This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 006066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ANTI-AMERICANISM IN SYRIA:  ON THE RISE BUT NOT 
OUT OF CONTROL 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  Since the mid-October release of the 
Mehlis report, the SARG has developed a response strategy 
that has included fanning existing anti-American sentiment in 
Syria, already evident because of popular perceptions about 
the war in Iraq and the global war on terror.  Some elements 
of the SARG response have been evident in the way the 
official media has covered the Mehlis story, while others 
have been transmitted via orchestrated protests, through 
mosques, and via President Asad's November 10 speech.  The 
sense that Syria faces an unprecedented crisis and must have 
national unity has allowed the SARG to silence its critics 
and to make it difficult, for example, for Syrians to speak 
up to defend detained dissident Kamal Labwani.  The current 
level of anti-American sentiment will make it more difficult 
for the USG to get much traction with its public message of 
support for democratization, human rights and civil society 
in Syria.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) BACKDROP TO ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT:  Anti-American 
sentiment, and in particular, anti-USG sentiment, is not new 
in Syria.  It has been a constant on the political landscape 
since the creation of the state of Israel and the rise of 
pan-Arab nationalism in the 1950's.  In both the ruling 
Ba'ath Party and among the opposition parties of the National 
Democratic Coalition, there remain ideological vestiges of 
this anti-Americanism.  Long-standing sympathy by Syrians for 
the Palestinians, reinforced by the widespread perception of 
unconditional U.S. support for Israel, has fed this 
anti-American sentiment over the years. 
 
¶3.  (C) WAR IN IRAQ AND GWOT ALSO CONTRIBUTING:  The war in 
Iraq and the U.S.-led war on terrorism have more recently 
caused a spike in anti-American sentiment in Syria.  The 
popular consensus among Syrians is that the U.S. has 
unjustifiably occupied Iraq and brought instability, chaos, 
and bloodshed, in order to implement a new regional order. 
Syrians' fears of such chaos, including the potential 
dismemberment of their own country, have also fed this 
anti-American sentiment.  In addition, many Syrians view the 
war on terror as a U.S. crusade against Islam.  According to 
Dr. Asem Kubtan, an activist in the opposition Democratic 
Arab Socialist Union Party, it is common for Syrians and 
Arabs to talk about living "in the days of American 
colonialism."  The U.S.-led campaign to isolate Syria -- in 
tandem with unilateral U.S. sanctions and repeated USG 
statements threatening further sanctions -- has led to 
increased Syrian nationalism and accentuated the sense that 
the U.S. has unfairly targeted Syria, according to observers 
like Nasri Khoury, SYG of the Syrian Lebanese Higher Council. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) MEHLIS INVESTIGATION CAUSING NEW SPIKE:  Since the 
release of the Mehlis report, the SARG has fanned such 
sentiments, causing another spike in anti-American sentiment. 
 The SARG has actively played "the nationalist card," 
primarily to link the fate of the Asad regime with that of 
the Syrian nation.  By insisting in his November 10 speech, 
for example, that he is standing up for Syria's national 
dignity, sovereignty, and security by rejecting the demands 
of Mehlis, Asad sought repeatedly to persuade Syrians that it 
is the homeland that is targeted, and not the regime. 
Positive reaction to the speech by ordinary Syrians, as well 
as by many in the elites, indicates that Asad largely 
succeeded in this objective.  (Note:  While he was careful 
not to point directly to the U.S. very often in the speech, 
this connection was understood by Syrians.  SARG officials 
and others made such links more directly afterwards.) 
 
¶5.  (C) SARG attacks on the credibility of Mehlis by 
insisting he is a CIA stooge and in the service of the 
Israelis have also fed anti-American sentiments.  The Mehlis 
investigation has been attacked as an exercise with a 
pre-determined outcome, to justify the targeting of Syria and 
the implementation of broader sanctions, regardless of the 
actions the SARG takes. 
 
