This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/1/2015 
TAGS: PGOV TH KDEM
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION CARRIES PICHIT ELECTION WITH MONEY, EMOTION 
 
REF: BANGKOK 6119 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bea Camp, Consul General, Chiang Mai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A surprising Oct. 30 victory by the opposition candidate in a by-election in northern Phichit province that pit the sons of two powerful families against one another dented the governing Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party's censure-proof majority in parliament. One of four by-elections held on Sunday, the Phichit case showed that despite TRT's modernized electoral organization and dominant political power, vote buying and personality-based campaigning still hold sway with Thai voters. The highly personalized nature of the rival campaigns combined with rampant vote buying all but guarantees TRT will challenge the results. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.      (U) Tuesday reports showed Siriwat Kachornprasart, son of 
Mahachon Party leader Gen. Sanan Kachornprasart, winning the Pichit constituency with a 39,000 to 22,000-vote lead over his TRT rival, Nawin Boonset. Nawin, the son of TRT MP Pol. Lt. Col. 
Adul Boonset won a 2,600-vote victory in the national election last February, but was one of three candidates to receive a "yellow card" from the national Election Commission (EC) forcing a new election. One other candidate in southern Satun province received a disqualifying red-card, and all four constituencies held by-elections Oct. 30.  Initial results show opposition candidates won three of the four seats, falling just one seat short of reaching a combined 125 seats in parliament - the magic number needed to force censure votes on government officials. 
Protests over this weekend's results and the prospect of more yellow cards, mean that the opposition's goal is still within reach (see Bangkok septel for nation-wide election coverage). 
 
¶3.      (C) Local and national media hyped the Phichit race as a 
bitter turf war between two powerful and connected political families in a province known nationally for a legacy of organized crime. By all accounts this was not a clean fight, with credible allegations of vote-buying running alongside less-convincing accounts of out-of-town gunmen flocking to the scene. Pre-election evidence pointed to a TRT win, with the ruling party's organizational prowess and institutional advantages (plus bribery, intimidation and two visits by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra) facing off against Mahachon's focus on its leaders' personalities and individualized efforts at vote buying. 
 
¶4.      (C) In Phichit and elsewhere, TRT launched an all-out 
campaign to defend its three yellow-carded MPs using the party's ample financial resources, cadre of celebrity figures, and influence over national media. Opposition parties stressed the importance of reaching their 125-seat goal, with Mahachon, Democrat, and Chart Thai parties agreeing to field only one candidate between them in each of the elections. In Pichit, Mahachon turned the election into a referendum on party leader Sanan's political legacy on his home turf. Judging by Sunday's results, the opposition's strategy to forgo issue-specific attacks on Thaksin's government and instead run on the combined platform of a strengthened opposition and the personality of the candidates paid off. In the case of Phichit, cash payments directly to voters backed up by personalized appeals proved a winning combo for Mahachon. 
 
Thai Rak Thai's Advantages Apparently Not Enough 
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¶5.      (C) Thaksin visited the province twice in the run-up to 
the vote, skirting election laws that forbid campaigning while on official business during business hours. In his final appearance, he appeared at a rally attended by some 40,000 (likely paid) supporters, where he and other TRT officials linked the national power of TRT to the developmental future of the province. Nebulous TRT promises of "development projects" 
were as close to an actual discussion of issues as voters heard from either side. In public, TRT advertised the power of its status as the dominant force in parliament and sent cabinet members to ensure locals paid attention. 
 
¶6.      (C) TRT's Phichit campaign demonstrated the party's 
efficient organizational skills, which, like U.S. political parties, allow it to track and collect information on voters and target resources accordingly. Instead of party canvassers and the candidates themselves personally delivering cash bribes to voters, TRT advertised its overwhelming power in parliament as a key to directing development projects to local districts. This, combined with actual vote-buying efforts directed at village leaders who would then filter the money downward, looked like a winning way for TRT to consolidate its power by funneling the spoils of its convincing February national win into a permanent edge. 
 
Sanan's Last Stand 
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¶7.      (C) But Gen. Sanan showed there is still life in old-style 
 
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bribery and personal campaigning. On the surface Mahachon advertised the race as both a test of Sanan's legacy in his hometown of Phichit and a chance to break into TRT's censure-proof majority in parliament. But local observers told PolOff in the week before the election that Gen. Sanan's emotional door-to-door appeals to save his political life came hand-in-hand with payments of up to 500 baht/person (about USD$12.50), and were the deciding factor in the race. 
 
