This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002017 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER CE LTTE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS OFFER 
LITTLE INSIGHT INTO NEXT STEPS ON PEACE PROCESS; CO-CHAIRS 
TO BE CONSULTED 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 2008 
     ¶B. COLOMBO 2003 
     ¶C. COLOMBO 1979 
     ¶D. COLOMBO 1929 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) In public statements made since his November 17 
election, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has offered few 
concrete details into how he plans to realize his oft-stated 
goal of achieving a political resolution to the conflict with 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  In particular, 
how he plans to bridge the sizable gaps between his policies 
and the LTTE's demands remains unclear, but his affirmation 
of a key role for the Co-chairs, conveyed in a November 28 
address to the diplomatic community, and a separate, private 
request to Norway to remain as facilitator are hopeful signs. 
 End summary. 
 
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PRESIDENT READY FOR TALKS: 
HOW AND WHEN UNCLEAR 
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¶2.  (SBU) In a series of public statements since his November 
17 election, including his November 18 inauguration speech 
(Ref C), his first address before Parliament (or the "Throne 
Speech") on November 25 and a November 28 briefing to the 
diplomatic corps, President Mahinda Rajapaksa has offered few 
concrete details on how he plans to advance the peace 
process.  On each occasion he has repeated his offer to 
engage in direct and immediate talks with the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but has given no specific 
indication of how he expects to encourage the Tigers back to 
the table.  Indeed, his comments before Sri Lankan 
audiences--the inaugural address and the policy statement 
before Parliament--emphasized his commitment to a unitary Sri 
Lanka, his intention to "revise" the Ceasefire Agreement and 
his plan to include Muslims and all other "interested 
parties" in peace talks--all non-starters for the LTTE. 
Moreover, his speech before Parliament specifically 
repudiated the LTTE's "concepts of traditional homelands and 
self-determination" and pledged to uphold the right of any 
member of any ethnic group to live anywhere in the country 
"on the grounds that the entire territory is the homeland of 
all communities." 
 
¶3.  (U)  Besides talking to the Tigers, the President 
undertook in his parliamentary address to include all 
"political parties, pressure groups, NGOs, religious 
organizations and the media" in "open discussions" aimed at 
building the ever-elusive national consensus on the peace 
process.  At the same time, he said, the Government will 
"properly organize" the facilitation services provided by the 
United Nations (note:  the UN has not performed a 
facilitation role in the peace process) and "the 
international community." 
 
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LESS POLARIZING, MORE FORTHCOMING 
WITH ENVOYS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In contrast to his remarks before Sri Lankan 
audiences, Rajapaksa's November 28 briefing of the diplomatic 
corps presented a more modulated, less polarizing approach. 
Omitting any reference to the preservation of a unitary state 
as part of a political solution, the President instead noted 
only that "the people of Sri Lanka have expressed their 
confidence" in his views on the peace process, and emphasized 
his plans for greater inclusiveness and transparency in the 
process.  Rather than "revising" the Ceasefire Agreement 
(which the LTTE has already made plain it will not consider), 
he suggested instead "reviewing" it to improve its 
implementation--something the LTTE had already agreed to do, 
at least in principle, in the late days of former President 
Kumaratunga's administration.  In tacit acknowledgment of 
international concern at possible Government involvement in 
the "dirty war," he pledged to uphold the ceasefire (a point 
notably absent from the considerably longer policy speech 
before Parliament) and to adopt a human rights charter fully 
compliant with international conventions.  He also expressed 
gratitude for foreign aid to support reconstruction in the 
north and east and appealed for "international assistance to 
ensure that peace making is not at the cost of democracy and 
pluralism." 
 
¶5.  (C) In another marked departure from his previous 
statements, in his comments to the diplomats Rajapaksa noted 
the need to begin consultations on the peace process with the 
four Co-chairs--Japan, US, EU and Norway--his first public 
acknowledgment of the group since the campaign and his first 
positive mention of Norway (albeit in its role as a Co-chair, 
rather than facilitator).  In the Ambassador's conversation 
with Rajapaksa after the speech, the President told him that 
he had inserted the reference to the Co-chairs after his 
conversation with the Ambassador on November 25 (Ref B), when 
the Ambassador had explicitly asked the President what he 
intended with regard to the Co-chairs.  In a separate 
conversation on November 28, Foreign Minister Mangala 
Samaraweera told the Ambassador that he planned to meet the 
Co-chairs the following week.  The Co-chairs have also 
requested a meeting with the President, and we expect that 
may also happen next week. 
 
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QUIET OLIVE BRANCH TO NORWAY? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) On November 28 Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar 
told the Ambassador that new Acting Head of the Peace 
Secretariat John Gooneratne (who is replacing, at least for 
 
SIPDIS 
now, Jayantha Dhanapala, who announced his retirement on 
November 10) had called in Brattskar, at the direction of 
ForMin Samaraweera, on November 26 to convey that the 
government wants Norway to continue in its role as 
facilitator.  The government was still working out the 
modality and timing of publicly announcing this, however, 
Gooneratne reportedly explained.  Brattskar told the 
Ambassador that he had replied that Norway is ready to 
continue if both parties want it to do so and if Norway is 
convinced it can play a positive role. 
 
 
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SOME THOUGHTS ON DEVOLUTION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In a November 29 lunch hosted by President Rajapaksa 
for visiting former President Clinton, Rajapaksa told the 
Ambassador and former President Clinton that he is 
considering, as an initial overture to the LTTE, offering 
provincial councils in Tiger-controlled territory substantial 
devolution of power, including police, land and finances. 
(Note:  As reported Ref D, an NGO contact had told us that 
Rajapaksa, via back-channel communication with the Tigers, 
had suggested a similar offer during the campaign, which he 
had described as a substitute for the interim administration 
the LTTE had been demanding.  The LTTE's reported reaction to 
this offer was that Rajapaksa was "practical" and 
realistic--an assessment echoed in LTTE leader Prabhakaran's 
November 27 Heroes' Day speech (Ref A).  End note.) 
Rajapaksa added that he would still like India to assume a 
more prominent role in the peace process.  The Ambassador 
commented that the idea of real devolved powers may have some 
merit, but the term "Provincial Councils" is likely to 
trigger a negative reaction with the LTTE--just as the term 
"federalism" causes a negative reaction among certain 
quarters in the south.  The Ambassador also suggested that it 
might be useful to persuade the Indians to become more 
involved in tandem with other international players, rather 
than as a solo performer. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8.  (C) It is all very well for Rajapaksa to declare he is 
ready for talks--just as it all very well for Prabhakaran to 
declare he is ready for Rajapaksa to deliver a political 
solution (Ref B).  Actually achieving these difficult goals 
is obviously a very different matter.  While it is 
encouraging that Rajapaksa has begun to think about what new 
offers he might put on the table, the danger remains that the 
nationalist rhetoric with Sri Lankan audiences may temper his 
ability to make "practical" and realistic overtures.  There 
is an enormous gulf between Rajapaksa's insistence on a 
unitary state versus LTTE insistence on self-determination 
and the ground that must be covered to get to an eventual 
peace agreement.  Rajapaksa's appeal to the Co-chairs (and 
his less public overture to Norway) are hopeful signs that he 
recognizes the important role that the international 
community could play in helping bridge this gap.  We plan to 
consult with other Co-chair representatives in advance of the 
expected meetings with the Foreign Minister and President. 
LUNSTEAD