This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 010392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PTER CO FARC AUC
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT ON "POST-CONFLICT"; PROMINENT 
LAWYER SAYS PARA PROCESS TOUGHER THAN POSSIBLE FARC DEAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) Vice president Francisco Santos said at a restorative 
justice conference November 2 that Colombia's paramilitary 
demobilization process was a "post-conflict situation" 
requiring deft management if Colombia was to avoid "the 
problems of Central America or the Southern Cone" on crime 
and human rights.  Former vice Justice Minister Rafael Nieto 
explained the political context in which the Congress 
approved the Justice and Peace law, defended in broad terms 
its provisions, and argued that a future FARC "peace deal" 
would almost certainly involve "less justice and more 
impunity" than the paramilitary peace process.  End summary. 
 
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Santos: Task is to Manage Post-Conflict Situation 
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¶2.  (C) Santos opened the "restorative justice" seminar by 
saying Colombia's task was to manage a post-conflict 
situation to avoid suffering "the problems of Central America 
or the Southern Cone" on crime and human rights.  Referring 
to two seminar participants who formerly served on South 
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he said 
Colombia is a democracy that is anxious to learn from the 
experiences of other countries which have gone through 
comparable post-conflict experiences.  He said the GOC's goal 
was the "absolute and total" dismantling of paramilitary 
structures.  Colombia had to "punish perpetrators and make 
victims whole," he said.  Santos rejected the view that the 
Justice and Peace law was "a law of total impunity," and 
predicted that "in the not too distant future" the FARC would 
seek to take advantage of it.  The vice president said the 
GOC would make a major effort to explain the Justice and 
Peace law's reconciliation and reparations objectives through 
a series of regional seminars that the National Commission on 
Reparations and Reconciliation would carry out.  Santos urged 
participants "not to doubt the goodwill of the government" as 
it pursued peace talks with the paramilitaries or other armed 
groups. 
 
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Context: Paras Not Defeated on Battlefield 
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¶3.  (C) Former vice Justice Minister Rafael Nieto said the 
Justice and Peace law could not be understood without an 
appreciation for the fact that the State did not defeat the 
paramilitaries on the battlefield and therefore had to make 
compromises.  The law reflects a tension between the needs of 
peace (a reduction in violence) and the goals of truth, 
justice, and reparations.  The government's task was to 
fashion an agreement that achieved the maximum justice and 
truth without fracturing the peace process. 
 
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Law Not Perfect, but Strong and Worth Supporting 
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¶4.  (C) In Nieto's view, the Justice and Peace law has more 
justice and less impunity than any previous Colombian peace 
process (all of which involved leftist guerrillas) and, he 
suggested, any future peace process with the FARC.  He 
predicted that a future FARC peace deal would have "less 
justice and more impunity" than the current paramilitary 
peace process.  The law was not perfect, but is strong and 
worth supporting, he said. 
 
¶5.  (C) Nieto argued that the law's incentives strongly 
suggest Colombia will hear more "truth" than critics expect. 
He said paramilitaries run a serious risk of being 
investigated and charged for crimes to which they do not 
confess during their "version libre" statements because there 
is no statute of limitations on gross human rights 
violations.  They can never be sure that information from 
governments and NGOs about their atrocities would not catch 
up with them one day.  Nieto said the law provides for such 
prosecutions under the regular criminal justice system, which 
includes lengthy sentences. 
 
¶6.  (C) Paramilitaries who are sentenced under the law cannot 
hold elective office, Nieto said.  He explained that such 
people have by definition been convicted of crimes of such 
magnitude that they are not "pardonable."  Such crimes 
include kidnapping, genocide, torture, narcotics trafficking, 
and certain intentional homicides. In addition, under 
provisions of the Colombian Constitution, people with 
convictions that are not "pardonable" are explicitly barred 
from holding elective office. 
¶7.  (C) Nieto discounted the view that paramilitaries would 
be able to "legitimize" or "launder" their illegally-obtained 
properties through the Justice and Peace law.  He said it 
would have been preferable to be explicit in the law on how 
to identify and confiscate such properties, but argued that 
Colombia's law on seizing illegally-obtained assets 
("extincion de dominio") would ensure that paramilitaries 
could not sleep safely as long as they held illicit property. 
 The "extincion de dominio" provisions would follow 
paramilitaries in the same way that regular justice system 
would follow them in cases in which they did not confess to 
crimes, he said. 
 
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Extradition Essential to Keep Pressure On Paras 
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¶8.  (C) Nieto insisted that the threat (and reality) of 
extradition, in particular to the U.S., was essential to keep 
the paramilitaries focused on the demobilization process. 
Most paramilitaries prefer eight years in a Colombian jail to 
40 years in a U.S. cell.  Without the extradition "Sword of 
Damocles" hanging over their heads, paramilitaries would not 
be in a rush to demobilize, in Nieto's view. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9.  (C) We continue to do what we can to discourage premature 
"post-conflict" talk. 
WOOD