This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 006068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ASAD SHOPPING AROUND FOR LEGAL COUNSEL? 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Samir al-Taki, a long-standing Embassy 
contact, told Polchief November 20 that on behalf of the SARG 
he had engaged the services of two British experts in 
international law.  Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had 
agreed to this approach in a meeting with al-Taki.  SMI chief 
Asif Shawkat has also brought in legal experts from Europe 
and Egypt, but they were too left-wing and anti-UN to be 
useful, reported al-Taki.  Shawkat is isolated, without 
support among the Alawite power brokers and is likely to be 
sacrificed eventually, although Asad is still going through 
the motions to protect him.  Polling that al-Taki has done at 
a small research center undercuts to some extent the 
post-Asad-speech view that ordinary Syrians identify with the 
regime and are ready to support confrontation with the U.S. 
and the international community.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  FIRST OF ALL, HIRE THE LAWYERS:  Dr. Samir al-Taki, 
an informal MFA advisor, told Polchief November 20 that he 
had traveled to London, Berlin, and Oslo in the past three 
weeks shopping for legal counsel specialized in international 
law who can help Syria extricate itself from its current 
predicament.  The goal is to comply with UNSCR 1636 but to 
assure the best deal for Syria, said al-Taki.  He settled on 
two British legal experts with international reputations, Ian 
Brownlee and Mary Williams-Worth.  The latter had already 
traveled to Syria and prepared a written report, which she 
had presented orally to the Syrian judicial commission 
investigating the Hariri assassination.  Al-Taki indicated 
that President Asad has seen a written version of the report. 
 
¶3.  (C) Brownlee is scheduled to visit Syria in the next day 
or two.  He has been engaged by the SARG and will be paid 750 
pounds sterling an hour for his advice.  Al-Taki said that 
both lawyers had agreed with his assessment that while 
Resolution 1636 imposed tough, arguably unfair conditions, 
Syria had absolutely no choice but to comply.  Al-Taki said 
he had seen President Asad for about 45 minutes in between 
two trips to Europe and obtained his consent to engage 
Brownlee and proceed with the legal approach.  MFA legal 
advisor Riyad Daoudi also supported this approach, said 
al-Taki. 
 
¶4.  (C) MAKING THE REGIME PAY THE PRICE:  Al-Taki at one 
point said, "I want the Americans to know what I am doing" 
(to obtain counsel).  His goal, he said is to ensure Syrian 
compliance and to extricate Syria from the current 
confrontation in a way that puts the price to be paid "on the 
regime, and not on the shoulders of my children."   Al-Taki 
was ambiguous about whether or not he thought President Asad 
would survive the current crisis, but hinted that he hoped 
Asad would survive to serve as a transitional figure for 
Syria's political future. 
 
¶5.  (C) SHAWKAT'S LEFTIST LAWYERS:  According to al-Taki, SMI 
chief Asif Shawkat has also shopped around for lawyers and 
had flown in experts in international law from France, 
Portugal, and Egypt, but "they were all left-wingers, only 
interested in talking about how unfair 1636 was, how Mehlis 
had exceeded the terms of the resolution, and how the UNSC 
had exceeded its mandate in passing it," said al-Taki in 
dismissing their usefulness.  An Egyptian legal expert, Salah 
Ammar, from a law faculty in Cairo, is still in Damascus, he 
added.  Al-Taki expressed mild disappointment that his 
friend, DFM Walid Mu'allim seems to have drifted into 
Shawkat's orbit of influence, hinting that Mu'allim's views 
had become more hard-line than al-Taki's.  He attributed it 
to Mu'allim's lingering nervousness about references to him 
in the Mehlis report. 
 
¶6.  (C) SAVING SHAWKAT: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?:  Asad is focused 
on "saving his brother, Maher" said al-Taki.  Asad seems to 
believe he has a deal with Mehlis to spare his brother, 
al-Taki added.  Asad would like to save Shawkat if he could, 
and is doing what is possible to achieve that objective, too, 
but al-Taki hinted that there is some recognition by Asad 
that this might not be possible. 
 
¶7.  (C) ALAWITE POWER BROKERS READY TO SACRIFICE SHAWKAT?: 
The Alawite confessional "wants compromise" in order to 
obtain SARG compliance with Resolution 1636 and to save the 
regime.  For this reason, Shawkat is in a very difficult 
situation, said al-Taki.  He does not have the support of the 
confessional, so he is not in a position to fight back. 
According to al-Taki, Shawkat may provoke a fight with the 
President, "but he can't win."  Hinting that what Asad may be 
aiming for is an honorable surrender, al-Taki pitched the 
idea of a "sliding handover," with Ghazaleh and several 
others handed over initially, without delivery of Shawkat. 
Even that would have a powerful, destabilizing impact on the 
regime, as it is likely that the men would be treated as 
criminal suspects, with such powerful optics beamed back to 
Syria, eroding the legitimacy of the regime.  When asked if 
such erosion might not be gradual, al-Taki sharply disagreed. 
 "It will be immediate," he countered.  Subsequently he noted 
that the regime's "revolutionary (Ba'athist) legitimacy" 
would end as soon as the first trial of one of the Syrian 
suspects began, and that Syria would need to go to free and 
fair elections for a new government to obtain the legitimacy 
to govern. 
 
¶8.  (C) POLLING ON 1636 AND CONFRONTATION WITH U.S.: 
Al-Taki, who also heads a small research and polling center 
operating under the informal auspices of the MFA and 
unidentified security services, described for Polchief recent 
findings on UNSCR 1636 and on Asad's speech.  He noted that 
the center had polled some 4,000 Syrians all over the country 
and had obtained fairly reliable results.  Polled initially 
before Asad delivered his November 10 speech, a clear 
majority were satisfied with the Resolution, and "happy" that 
it seemed to be targeted at the regime and not at the Syrian 
people.  The poll had also found a clear majority for the 
proposition that Syria needed to avoid a confrontation with 
the U.S. and the international community.  With regard to 
subsequent polling on Asad's speech, al-Taki described a 
majority who assented to the proposition that they did not 
understand why it was necessary to shelve political and 
economic reform in the current crisis.  (Note:  Al-Taki 
promised to turn over the complete polling results to 
Polchief at a later date.) 
 
¶9.  (C) ASAD STILL TOYING WITH DEFIANCE?  Interestingly, 
al-Taki offered a second-hand description of a conversation 
between Asad and MFA legal advisor Daoudi about the 
post-UNSCR 1636 polling on confrontation (as recounted by 
Daoudi subsequently).  (Note:  The conversation presumably 
took place before the Asad speech.)  Asad took issue with 
"Samir's question," saying it had been badly worded.  While 
he agreed that Syrians in the abstract do not want 
confrontation, "Samir did not specify military or economic 
confrontation," Asad is reported to have said.  In Asad's 
view, however, Syrians "would accept economic confrontation," 
i.e., sanctions, reported al-Taki.  Al-Taki acknowledged that 
this gave an indication that Asad was still giving 
consideration to the idea of defying the international 
community and absorbing sanctions. 
 
¶10.  (C) A STUPID SPEECH:  Regarding Asad's speech, al-Taki 
described it as "stupid," designed for domestic consumption, 
and given at a time when the President was under stress. 
Al-Taki at one point also muttered that the President was 
"stupid" to have delivered such a speech, indicating that all 
the attention given to the domestic audience would not change 
the international predicament in which Syria found itself. 
 
 
 
 
SECHE