This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 010230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PTER VE CO ELN FARC
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT GAVIRIA HIGHLIGHTS PARAMILITARY 
INFLUENCE; SUGGESTS U.S. ESTABLISH CHANNEL TO CHAVEZ 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reason: 1.4 (b,d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) Former President Cesar Gaviria told Polcouns October 
28 that paramilitaries are threatening and intimidating 
Liberal Party candidates and office holders, and claimed 
President Uribe's efforts to combat such activities are 
conspicuous by their absence.  The Liberal Party would 
continue to campaign throughout the country despite 
paramilitary threats.  (Almost as if on cue, Uribe said the 
same day that paramilitaries who interfered in the electoral 
process would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law.) 
 Gaviria said extradition is at the core of the current 
GOC-paramilitary impasse and expressed surprise at the manner 
in which Uribe was handling the issue.  Gaviria predicted the 
Liberals would increase their legislative representation in 
March 2006 elections.  He discounted the importance of an 
upcoming Constitutional Court ruling on the Electoral 
Guarantees law, and predicted that Uribe could win the 
presidency in May on the first ballot.  Gaviria suggested the 
U.S. establish a private, confidential channel to Venezuelan 
President Chavez, preferably a U.S. citizen close to 
President Bush.  In the alternative, Gaviria said OAS 
Secretary General Insulza "would not be a bad choice," nor 
 
SIPDIS 
would a non-U.S. citizen who had the confidence of President 
Bush.  End summary. 
 
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Paramilitaries Exerting Dangerous Influence in Campaigns 
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¶2.  (C) Gaviria said paramilitaries are threatening and 
intimidating Liberal Party candidates and office holders, 
especially in the Departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, and 
Bolivar, as well as on the coast.  In one case, Gaviria said 
narcotics trafficker "Macaco" (who heads up the Central 
Bolivar Bloc of paramilitaries, the most powerful yet to 
demobilize) visited a town in Risaralda to ensure that 
Macaco's brother became the next mayor.  In similar ways, he 
said, paramilitaries are telling Liberal Party candidates 
that they are not welcome in certain areas and that the 
paramilitaries have already selected the winning candidates. 
The party has received information from confidential 
informants about paramilitary intentions against party 
candidates and from security detail observation of vehicles 
following party officials.  The party has filed complaints 
with the police.  Gaviria said Liberals would continue to 
campaign throughout the country despite the risks because 
there was no other option.  (One of Gaviria's DAS security 
detail said after the meeting that an AUC informant had told 
of a specific AUC plan to attack Gaviria.  Gaviria's security 
detail has one armored vehicle for Gaviria's use.) 
 
¶3.  (C) Gaviria is worried about a violent election campaign 
(though not as violent as the 1990s) in the wake of the 
recent attack on Senator German Vargas Lleras, which Gaviria 
believes is more likely to be the work of a 
paramilitary/narcotics trafficker nexus than the work of the 
FARC.  The possibility of a violent campaign is increased 
when the influence of regional mafias is taken into account, 
he said.  They also have interests to protect. 
 
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Uribe Silent on Paras, Gaviria Says 
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¶4.  (C) Gaviria said he did not understand why Uribe stayed 
silent in the face of clear evidence of paramilitary 
intimidation.  "We don't know where he stands," he said.  In 
Gaviria's view, Uribe should at least state that 
paramilitaries are not welcome in any political grouping that 
purports to support the president, and make clear that he 
rejects paramilitary support.  His silence is troubling, in 
Gaviria's view.  Uribe's efforts with the paramilitaries have 
focused too much on reconciliation and not enough on justice 
and truth, he said.  More generally, the Uribe 
administration's effort to permit sentenced prisoners (from 
the AUC and FARC) to benefit from the Justice and Peace law 
was "absurd," Gaviria said. 
 
