O 290845Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0891
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L  BEIRUT 003818 
 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2015 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI HALF-HEARTEDLY DEFENDS 
HIZBALLAH'S ACTIONS, BUT UNDERSTANDS NEED FOR CONSTRAINT 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason:  Sections 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Speaker Nabih Berri tried to explain 
Hizballah's November 21 attack on an Israeli position in the 
Blue Line village of Ghajjar as merely a response to Israeli 
military activity earlier in the month.  Yet Berri indicated 
he understood that Hizballah's aggression in Ghajjar, and its 
subsequent fiery rhetoric on martyrdom, were 
counter-productive and destabilizing to Lebanon.  Berri said 
that even though he wanted to issue public statements to that 
effect, he could not.  He still believes it is in everyone's 
interest to keep Hizballah inside the government, but 
realizes this will require better coordination among himself, 
Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt to balance Hizballah's growing 
power.  In discussing a possible Michel Aoun-Jumblatt 
reconciliation, Berri hinted that he could publicly break 
with Hizballah over an anticipated by-election for one 
Parliamentary seat.  Berri also said he is trying to work 
with the Siniora government to deliver measurable progress, 
such as a recent energy transaction with the Gulf Emirates 
that will help the GOL lower the price of heating fuel this 
winter.  The Speaker also promised to join Siniora in 
supporting an extension of the UNIIIC mission in Lebanon, 
despite his strongly expressed feeling that they were 
"sons-of-bitches" who may be trying to implicate him in some 
manner in the Hariri assassination.  Berri was convinced that 
a "secret deal" involving Syria, the UNIIIC, and the U.S. had 
been reached, and that this was the real reason behind 
Syria's last minute agreement with Detlev Mehlis.  Finally, 
Berri confided that in a meeting held last week, former 
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'ja and Druse leader Walid 
Jumblatt agreed not to pursue for now the ouster of President 
Emile Lahoud.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Speaker of Parliament and leader of the Amal Shia 
movement, Nabih Berri, met with the Ambassador and Poloff on 
November 28 at Berri's residence in West Beirut.  He 
acknowledged the Embassy's invitation to meet with CODEL 
Hagel on December 3 and said he looked forward to discussing 
issues with them. 
 
HIZBALLAH'S RATIONALIZATION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  In response to a question regarding Hizballah's 
motivation for its November 21 aggression against Israeli 
positions, Speaker Berri reacted with a gesture of 
frustration and launched into a protracted (and possibly 
rehearsed) explanation that struck us as more half-hearted 
than usual.  He reviewed for the Ambassador a list of recent 
Israeli "provocations" -- IDF naval activity close offshore 
Sidon; high-level, reconnaissance overflights over the Biqa 
and south Lebanon; extended artillery firing close to the 
Blue Line; and low-altitude supersonic flights -- all of 
which he felt gave Hizballah an "excuse" to retaliate, in 
order to prove they were not "weak."  Hizballah leader Hassan 
Nasrallah made his point on November 25.  But Berri did 
acknowledge there was a considerable difference between the 
non-lethal nature of recent Israeli activity compared to 
Hizballah's pre-meditated, lethal attack of November 21.  The 
Speaker expressed a not so subtle fear of Hizballah's real 
intentions, but rhetorically asked what could he do in the 
face of such power.  Berri implied that if he could show that 
Hizballah's actions were not justified, he would speak out 
against their destabilizing effect.  (Note:  Playing a 
surprising and refreshingly constructive role, Berri did 
assist the Embassy and the Siniora government in dampening 
tensions during last week's events by acting as an 
intermediary with Hizballah.  But it is clear he fears 
stepping beyond that role, despite the seriousness of more 
aggressive Hizballah policies in Lebanon.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  (C)  Because of the stakes involved, Speaker Berri 
insisted he was now trying to work more cooperatively with 
Prime Minister Siniora and his government.  In fact, he said 
he had just concluded an agreement with the United Arab 
Emirates to supply heating fuel to Lebanon to help ease 
public demand for lower energy costs.  This USD 55 million 
transaction will help blunt criticism of the Siniora 
government that it is heedless of the needs of ordinary 
citizens.  The ever-calculating Berri implied he will be 
cooperative whenever political realities permit. 
 
STILL GRUMPY ABOUT "MR. X," SPEAKER 
NEVERTHELESS TO SUPPORT UNIIIC EXTENSION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  Concerning UNIIIC and greater cooperation among 
Lebanon's moderate political forces, the Speaker related how 
his confidant MP Ali Hassan Khalil, carrying messages from 
Walid Jumblatt, had just asked him to support publicly an 
extension of the UNIIIC's mandate in Lebanon, and perhaps, 
the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute 
those accused in the investigation.  He indicated he would 
support these positions, but laughing bitterly, expressed 
contempt for the investigative "sons of bitches who don't 
understand the warm relationship that existed between himself 
and Rafiq Hariri" before the latter was assassinated.  He 
described a complicated and continuing UNIIIC sub-inquiry 
into the now-infamous "Mr. X" wiretap, implying he had been 
set up by Syrian Military Intelligence chief in Lebanon 
Rustom Ghazaleh, and feared that he, like President Lahoud, 
was somehow being implicated in the crime.  As he has on 
previous occasions, the Speaker professed complete innocence 
and said he welcomed the truth.  To demonstrate his 
commitment, he said he was sending a letter that afternoon 
declaring his support for the UNIIIC extension.  As for the 
content of the "Mr. X" wiretap, Berri said that he was 
convinced Ghazaleh had tapped the call with the intention of 
sharing its content with Hariri, as Ghazaleh worked to keep 
Lebanese politicians divided.  At the time of the "Mr. X" 
phone call, Berri claimed, Ghazaleh would have prohibited 
Jumblatt, Hariri, and Berri from meeting together privately. 
 