¶8.      (C) In the weeks before the election, Sanan publicly 
staked his future on the outcome of Sunday's election, tearfully threatening to leave the province if his party lost. Mahachon, a party Sanan helped found after breaking away from the Democrat Party, lost badly in last February's election, winning just two seats nationwide. Sanan saw Phichit as the one district he could still win and so made sure the Election Commission yellow-carded the TRT winner in order to force a by-election. A member of the independent watchdog group People's Network for Elections in Thailand (P-NET), which monitored elections for the four by-elections, told PolOff that Sanan used his influence over EC members to elevate relatively minor charges of wrong-doing to yellow-card status (three of five EC members served in the Interior Ministry while Sanan was Interior Minister under a previous government). 
 
¶9.      (SBU) With February's results nullified, Sanan called in a 
handful of defeated Mahachon MPs who traveled to Phichit to help their boss stage his last stand. The patriarch then turned to his son Siriwat to save the family name. In reality though, Sanan still ran the show, just as Adul did for his son Nawin. 
Although Siriwat's and Nawin's faces appeared on campaign posters, it was the two fathers that voters heard and saw in the media and it was Sanan who knocked on their doors. In an Oct. 26 meeting with PolOff, Adul fielded all the questions, even those directed at his son, who sat meekly as his father predicted the downfall of Sanan and Mahachon. At that point both TRT and the independent watchdog group P-NET cited polls showing Nawin leading by 10 percent. 
 
¶10.     (C) In the end, Phichit remained Sanan country. TRT 
officials tried to argue that their new MPs have delivered more for the province in the last few years than Sanan ever did during his decades-long political career, but Sunday's results suggested that the emotional nature of Sanan's hometown hero appeal and the cash that came with it for once outweighed the power of TRT politics. 
 
Election Officials Miss the Forest for the Trees 
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¶11.     (C) With each party's price per vote the worst kept secret 
in town and distrust between TRT and Mahachon leading to allegations of vote-rigging, provincial EC officials told PolOff that they were taking new measures to guarantee the security of the ballots. Vote counting was moved away from the individual 200-plus polling sites to a well-guarded and transparently monitored single site, where officials counted votes from within a secure cage. In addition, both parties, P-NET, and the EC described plans to make sure the number of voters entering polling stations matched up with the total vote count released to the public. 
 
¶12.     (C) While eager to talk about these ballot box security 
measures, few officials were prepared to deal with illegal practices that went on before the election or to directly discuss the vote-buying practices of either party.  P-NET, however, reported that grocery store owners noticed customers spending their extra money shortly after party canvassers visited their areas.  Phichit Gov. Phinit Pichayakul, requesting confidentiality, told PolOff in a refreshing moment of candor that, "whoever pays the most wins." The actual vote count was in all likelihood accurate, but no obstacle slowed down personal "donations" from Sanan or the better-disguised "development project" funds from TRT associates. 
 
¶13.     (C) According to P-NET, Sanan (and likely TRT) found ways 
around the loose anti-corruption measures put in place before election day. Local officials announced nighttime police checkpoints to look for canvassers who might sneak into villages to deliver bribes. While Mahachon leaders complained to PolOff that these checkpoints were just excuses for TRT-ordered police harassment of Mahachon members, P-NET reported that Sanan and his followers moved their vote-buying treks to daylight hours and avoided the checkpoints entirely. 
 
¶14.     (C) Although Adul and Nawin told PolOff Oct. 26 that they 
would accept the results if they lost, most expect that TRT will push the EC to issue a yellow card to Siriwat. Early media reports, however, show that their complaints are focusing on the election-day vote counting process, once again ignoring the obvious vote-buying schemes that were rampant in the weeks before the election. Gov. Pichayakul told PolOff he expected a Mahachon win would further divide local politics and lead to more challenges to election results. In the words of one 
 
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observer, "the eventual winner will get a chance to win three or four times before taking his seat." 
 
¶15.     (C) COMMENT: Mahachon's win shows that old-style Thai 
politics, with its vote-buying schemes and  personality-driven campaigning can still win against TRT's blend of modern political organization and influence peddling, at least on friendly turf.  What worked in Pichit, however, is hardly a model for the opposition to shake TRT's hold on power. 
 
¶6.         (C)  COMMENT continued:  Despite a stronger public 
anti-fraud tack taken by the EC, Thai politicians continue to find means to circumvent election laws. A system that relies mostly on complaints from one political party to initiate an investigation against another has not done much to promote good electoral practices.  Few officials are ready to tackle the underlying corruption inherent in contests such as the Phichit by-election; it is doubtful that any party will call for comprehensive investigations into allegations of institutionalized vote buying when all parties have their hands dirty, even if some are dirtier than others. 
 
 
CAMP