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Extradition is Point of Contention 
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¶5.  (C) Gaviria believes that extradition is the crux of the 
current difficulty that Uribe is facing with the 
paramilitaries and expressed surprise that Uribe has failed 
to manage the matter more effectively.  Gaviria asserted the 
GOC, through Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, had 
made private commitments on extradition to certain 
paramilitary leaders and is now facing their fear and 
distrust.  The paramilitaries worry about extradition above 
all else.  In Gaviria's view, Uribe's lack of transparency on 
extradition has caused the current tensions.  He said if 
Uribe was going to promise not to extradite certain leaders, 
he should have obtained a much better deal from the 
paramilitaries than that embodied in the Justice and Peace 
law. 
 
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Uribe Could Win on First Ballot; Law No Impediment 
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¶6.  (C) Gaviria predicted Uribe could win the presidency on 
the first ballot in May 2006 but noted that his likely voter 
poll numbers are falling.  The Liberals would not win but 
would make it a contest.  Horacio Serpa was the most likely 
Liberal standard bearer against Uribe, but Rafael Pardo and 
Rodrigo Rivera should not be discounted.  The Constitutional 
Court's ruling on the Electoral Guarantees law (expected 
November 11) would be no impediment to Uribe running again, 
in Gaviria's opinion.  The Court has made its basic 
constitutional ruling and the Court's view of the guarantees 
law cannot change that.  It would be helpful to have a 
clearer sense of the limitations on public officials getting 
involved in political campaigns, and of the allocation of 
media time, but such issues pale when considered next to the 
dangers of campaigning in the face of paramilitary threats, 
he said. 
 
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Liberals Expect to Increase Legislative Seats 
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¶7.  (C) The Liberal Party should be able to increase its 
Senate representation from 20 to between 25 and 30 seats in 
March elections (out of 102), according to Gaviria.  (Note: 
Liberal Party identification is somewhat murky, as 
allegiances are prone to shift.  Gaviria's figure of 20 
Liberal Senators seems high.  End note.)  Liberal Party 
workers are motivated and energetic, more so than the 
backbone of other parties.  A combined Liberal/Polo 
Democratico legislative bloc would have a good chance of 
exceeding a combined Uribista/Conservative party grouping, he 
suggested. 
 
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U.S. Should Establish Channel to Chavez 
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¶8.  (C) In response to a question about Venezuela, Gaviria 
suggested that the U.S. open a private, confidential channel 
to Chavez.  The best candidate to serve in this position 
would be a U.S. citizen close to President Bush.  Other 
possibilities included OAS Secretary General Insulza ("he 
would not be bad") or other non-U.S. citizens, as long as 
such a person had reasonably strong access to the White 
House.  From Gaviria's perspective, Chavez is more measured 
in his actions than many give him credit for and has a strong 
sense of how far he can go; he will not cross certain lines. 
His rhetoric is more important to him than concrete 
achievements.  Chavez has to know that he is essentially 
talking directly to the White House when he deals with a U.S. 
emissary. 
 
¶9.  (C) Gaviria said Chavez might try to influence Colombian 
politics but he would not be successful.  "No-one would dare 
take his money," he suggested.  He said it was more likely 
that Chavez was already trying to influence elections in 
countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador. 
 
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FARC and ELN 
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¶10.  (C) Gaviria said the FARC was likely to commit terrorist 
attacks during the electoral campaign "because that is what 
they do."  However, the FARC has never been a factor in 
Colombian electoral campaigns and this time would be no 
different.  The ELN peace process is worth the effort, 
Gaviria said, but it appears to lack the necessary political 
will to be successful, especially on the part of Uribe, who 
(like Samper and Pastrana) started the process late in his 
term. 
 
Comment 
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¶11.  (C) Gaviria remains one of the most adroit partisan 
political leaders in Colombia.  Uribe and Gaviria exchanged 
views on paramilitary influence in recent days.  Uribe said 
October 28 that paramilitaries should respect democracy, and 
warned that those who interfered in the political process 
would lose benefits under the Justice and Peace law. 
Gaviria, in an interview published October 29, repeated his 
criticisms of Uribe on this subject and called for action, 
not words, to ensure a fair campaign environment. 
 
WOOD