¶6.  (C) LACK OF SUPPORT FOR LABWANI ALSO INDICATIVE:  The 
sense that Syria faces an unprecedented crisis has allowed 
the SARG to silence its critics and to make it almost 
impossible for Syrians otherwise well-disposed to the U.S. to 
speak up.  After the arrest of dissident Kamal Labwani, only 
a handful of human-rights activists directly involved in his 
case dared to voice even limited support.  Many in the 
opposition, because of residual suspicions about American 
intentions, felt betrayed by Labwani.  Others were cowed by 
the SARG-manufactured nationalist atmosphere and decided it 
was more prudent to remain silent.  Some friends of the U.S. 
have told Polchief that the USG's failure to declare its 
intentions clearly (i.e., to change the regime, surmise these 
contacts) and the absence pre-Labwani of sustained public 
support for democratization, human rights and a vibrant civil 
society, have created suspicions that it is insincere about 
these concerns and is merely using them to pressure the SARG 
to make a deal on external issues. 
 
¶7.  (C) SARG TAKES IT FOOT OFF THE BRAKE:  Observers like 
liberal Islamic cleric and MP Mohammed Habash also note that 
in the past, when there were vocal Syrian critics of the U.S. 
on television or in other regional media, SARG officials 
often quietly encouraged them to "tone it down," since Syria 
needed good relations with the U.S.  Now, such admonishments 
are more rare, according to Habash, leading to a flood of 
anti-American sentiment that is being communicated to Syrians 
via local and regional media.  Habash's point converges with 
that of others who have often insisted privately that the 
current regime, and in particular Asad, wanted good bilateral 
relations, but has finally become convinced that the U.S. 
wants regime change, so there is little to be lost in a 
tactical shift to a more anti-American line. 
 
¶8.  (C) SPECIFIC INCIDENTS:  Embassy personnel in the past 
month have reported a few isolated incidents where Syrians 
have uttered anti-American sentiments in a personal, 
insulting manner, and there have been a few reports of 
anti-American graffiti.  At the protest tent erected in early 
November one block from the Embassy, there are occasionally a 
few signs with anti-American or "anti-Bush" sentiments 
expressed, although most speakers have shied away from any 
anti-American themes, harping instead on the need for Syrian 
national unity.  At a November 19 protest at the tent  -- the 
largest to date -- some 2,500 protesters, mostly university 
students, shouted anti-American slogans, including (in 
English) "Down, down, USA, we're not afraid of the CIA;" and 
(in Arabic) "We don't want to see the U.S. Embassy anymore." 
 
¶9.  (C) In October, during the holy month of Ramadan, the 
SARG orchestrated an anti-American campaign in the mosques, 
where imams were provided with general anti-American themes 
to emphasize, including accusations that the U.S. wanted to 
dismember Syria and create chaos, like that in neighboring 
Iraq.  The campaign was kicked off in the important Ommayyad 
Mosque in the Old City, according to contacts, and was 
repeated for days afterwards, in mosques throughout the 
country.  In November, since the end of Ramadan, this 
anti-American message used in the mosques has been heard less 
frequently. 
 
¶10.  (C)  RESTRAINTS ON ANTI-AMERICANISM:  There are several 
factors that have restrained the rise in anti-American 
sentiment.  Most observers point to the large population of 
Syrians living in the U.S., many of them Amcits.  Almost any 
Syrian family has some relative living and prospering in the 
U.S.  Many Syrians dream of following these relatives to the 
U.S. and view it as a land of opportunity and freedom, 
leading many Syrians to distinguish between USG policies and 
the American people.  The unanimity of the UNSC vote on 
Resolution 1636 has also tempered anti-American sentiment and 
made it more difficult (but not impossible) for the SARG to 
argue that Mehlis is a USG conspiracy. 
 
¶11.  (C) Finally, influential voices in the SARG that argue 
that Syria needs good relations with the U.S. in the future, 
and needs to avoid a major confrontation with the lone 
superpower have also served to check its fanning of 
anti-American sentiment.  As a result, the government has 
generally opted for coded language, turned off campaigns such 
as that in the mosques before they got out of hand, and used 
controlled doses of anti-American sentiment as a tool to 
foment Syrian nationalist sentiment and to highlight the 
common bond between the regime and the nation. 
Long-standing, wide-spread Syrian antipathy for the regime 
also serves as a limited natural brake on the SARG's effort 
to use anti-American sentiment to provoke affection for the 
Asad regime. 
 
SECHE