This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 005780 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: INITIAL SYRIAN REACTION TO UNSCR 1636: SARG 
EXPECTED TO OPT FOR "COOPERATION LITE" WHILE PUSHING 
ANTI-AMERICAN LINE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Syrian contacts reacting in the immediate wake of 
passage of UNSCR 1636 predicted that the SARG, despite 
mounting pressure, would provide only limited cooperation 
with the UNIIIC investigation, while trying to prolong any 
negotiations on the modalities of the cooperation.  In 
addition, the SARG is likely to shore up domestic support 
with a  release of poltical prisoners and other political 
reforms.  It will exploit an anxious public mood and continue 
to fan anti-American sentiments.  Contacts were divided about 
the strength of the resolution and its impact on the regime. 
One view argues that if President Bashar al-Asad does not 
take dramatic action, amounting to a "palace coup" that would 
involve separating his fate from that of family members 
likely to be named as suspects, the regime would end up 
taking the country down a disastrous path.  Proponents of 
this view said that the army would have to play a critical 
role in this scenario, but they did not believe circumstances 
had yet ripened for such a move.  A second view argues that 
the regime is betting that limited help from its allies, 
mistakes by resolution sponsors that would give the regime 
popular support, and ongoing anti-American, anti-Mehlis 
propaganda would allow the regime to survive, even if if 
faces a year or two of sanctions.  Human-rights activists 
generally hailed the resolution as a useful tool with which 
to pressure the regime.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Reacting to passage of UNSCR 1636, long-standing 
Embassy contact Dr. Samir al-Taki told Polchief he expects 
relatively dramatic developments in the next two months.  He 
said he had spoken with a range of political, security, and 
party figures in the hours after passage of UNSCR 1636 and 
warned them to expect a demand from UNIIIC head Mehlis in the 
next few days that key Syrian suspects be rendered abroad for 
questioning.  Al-Taki said that "half-cooperation" or "fake" 
cooperation with UNIIIC is the most dangerous solution for 
Syria because it would expose the nation to consequences, 
without gaining any benefit. 
 
¶3.  (C) In al-Taki's view, it is necessary to fully cooperate 
with UNIIIC in a way that would "split the SARG leadership" 
and separate the fate of President Bashar al-Asad from that 
of his brother Maher, and his brother-in-law, SMI chief Asif 
Shawkat.  Al-Taki described as urgent the need to find ways 
to convince Asad that he needed to take action, and soon, to 
facilitate this separation.  Al-Taki said it is not clear 
whether Asad could hand over the two or separate his fate 
from theirs, "because it will involve some kind of internal 
coup." 
 
¶4.  (C) Like other contacts, al-Taki described a divide in 
the regime between those who followed his and GID head Ali 
Mamluk's assessment that the President needed to take drastic 
action, and those siding with Maher and Shawkat, who argued 
for limited cooperation and for waiting to see what happened. 
 Ba'ath Party Regional Command member Haithem Satayhi was 
described as one offering Asad honest advice that leaned 
toward the al-Taki/Mamluk view of the situation.  According 
to al-Taki, Mamluk assessed that the situation was not yet 
ripe for any type of partial coup in support of the President 
by military elements opposing Maher and Shawkat, but 
indicated the current "difficult, fluid" situation could move 
in this direction.  Al-Taki lamented that "there are only 
four people in the military/security services, and one 
political figure," who could confront "the suspects and their 
supporters" but did not elaborate. 
 
¶5.  (C) Al-Taki pointed to a SARG leadership meeting that 
took place October 31, including political, security, and 
party officials.  He described it as "hectic and confused" 
with people focused on their individual survival. "What they 
don't understand is that once the UN names them, there won't 
be any place to flee to or access to the money they have 
obtained."  Al-Taki said his source for this description was 
Ali Mamluk, the head of GID, with whom he spoke directly. 
Mamluk described to al-Taki an argument between the President 
and Shawkat before the meeting, in which Shawkat was quoted 
as saying "We came (to power) together, and we will leave 
together." 
 
¶6.  (C) While acknowledging family pressures, al-Taki said 
that they would not be critical.  For him, "the key now is 
the Syrian army" (military forces not including the security 
services).  "It must stand up for Syria's future stability 
and survival," said al-Taki.  The fact that Shawkat had 
spread "his men" throughout the security services would not 
be critical if the army moved. 
 
¶7.  (C) On a related note, al-Taki said it was regrettable 
that the American Ambassador is not present in Syria at 
present, noting that U.S. input in the coming period could be 
critical.  "Only the U.S. among foreign elements can shape 
the upcoming events." 
 
¶8.  (C) Al-Taki discounted the significance of any relief 
that SARG officials expressed with the language of the 
resolution passed.  He also insisted that the SARG, as soon 
as possible, should negotiate a protocol with UNIIIC on 
future cooperation.  He expected that it would not be to the 
SARG's advantage, because the government had waited too long 
to act, but anything would be better than no action. 
 
¶9.  (C) LAYING OUT THE SARG STRATEGY:  All4Syria website 
founder and Ba'athist reformer Ayman Abdul Noor also pointed 
to this split between hard-liners supporting the Maher and 
Shawkat and those who were arguing for a somewhat more 
moderate position on UNIIIC cooperation, in tandem with 
"fundamental internal change." He said these changes would 
include starting negotiations with the opposition on a new 
political parties law, releasing all political prisoners, 
some economic reforms, and announcing elections, "with the 
prospect of real competition and power-sharing."  Despite 
this split, Abdul Noor detected the outlines of a strategy 
emerging which would amount to the "cooperation-lite" policy 
with UNIIIC that al-Taki decried as the most dangerous, and a 
few internal changes. 
 
