This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 007045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, ISN 
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL PARM PHSA PINS PTER TH ARF
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S MEETINGS AT THE ARF SEMINAR FOR 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The U.S. delegation at the ARF CBM Seminar on 
Missile Defense, held in Bangkok October 6 and 7, was led by 
Acting A/S for International Security and Nonproliferation 
Stephen Rademaker.  In the plenary session and side meetings 
with numerous participants, Rademaker stressed three key 
themes:  1) ARF needs to be strengthened as a forum for 
discussing serious security matters; 2) the U.S. is sincere 
about promoting transparency on missile defense and other 
security issues; and 3) the U.S. is honestly working to 
correct misperceptions about missile defense.  Experts from 
the U.S. Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Missile Defense Agency gave presentations 
explaining U.S. missile defense policies and programs, 
seeking to address concerns and misconceptions of other 
countries regarding missile defense.  Several other countries 
expressed their opinions concerning missile defense and its 
relationship to the further proliferation of missiles and 
missile technology.  On missile defense, countries lined up 
as expected:  Japan, Korea, and Australia explained why they 
endorse missile defense and how it promotes peace.  China and 
Pakistan gave presentations arguing that missile defense is 
destabilizing.  Co-chair Thailand stressed the need for 
greater transparency and further need to dispel 
misperceptions about missile defense. 
 
¶2. (C) A/S Rademaker also used his visit to urge countries to 
endorse the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
Statement of Interdiction Principles (SOP).  He urged 
Thailand and other countries that have not yet endorsed PSI 
to consider endorsing it as soon as possible, and reiterated 
the suggestion of a group endorsement during the upcoming 
Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation (ASTOP) in Tokyo 
early in 2006.  A/S Rademaker also took advantage of the 
visit to urge countries to sign Article 98 agreements with 
the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PLENARY SESSION 
================================= 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  During the Plenary session of the ARF Seminar,  a 
number of countries made presentations outlining their  views 
on missile defense, proliferation and other issues.   Among 
these: 
 
--Australia outlined its rationale for supporting missile 
defense, characterizing missile defense as part of a "layered 
approach" to combating the growing threat posed by 
proliferation. 
 
--Japan explained that its planned deployment of missile 
defense would be strictly defensive and not be used to defend 
"third countries".  MOFA U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Division 
Senior Coordinator Suzuki Hideo also explained how the GOJ's 
carve out exception to Japan's three principles on the 
non-export of weapon systems to allow joint development of 
missile defense was a limited exception to that rule. 
 
--Singapore focused primarily on the threat posed by 
proliferation and gave a comprehensive explanation for its 
endorsement of PSI. 
 
--Korea explained that missile defense can reduce the threat 
posed by ballistic missiles by rendering them ineffective. 
The Korean delegate also explained that Seoul is considering 
PAC-2 or PAC-3 or equipping destroyers with AEGIS SM-2 as 
ways to implement its own missile defense program. 
 
--China gave five reasons why it opposes missile defense:  1) 
it does not deter, but rather stimulates the spread of 
ballistic missile technology; 2) missile defense undermines 
mutual trust; 3) missile defense harms regional stability, 
especially on the Korean Peninsula; 4) missile defense 
technology cooperation promotes the proliferation of 
ballistic missile technology; and 5) missile defense 
jeopardizes the peace and security of outer space. 
 
--Malaysia acknowledged the threat posed by WMD proliferation 
and terrorism but expressed concerns that missile defense 
could lead to an arms race in Asia. 
 
--Pakistan gave four reasons why it opposes missile defense: 
1) its prohibitive cost; 2) the likelihood of missile 
defense leading to an arms race; 3) because no weapon systems 
is "purely defensive" technology cooperation will  lead to 
proliferation; and 4) missile defense systems based on boost 
phase intercept and mid range intercept would weaponize 
space. 
 
--Russia explained that, while missile defense is not a 
panacea, it could be stabilizing so long as countries worked 
to create "architecture of transparency" and created a better 
assessment of the real missile defense threats in Asia.  Such 
threat assessments are not simply functions of the numbers of 
offensive missiles, but also of the political will of states 
to use them. 
 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM SESSION TWO 
=========================== 
 
