This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 006014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SY
SUBJECT: USG STATEMENTS ON POLITICAL PRISONERS OVERSHADOWED 
BY AFTERMATH OF BASHAR,S SPEECH 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 05933 
 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 05934 
 
Classified By: CDA Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY: Civil-society activists, especially those 
focusing on human rights, have expressed satisfaction with 
recent USG statements calling for the release of Kamal 
Labwani and other political prisoners.  While glad that the 
U.S. now includes human rights on its Syria agenda, many 
contacts feel that such signals are long overdue, too focused 
on Labwani as an individual, and are exploiting the 
Mehlis-induced political climate.  However, the statements' 
impact on the general population appears limited, as most of 
Syrian society is preoccupied by struggles to make ends meet 
and, in many cases, very supportive of President Asad,s 
November 10 speech.  Meanwhile, European diplomats are not 
pushing their own governments to make public statements on 
Labwani's behalf, citing the current political climate. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Discussions with a number of civil-society contacts 
reveal satisfaction with USG statements over the last week 
calling for the SARG to release political prisoners, 
including opposition figure Kamal Labwani and the six 
remaining Damascus Spring detainees.  Anwar al-Bunni noted to 
Poloff that Syrian civil society had long desired such public 
statements as evidence that the USG cared about SARG domestic 
policies in addition to its foreign policy.  Joumana Riad 
Seif, daughter of Damascus Spring detainee Riad Seif, was 
pleased that public pressure on the regime had increased and 
hopes that European countries will follow the US's lead.  As 
noted in Ref A, a number of contacts feel that USG pressure 
forced the SARG to reduce the criminal charges against 
Labwani from those initially planned. 
 
¶3.  (C) One contact, Haithem Maleh, felt that USG statements 
were insufficient, noting that there should have been a 
general call for the SARG to discontinue torture and to 
release all political prisoners.  Civil society activists 
also fear that USG efforts took place simply on behalf of 
Labwani himself based on his connections with Washington and 
that further action is not to be expected.  One skeptical 
contact lumped Labwani and Farid Ghadry,s ambitions 
together, derisively referring to the two oppositionists as 
the "two princes of Syria."  Attorney Salahideen al-Khatib 
told Polchief that while the USG statements were certainly 
welcome, the timing could not have been worse, given the 
current internal tensions and external crises induced by the 
Mehlis investigation.  The bad timing had undercut much of 
the impact of the statements.  Civil-society activist Hassan 
Abbas, an Alawite intellectual, offered a broad dismissal of 
the statements, saying Syrians generally considered USG 
declarations on democracy as code language for re-ordering 
the Middle East.  He noted that press reports on Abu Ghraib 
and secret U.S. prisons overseas had undercut-- at least 
temporarily-- the USG's moral authority on the human rights 
issue. 
 
¶4.   (C)  In addition to Mehlis-related developments, USG 
statements on Labwani have been also largely overshadowed by 
President Bashar al-Asad's November 10 speech (ref B) among 
both civil society and the population at large.  Multiple 
civil-society contacts have noted that fear has grown among 
the opposition community following Asad's threatening 
remarks, promising to "deal firmly with unpatriotic" people 
with connections to the outside.  In the days immediately 
following the speech, Bunni took additional personal security 
steps, including moving his car and keeping his children 
indoors.  Women's-rights activist Daad Mousa told Poloff that 
she has been told by a friend with connections to the SARG 
that authorities are demanding that civil-society figures 
stop giving interviews to the foreign press and meeting with 
diplomats.  Mousa was also told that the SARG would increase 
surveillance of activists and diplomats alike.  Nonetheless, 
many civil-society activists have ignored the threats and 
continued business as usual, attending meetings with Poloffs 
and make provocative statements in public fora, including at 
a women's conference earlier this week (septel). 
 
¶5.  (C)  Due in part to the current political environment 
following Bashar's speech, other Western embassies in 
Damascus are not willing to take a public stance on Labwani's 
behalf and will not recommend such action to their respective 
ministries.  During a Canadian-hosted luncheon of 18 North 
American and European mission human rights officers on 
November 16, much discussion took place regarding how to 
handle the Labwani case.  While not directly criticizing 
recent USG statements, a German diplomat stated that given 
the current political situation, now is not the appropriate 
time for taking public action.  She also noted that because 
Labwani had held political meetings with European and U.S. 
officials, his was not a "purely" human rights case.  A 
Swedish diplomat noted that any public statements must 
address political prisoners in general and not just 
high-profile individuals.  While acknowledging that human 
rights activists had long been calling for foreign 
governments to make public comments on the Syrian human 
rights situation, an Austrian diplomat concurred with her EU 
colleagues that public statements at this moment would be 
ill-advised.  A representative from the European Commission 
noted that he expects a European Parliament resolution 
(sponsored by the EP Liberal Democratic wing, which met with 
Labwani in October) calling for Labwani,s release.  However, 
the EC does not plan to do anything on a local level. 
 
¶6.  (C)  COMMENT: Asad's emotional November 10 appeal to 
Syrians' patriotic and religious sentiments made a huge 
impact on public opinion, both on the street and among the 
elite. While many contacts acknowledge that the speech was 
"rough" in places, especially the language on Lebanon, by and 
large it elicited a positive, emotional Syrian response.  One 
contact reported seeing Syrians burst into tears of emotional 
agreement with Asad's statement he would only bow his head to 
Allah.  Asad used his moment at the podium to effectively 
forge the link between the regime and the Syrian people by 
appealing to Syrians' patriotism and pointing out the threats 
to Syria's dignity and security.  In the wake of the speech, 
it is very difficult for any activist to raise his or her 
voice to defend Labwani and his criticism of the SARG.  Asad 
in his speech also effectively played on the doubts many of 
Labwani's opposition colleagues have had regarding the 
advisability of his visit to the U.S. at this time and of 
publicly criticizing the regime during the visit.  So far 
Labwani's defenders, except for his family and other Damascus 
Spring family members, are maintaining this carefully 
circumscribed defense, insisting merely that his imprisonment 
is a human-rights violation, but unwilling to make him a 
cause celebre. 
 
 
SECHE