BUILDING COALITION TO WITHSTAND 
HIZBALLAH-INDUCED PRESSURE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  In response to an inquiry as to why Hizballah was 
not criticized as a "foreign agent" when it was clear they 
received both funds and direction from Syria and Iran, Berri 
fell back on history.  He implied that when Hizballah 
strategically claimed the mantle of the "resistance" in 
opposing Israel, the organization acquired a considerable 
amount of immunity from such criticism.  He said that you had 
to go back to 1948 and 1982 to appreciate the position they 
now hold.  But Berri did admit the situation with Hizballah 
was now becoming untenable and had to be constrained.  The 
Speaker explained that he was working more closely with 
several factions -- Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Amal, and 
the various Maronite leaders -- to create a coalition strong 
enough to deal with Hizballah.  He stated that even Jumblatt 
was planning to meet with Michel Aoun to shore up relations. 
 
AMAL TO SPLIT FROM HIZBALLAH 
IN POTENTIAL BY-ELECTION? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  In discussing the potential Jumblatt-Aoun 
rapprochement, Berri noted that Baabda-Aley MP Edmond Naim is 
quite ill and might vacate his seat.  Deciding who to back in 
a by-election might be the vehicle by which to build a 
Jumblatt-Aoun reconciliation, Berri said.  He noted that Amal 
would still back Jumblatt's list (in the mixed 
Shia-Druse-Christian election district) but that Hizballah 
would not.  (Note:  This is the first time Berri has 
indicated to us that he might take Amal in a different 
direction than Hizballah, in terms of elections.  End note.) 
 
 
BETTER THAT HIZBALLAH 
REMAIN INSIDE THE TENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Asked by the Ambassador about the possibility of a 
united front isolating Hizballah, Berri said that he still 
believes it is in the country's best interests to keep 
Hizballah engaged in the government.  He explained how he 
worked quickly after Hizballah's walkout from the Cabinet 
meeting on November 10 to limit the damage to Siniora's 
government.  Berri said he had heard about the incident and 
rushed to convince the other three Hizballah-associated 
Ministers to state that their action was based merely on 
"administrative" concerns, that is, that no one had a 
complete transcript of Bashar Assad's November 10 speech as 
it was then being discussed later that same day in the 
Cabinet.  In describing this and other political maneuvers, 
Speaker Berri argued that it, "was better to bring Hizballah 
along, rather than leave them (for Syria and Iran)." 
 
POSTPONING LAHOUD'S REMOVAL 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  With regard to the president, Berri stated that, 
despite the diplomatic gestures expressed by the U.S. and the 
EU, the show of unity with himself, Lahoud and Siniora on the 
parade reviewing stand on Independence Day was good for the 
country.  He confirmed other reports that Walid Jumblatt had 
just met with LF leader Samir Ja'ja, but then added they had 
agreed to postpone for the time being any effort to force 
President Lahoud from office.  The reason, with which he 
concurred, was that if Lahoud was driven from office, it 
would make Hizballah anxious and that much more difficult to 
control.  And in the unique world of Lebanese politics, 
Lahoud's removal could also push Michel Aoun into a deal with 
Hizballah. 
 
ALLEGATIONS OF U.S.-SYRIAN DEAL 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  The discussion closed with Berri pressing for an 
explanation of Syria's November 25 agreement with UNIIIC 
investigator Detlev Mehlis.  "There must be a deal among the 
U.S., Syria, Mehlis, and perhaps Saudi Arabia," he exclaimed, 
"otherwise, it would be stupid."  Although he did not receive 
the answer he was apparently looking for, Speaker Berri 
closed by promising to work in cooperation with the country's 
other moderate elements. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Probably no single event over the past six months 
disappointed reform-minded Lebanese more than Nabih Berri's 
re-election as Speaker of the Parliament.  As we have 
reported earlier, Berri won his position by relying on what 
was in essence a "confessional veto" -- the Hizballah-Amal 
monolith only permitted one Shia candidate, Berri, for the 
Speaker post that is always reserved for a Shia.  While 
Sunni, Druse and Christian MPs, holding the majority, could 
have voted in someone else, no one wanted to defy the will of 
the Shia community as represented by Amal and Hizballah. 
Now, Berri could rehabilitate himself in the eyes of many 
Lebanese if he would begin to distance himself from 
Hizballah, so that Hizballah could no longer claim to 
represent all of Lebanon's Shia.  It would be easier for the 
rest of Lebanon to confront Hizballah if that confrontation 
was not perceived to be a confessionally-driven campaign. 
Berri is the key to the success of that approach.  What Berri 
told the Ambassador and Poloff in this meeting was more 
encouraging than Berri's usual statements, in that he 
acknowledged distance between his own views and those of 
Hizballah.  But we should not kid ourselves:  Berri is a 
survivor and the head of a movement that now has now been 
largely subsumed into Hizballah.  While we are convinced that 
he personally detests Hizballah, he is, at best, essentially 
a fence-sitter:  he is constantly calculating whether his 
political prospects are brighter with Hizballah or with 
Hariri et al. 
 
 
FELTMAN