¶4. (SBU) During the afternoon session on 6 October, 
Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines presented 
more fulsome presentations on nonproliferation and missile 
defense.  The Australian delegation expanded on the themes in 
their earlier statement.  Indonesia agreed that missile 
proliferation is of great concern, but made clear their 
concern about the impact of any new technology controls on 
developing economies, particularly when developing countries 
are not involved in the negotiation of the controls.  In 
addition, the delegation from Jakarta highlighted its 
preference for a multilateral effort under the UN to tackle 
missile-related issues.  The Philippines outlined the basics 
of the HCOC in a powerpoint presentation. In particular, the 
Philippines encouraged more ARF members to subscribe to the 
HCOC. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Japan, in the first of two presentations, gave a 
succinct outline of the mechanics of their missile defense 
program and a stark comparison of defense figures to 
highlight the fact that missile defense was not the start of 
any new military build-up. Japan explained that its missile 
defense components were to be entirely self-contained, and 
would be incapable of any offensive use.  In their second 
presentation, the Japanese delegation made a strong pitch for 
continued cooperation in the MTCR and HCOC and called upon 
other countries to support and participate in PSI. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Three USG experts provided presentations. Mr. Philip 
Jamison of the Office of Missile Defense Policy at the 
Department of Defense gave an overview of U.S. Missile 
Defense policies and programs.  He stated that missile 
defense is one of the tools the USG has to combat WMD 
proliferation.  The four goals of missile defense are to 
assure allies and friends that the U.S. will not be coerced 
by missile threats; dissuade potential adversaries from 
investing in ballistic missiles; deter ballistic missile use 
by denying benefits of any attack; and defend against 
ballistic missiles should deterrence fail.  Mr. John 
Schoenewolf of the Missile Defense Agency then gave an 
explanation of several of the current and planned elements of 
the U.S. missile defense system, stating that "we now have a 
thin line of defense in case of emergency."  Dr. Kerry 
Kartchner of the U.S. Department of State then gave a 
presentation addressing several misconceptions about the 
technical, cost, and diplomatic aspects of missile defense. 
He stated that missile defense is not an alternative to 
deterrence, as many had claimed, and that deterrence remains 
our highest priority.  He also noted that missile defense has 
not led to the collapse of arms control or to a renewed 
U.S.-Russian arms race, and that U.S. missile defense was not 
aimed at either Russia or China.  All three presentation 
reaffirmed U.S. commitment to promoting transparency 
regarding its missile defense programs. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Pakistan opened up the round-table discussion with a 
brief synopsis: all countries present agree that 
proliferation is a concern, but representatives are divided 
on the issue of missile defense.  In particular, Pakistan 
questioned the utility of missile defense in the face of 
non-state actors and suggested that missile defense would 
destroy the concept of deterrence, leading to a more 
dangerous world.  A/S Rademaker explained that although 
deterrence was a familiar idea, it was not necessarily a good 
one and was fraught with its own perils.  Picking up  on the 
Pakistani charge (also echoed by the Chinese and  Russians) 
that missile defense development would drive the  development 
of offensive weapons, A/S Rademaker explained  that missile 
defense actually lowered the utility of a  given offensive 
deployment and was far preferable choice to  a build up of 
offensive weapons.  In response to Russia and Indonesia's 
concerns about "debris" from the intercept of a missile, A/S 
Rademaker explained that in U.S. modeling, such debris tended 
to follow the original trajectory of the incoming missile, 
with a small cluster of debris being much less dangerous than 
an  actual missile. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The ROK delegation asked how U.S. missile defense 
efforts worked in conjunction with the MTCR HCOC and other 
existing regimes.  A/S Rademaker noted that most missile 
defense systems were too small -- based on range and payload 
-- and did not fall under these regimes. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Chinese delegation asked a number of direct 
questions during the second session.  They wanted to know why 
the U.S. was limiting its cooperation on missile defense to 
"only" 18 countries, suggesting those countries not included 
were concerned about being excluded.  The Chinese also 
suggested that the U.S. programs were "weaponizing space" and 
asked how we could do this consistent with our other 
international obligations.  They also expressed concern over 
the ability of the U.S. to make the correct judgment as to if 
a launch is peaceful or not, particularly at the boost phase 
of missile launch.  The U.S. delegation replied that the 
states to which the U.S. might extend protection would be the 
subject of further diplomacy and discussion and no definitive 
answer could be provided.  Furthermore, U.S. missile defense 
remains an extremely transparent program, given its high 
profile and the Congressional oversight to which it is 
subject.  Regarding the potential weaponization of space, the 
U.S. remains committed to the Outer Space Treaty.  Missile 
defense plans do not include anti-satellite weapons and the 
existing program would not lead to the weaponization of 
space.  The U.S. acknowledged that discriminating a hostile 
missile launch from a peaceful space vehicle launch may be 
difficult; however, the U.S. would take the political context 
surrounding the launch into consideration.  This would 
include an assessment of validity of any claim that a launch 
was indeed peaceful.  It is therefore the responsibility of 
the launching party to take steps to reassure its neighbors 
that its intentions are in fact not hostile. 
 
