This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

180842Z Nov 05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007197 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS 
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH TRT
SUBJECT: THE KING AND HIM; THE OPPOSITION PLAYS THEIR KING 
AGAINST THE PRIME MINISTER 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 7100 AND PREVIOUS 
 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 6958 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 6119 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.   Evidence suggests that 
Prime Minister Thaksin is alienating an ever-growing segment 
of the political class.  The antipathy that started with NGOs 
and journalists is spreading; by some accounts, it includes 
many in the military leadership and reaches even to the 
palace.  At the same time, Thaksin's populist policies are 
winning him acceptable numbers in the public opinion polls. 
His nationalist rhetoric on the South makes him look strong, 
(even if the government's policies are ineffective.)  In any 
case, his lock on the National Assembly -- 375 out of 500 
seats -- hamstrings the organized political opposition, which 
cannot stop the PM's legislative program.  Thai Rak Thai's 
(TRT) strong position in the allegedly non-partisan Senate 
means that the Senate-appointed agencies that should act as a 
break on the PM's power are suborned before they are even 
established.  What's a Thaksin opponent to do? 
 
¶2.  (C) The anti-Thaksin forces are reduced to hoping for 
help from two extremes -- the street, and the palace. There 
is some irony here: the democratic opposition and civil 
society are pinning their short term hope on rather 
undemocratic solutions.  This fight so far is waged mostly in 
arcane (to foreign observers, at least) skirmishes over the 
views of elderly monks or obscure constitutional procedures. 
The opposition appears to be looking for a way to provoke 
Thaksin into taking one step too far in encroaching on the 
prerogatives of the much-loved monarch, and provoking public 
outrage in response. (Septel reports on yesterday's gag order 
against one of these provocateurs.)  A few others even raise 
the (highly unlikely) possibility that Thaksin opponents 
might arrange "an accident" to remove the PM.  We believe 
that Thaksin is still in a strong position, but he is 
impulsive; a major misstep -- or a series of them -- would 
embolden Thaksin's critics and increase his vulnerability. 
END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
¶3.  (C) Thaksin's latest "proxy confrontation" with the 
palace involves an ancient monk from northeast Thailand, and 
a businessman-cum-journalist (both of whom used to be Thaksin 
supporters).  The monk, Luangta Maha Bua, delivered a sermon 
in September that compared Thaksin to a "powerful giant with 
savage power to swallow the country" that "puts its feet on 
the people's heads, eating their lungs and livers."  Most 
seriously, he accused Thaksin and his cabinet of trying to 
"swallow the country, religion and King" and "lead the 
country to a presidential system."   The 
businessman/journalist, Sondhi Limthongkul, owner/publisher 
of several Thai newspapers, printed the text of the sermon in 
the news daily "Manager" on September 28. On October 11, 
Thaksin filed civil and criminal libel complaints against 
Sondhi, seeking 500 million baht in compensation. (Septel 
reports on a subsequent 11/17 civil court "gag order" against 
Sondhi.)   Thaksin did not, however, sue the venerable monk, 
saying that Luangta Maha Bua had helped him in the past. 
 
¶4.  (C) This was the second lawsuit filed against Sondhi by 
the prime minister in October. On October 3, the PM filed a 
suit against Sondhi following the broadcast of his popular 
(and subsequently canceled) television program, "Thailand 
Weekly."  On that broadcast, Sondhi repeated his previous 
criticism that the government had undermined the King's 
prerogatives and the Sangha (the Buddhist leadership) by 
controversially appointing an "acting Supreme Patriarch" in 
January 2004 (allegedly to "assist" the ailing Supreme 
Patriarch appointed by the Sangha and the King).  Sondhi 
accused Thaksin of choosing a monk who is close to his wife's 
family to take this position.  Sondhi then read a pointed 
allegory, comparing a "good father" who raises his 60 million 
children virtuously to an "eldest son" who lets the other 
children be "spoiled and enslaved by wealth, headphones and 
gambling." That suit also sought 500 million baht in 
compensation.  (Channel 9 canceled the show. Sondhi sued 
Channel 9.) 
 
¶5.  (C)  Sondhi continues to hammer on the theme of Thaksin's 
purported challenge to the King.  Although "Thailand Weekly" 
is off the air, Sondhi continues to stage the "show" each 
week before eager crowds at public venues.   Last week, 
thousands of people turned out in Bangkok's main park to hear 
Sondhi, who wore a T-shirt with the motto, "I will fight for 
the King."  (Most of the government-controlled (or co-opted) 
media have not given much play at all to these rallies; 
Sondhi's own "Thai Day" English-language newspaper reported a 
crowd of at least 10,000, but this may be inflated.)   Sondhi 
in the meantime continues to rack up legal problems and other 
headaches.  A high-ranking police official filed a 
lese-majeste complaint against Sondhi on November 8, after 
Sondhi's show the previous week, in which he compared the 
PM's desire for a personal aircraft unfavorably to the King's 
modest personal requirements.   A group of lawyers called 
"Lawyers Fighting for Country and King" has leapt to Sondhi's 
defense in this instance, and it is not clear that this suit 
actually has the backing of the PM. Also not clear is the 
reason for the small explosion that occurred one night 
recently in front of Sondhi's office.  On November 16, the 
commander of an important military unit (and a classmate of 
Thaksin's from the Armed Forces Academy) turned up the heat 
still further, sending Sondhi a protest letter.  Maj. Gen. 
Prin Suwwanadhat told the press that he and "nearly 14,000 
royal guards under his command are not happy with  Mr. 
Sondhi's remarks about the King." On November 17, the PM got 
an injunction from the civil court, requiring Sondhi to stop 
all criticism of Thaksin (septel). 
 