¶10.  (C) The regime will try to enter into drawn-out 
negotiations with Mehlis on the modalities for cooperation, 
discussing guarantees for any witnesses sent abroad (e.g. no 
change in status from witness to suspect, UN commitment they 
will be allowed to return to Syria) and so forth.  For every 
positive step the SARG takes towards cooperating, it will 
send a warning signal that at a certain point, if pushed too 
hard, the cooperation will stop.  In the intermediate future, 
the regime understands that this posture will likely lead to 
sanctions, which it prefers to taking the drastic action of 
delivering Maher al-Asad and Shawkat. 
 
¶11.  (C) By insisting publicly that it will cooperate fully, 
while insisting on conclusive evidence, the regime will keep 
Syrian public opinion on its side, even in the face of the 
sanctions threat.  At the same time, the regime will 
intensify its anti-American campaign, as it tries to enhance 
its pull on Syrian public opinion.  Abdul Noor described the 
message going out of the mosques over the past week, as 
directed by SARG authorities, as inflammatory, emotional, and 
dangerous, since once such discourse took on religious 
overtones, it became irrational and difficult to control. 
 
¶12.  (C) Abdul Noor expected the regime to reduce any 
residual domestic criticism by using the anti-American line, 
charges of international conspiracy, and the message that 
Syria is being targeted without evidence or sense of fair 
play.  Part of its strategy will also include attacking the 
personal credibility of Mehlis, which the regime so far has 
not done.  Abdul Noor insisted that the SARG has photographs 
of Mehlis meeting with Mossad agents, and will broadcast such 
visuals in the coming days.  The SARG will also spread the 
view that "Syria is targeted, not the regime."   He urged the 
U.S. to speak out publicly in the next few days to make clear 
(and counter regime propaganda) that neither the U.S. nor the 
UN would target the Syrian people, but instead would focus on 
individuals in the regime. 
 
¶13.  (C) If the regime borrows a few of the other 
recommendations from the moderate camp (in which Abdul Noor 
includes himself), Asad will also change a few members of his 
government, particularly FM Shara'a.  Asad is also likely to 
deliver a speech to the nation in the coming days, explaining 
"how the country got into such a mess." 
 
¶14.  (C) Abdul Noor insisted that Bashar al-Asad has the 
power to turn over family members to Mehlis for interrogation 
or even trial, even without demanding conclusive evidence 
first, but "he does not want to."  When asked why he would 
not want to, if Asad faces such a threat to his regime, Abdul 
Noor replied cryptically, "because he knows," hinting that 
what the two know about the assassination of Hariri poses 
more danger to his regime than a possible UN sanctions regime. 
 
¶15.  (C) Abdul Noor took issue with the official view that 
the resolution had been watered down and was not so damaging 
to Syria.  It is still "a Chapter VII resolution" and shows a 
clear, unanimous call by the Council for SARG action, he 
said. 
¶16.  (C) Historian Sami Moubayed speculated that the regime 
has already decided to do the minimum and is basically "just 
waiting for sanctions."  While there is some hope that Russia 
and other allies will help them avoid the sanctions, Moubayed 
discounted that possibility.  Concurring with many other 
contacts, he said it is impossible for Bashar al-Asad to turn 
over his brother or brother-in-law as suspects.  Maher sees 
himself as his brother's equal in "the family enterprise." 
Some sort of limited questioning in Cairo might eventually be 
accepted, but even that would be viewed as "a tremendous 
humiliation" for the regime.  Moubayed also predicted 
increasing anti-American sentiment stoked by the regime, but 
noted that such feelings were already present on the Islamic 
street in Syria.  Like Abdul-Noor, he also predicted SARG 
domestic moves to shore up public support. 
 
¶17.  (C) MP George Jabbour, a regime defender, hailed the 
successful efforts of Russia to have removed from the 
resolution the reference to Article 41 and to have inserted 
the reference to Syria's newly formed investigative 
committee.  He told Polchief things were not yet at an 
impasse, but they could develop in that direction if what he 
projected as negotiations between Syria's investigative 
committee and UNIIIC broke down.  Jabbour acknowledged "very 
strong feelings" in Syria against the UN and Mehlis, which he 
regretted, but blamed on Mehlis' mistaken insistence on 
publishing his report before his findings were final. 
 
¶18.  (C) Human rights activist Anwar al-Bunni predicted a 
crisis between the SARG and the UN even before December 15, 
with SARG efforts to combine pretenses of cooperation with 
stalling tactics doomed to failure.  In his view, UNSCR 1636 
makes clear that the SARG will not be offered a deal to get 
out of its predicament.  He also expressed his belief that 
the resolution successfully differentiated between the regime 
and the Syrian people. 
 
¶19.  (C) Other civil-society activists also weighed in with 
Emboffs.  Maan Abdul Salam said that the international 
community had acted wisely in compromising on the resolution 
to get unanimous passage.  The SARG would now have more 
difficulty gaining time by playing up divisions in the 
international community.  Taking issue with assessment of 
other contacts, Abdul Salam insisted that the SARG's efforts 
to gain the support of the public with Syrian nationalist 
messages were not working.  Attorney and activist Da'ad Musa 
described 1636 as "a soft resolution" but at the same time 
expressed relief that it stopped short of a repeat of UN 
sanctions like those implemented against Iraq and Sudan, 
 
 
 
SECHE