
activity in Tajikistan.  Since one of DCM's talking points was 
to suggest a roundtable for November 29-30, DCM readily agreed 
that Nasredinov had hit on a good idea.  Nasredinov said the 
roundtable would not resolve all problems, but if mid to high 
level officials from MFA, Justice, and Security attend, there is 
a good chance of making progress.  Nasredinov also suggested 
that NGO's go on an information offensive and raise their 
profiles.  He said some NGO's such as Save the Children and IFES 
are well known for their good work.  Others "simply register and 
never do any work or promotion."  When DCM raised the Rotary 
Club for example, an organization that is apparently being 
denied registration, Nasredinov said most Tajik bureaucrats do 
not even know that Rotary is a service organization providing 
community projects and business promotion worldwide.  Nasredinov 
said Tajik officials are only getting one side of the argument 
(from the Russian propaganda machine) but if presented with both 
the negative and positive assessments they could analyze the 
conflicting reports and hopefully come to the right conclusion. 
As it is now, officials are only hearing the negative side. 
 
¶3.  (C) Nasredinov was quite impressed with his first-ever trip 
to the United States.  He was not aware of the power of business 
and political lobbies prior to the trip, nor did he expect to 
hear so many different opinions on foreign policy from his 
interlocutors.  The political debate that he was exposed to was 
clearly eye opening and extremely useful in shaping his views on 
American democracy.  Nasredinov was impressed with the dynamism 
of the interagency process and the competition for ideas. 
American border control procedures in Buffalo, New York were 
also useful in shaping his thinking on Tajikistan's border 
operations. 
 
¶4.  (C)  COMMENT:  Nasredinov is not a power broker in 
Tajikistan, but he is clearly not on the path to becoming part 
of the "old guard."  He is savvy enough to understand what can 
and cannot get done in the U.S.-Tajik relationship and he is 
willing to offer ways forward.  However, it is clear that his 
trip revealed to him just how backward his colleagues can be, 
particularly on the issue of civil society.  Post will have to 
be careful not to expose Nasredinov as too much of a reformer, 
and hope that he can rise to a level of influence within the 
government soon.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶5.  (C)  AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT:  We have argued that this 
government is neither monolithic nor dumb.  We need to listen 
carefully to our mid-level contacts, while recognizing that they 
have very little influence at this time.  We had already planned 
to begin working on a major information and public relations 
offensive, and will soon put this into play.  We will soon 
submit a cable outlining what we think is happening in the 
country and steps that Embassy Dushanbe and the U.S. Government 
can take in response.  While we will inevitably be reactive, we 
also want to take the high road and search for those strategies 
that will best promote the goal of transformational diplomacy. 
END COMMENT. 
HOAGLAND 
 
 
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