¶6. (C) In a recent conversation with Sondhi, he was upbeat 
about the situation.  He boasted that he'd been sued many 
times, and never lost a case.  He said that Thaksin was 
"unbalanced" in his reaction to criticism, and that, with 
this latest suit, he had gone too far.  In the previous 
lawsuits against the press, some other entity (Shin 
Corporation, or a government ministry or agency) brought the 
suit.  In this case, Thaksin brought the suit himself, 
claiming that Sondhi had defamed him.  Therefore, according 
to Sondhi, when the case comes to court (perhaps early next 
year), Thaksin himself will have to testify, and explain how 
he was defamed.  Sondhi believes that he will then have a 
chance to ask Thaksin directly the kinds of questions he has 
raised in his shows and publications, and Thaksin will have 
to answer under oath.  Sondhi speculates that Thaksin did not 
think this through before he lashed out with the lawsuits. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The accusations against Thaksin also keep coming. 
The anti-Thaksin papers have resurfaced an accusation against 
Thaksin from earlier this year.  In April, the PM presided 
over a ceremony in the Temple of the Emerald Buddha, one of 
the most sacred sites in the kingdom.  The press claimed 
first that no commoner had the right to preside over such a 
ceremony.  When the government produced a signed 
authorization from the palace, Thaksin's opponents raised 
further objections about the authenticity of the documents 
and whether they allowed Thaksin to preside over, or just 
participate in, the ceremony.  This week, a retired general 
sued Thaksin for lese-majeste over the incident. 
 
¶8.  (C)  What is the point of all of this?   Sondhi, a 
flamboyant but appealing political gadfly, clearly relishes 
his one-man crusade against the PM.  He does not appear to be 
working actively in concert with any of the opposition 
parties or civil society groups.  But he is carrying yet 
further the tactic already used in the long controversy over 
the Auditor-General (AG) (ref A.)  In the AG case, 
anti-Thaksin forces did not highlight the most obvious 
accusation -- that the government's allies in the Senate were 
trying to replace an active and effective official fighting 
corruption.  Rather, they focused on the claim that the 
replacement of the AG challenged the King's authority, since 
the King had appointed her.  During the first phase of the 
controversy, opposition politicians allowed themselves to 
hope the issue would bring the students and others onto the 
streets in a real challenge to the government.  This was, of 
course, misguided thinking and stirred up little public 
enthusiasm for protest.  But some Thaksin opponents continue 
to think that hammering on these issues will soon provoke a 
outburst from the public that could, ultimately, unseat the 
PM. 
 
¶9. (C) Sondhi told us he predicts Thaksin will run into 
serious trouble, and that there would be violence, before the 
end of the year.  An associate of the Auditor General made a 
similar prediction.  One journalist told us he was surprised 
that Thaksin dared to leave the country for so long in 
September (for the UNGA and White House meeting).  Several 
contacts have even hinted darkly that Thaksin "might have an 
accident."  On top of this, some claim that Thaksin has so 
alienated the military - by favoring the police over the 
army, and by his bungling of the problems in the south -- 
that the military would not support him if there were a 
crisis. 
 
¶10.  (C) So, what does the palace really think?  It's not 
easy to tell what the King actually wants.  It is widely 
presumed among the political class that the King and his 
closest councillors loathe Thaksin.  However, the King 
conveys his views in signs so subtle that much of the 
ordinary Thai public probably misses them, even if they do 
make it into a news report.  For example, the King reportedly 
takes care to be photographed calling on the "real" Supreme 
Patriarch. The King's daughter, Princess Chulabhorn, visited 
the crotchety monk in October in a ceremony broadcast on TV, 
and raised money for his temple.  The King's refusal to 
respond to the nomination of a replacement for the Auditor 
General was taken as a slap in the face to TRT and the PM, 
presumed to be behind the move.  The palace delayed the 
approval of the military promotions list proposed in October; 
because Thaksin had reportedly meddled with the list, this 
delay was likewise seen as a subtle rebuke to the PM.  The 
King's annual birthday speech in December seems to contain 
barely-veiled digs at Thaksin each year.  This may not seem 
like much to an outsider, and care must be taken to not read 
too much into royal gestures (or lack of them). But the 
King's every action is carefully scrutinized -- at least by 
the political class -- and his moral authority is unequaled 
among the Thai. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Thaksin's opponents can't unseat him (at least, in 
the short term) through the ballot box, so they feel they 
have to try something.  There isn't much hope of seriously 
splintering TRT, which seems to be largely sticking by the PM 
that brought them to power.  It is difficult to evaluate the 
hints that Thaksin "might have an accident."  Violence is a 
feature of political life here even today, and Thaksin has 
plenty of enemies. Still this strikes us as extreme and 
unlikely. The opposition parties and NGOs remember 1992, when 
the power of street demonstrations, coupled with the 
resulting loss of royal support, helped oust a despised PM; 
those who are virulently anti-Thaksin hope such tactics might 
work again.  They are overestimating, in our view, the 
resonance of their issues with a public more preoccupied with 
economic livelihood.   Even for the Thai who are aware of 
tensions between the King and PM, TRT's populist programs 
seem to outweigh other considerations.  And so far, people 
don't really have to choose between the King and the PM; they 
are happy to take the government's 30 baht health scheme, its 
village development fund, its million cow program and all the 
rest, and then show their veneration to the King at the same 
time.  It is hard to see how Sondhi and the political 
opposition can inflict serious political damage on Thaksin 
with these current tactics. However, they are clearly set to 
keep provoking the PM with accusation after accusation, 
knowing that Thaksin, with his tendency to speak and act 
before he thinks, is frequently his own worst enemy. 
BOYCE