THAILAND URGED TO ENDORSE PSI AT ASTOP 
====================================== 
 
¶10.  (C)  Prior to convening the plenary session of the ARF 
Missile Defense Seminar, on October 5, A/S Rademaker held a 
series of bilateral meetings with key countries to discuss 
proliferation issues.  Thai MFA Deputy Permanent Secretary 
Taker Phanit assured Rademaker that Thailand will endorse PSI 
soon but stressed the need not to exacerbate the Muslim 
separatist situation in Southern Thailand.  Thakur explained 
that Thailand is waiting for a "Muslim neighbor" to sign the 
PSI Statement of Principles before endorsing.   Rademaker 
told Thakur that he had heard similar concerns from other 
ASEAN countries and reiterated a previous U.S.-Australian 
suggestion of a joint endorsement of the PSI SOP by a number 
of countries with similar concerns.   Rademaker noted that 
the upcoming Asian Senior Level Talks on Proliferation 
(ASTOP) in Tokyo, scheduled for January or February 2006, 
might be a ripe opportunity.  While noncommittal, Thakur 
seemed open to Rademaker's suggestion.  Thakur noted that he 
will meet with Ambassadors from PSI participant countries 
October 14 to discuss this issue further.  Of note, during 
the plenary session of the seminar on October 6, Thai LTG 
Naraset Israngkura, Deputy Director for Policy and Plans at 
MOD, told the assembled delegates that Thailand "views PSI as 
an important instrument to reinforce political will" and 
pledged to "work closely with PSI countries." 
 
VIETNAM NEEDS MORE TIME TO "STUDY" PSI 
====================================== 
 
¶11. (C) A/S Rademaker and delegation met with Vietnamese 
Ministry of Defense Sr. Colonels Nguyen Quoc Long and Hong 
Viet Quong and MFA officer Vu Van Nien on 5 October to 
discuss PSI.  Following A/S Rademaker's general overview of 
PSI's components and the growing global support for this 
initiative, Nguyen responded that the SRV was still studying 
this initiative internally, and that a decision would take 
some time.  According to Nguyen, Vietnam respects the goals 
of nonproliferation and counterterrorism but had to consider 
the regional context.  Vu added that Vietnamese officials are 
working to understand PSI's interplay with international and 
domestic laws, as well as ongoing efforts such as the NPC. 
The SRV is also interested in the logistical details of PSI, 
such as compensation for detaining the wrong vessels; "this 
could impact our bilateral relations with other countries." 
A/S  Rademaker explained that many countries had these same 
concerns before joining in support of PSI, and that the SOP 
are consistent with international law and respect domestic 
ones as well.  PSI activities are a cooperative effort that 
involves multiple countries.  Even if Vietnam does not join 
in supporting PSI, other PSI countries will likely turn to 
the SRV for assistance if proliferation activities involve 
Vietnam, its ships and/or ports. 
 
¶12. (C)  Vu inquired whether the main purpose of PSI was the 
coordination and sharing of intelligence information (Note, 
the entire SRV team seemed very interested in this. End 
Note).  A/S Rademaker responded that the sharing of 
information was an important part of PSI, and explained the 
role of the Operational Experts Group and other PSI 
activities in helping PSI members to work to build their 
capacity to support the goals and activities of the PSI. 
Nguyen pointed out that the SRV does not participate in 
bilateral or multilateral military exercises, but admitted 
that other elements such as the police or customs units could 
possibly be involved.  Nguyen closed by repeating the SRV's 
need for more time to consider PSI, but suggested that 
Vietnam may be able to so "some parts" of PSI if not others. 
(NOTE: The Vietnamese delegation was not particularly 
familiar with PSI concepts or ideas. It is possible that 
their comments and questions do not reflect the latest 
thinking in Hanoi. END NOTE) 
 
MALAYSIA IS "ON THE SAME PAGE", BUT HAS SOME CONCERNS 
============================================= ======== 
 
¶13. (C)  A/S Rademaker met with four Malaysian officials: 
Mr. Ilango Karuppannan (Principal Assistant Secretary, Policy 
Planning Division, MFA and head of delegation); ASP Asuar 
Rahmat (Director, National Security Division, Prime 
Minister's Department); Mr. Hasnan Zahedi Ahmad Zakaria 
(Principal Assistant Director, National Security Division, 
Prime Minister's Department); and Colonel Othman Abdullah 
(Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Division, Ministry of 
Defense).  A/S Rademaker began the session with a general 
overview of the PSI and its objectives.  Karuppannan 
addressed A/S Rademaker's comments by stating that, in 
general, the GOM is on the same page as the U.S. when it 
comes to PSI.  However, the GOM had two concerns.  First, 
they wanted assurance that the PSI and any actions taken from 
signing the PSI were consistent with international laws. 
Second, the GOM is concerned about the potential 
repercussions should it be a willing participant in an 
operation that does not go well.  Karuppannan seemed pleased 
to learn that other ASEAN countries were also giving serious 
consideration to PSI.  Karuppannan concluded by stating that 
Malaysian officials are studying the issue very closely, but 
in the interim want to assure us that they agree with the 
objectives of PSI. 
 
INDONESIA MISTRUSTFUL OF U.S. INTENTIONS ON PSI 
============================================= == 
 
¶14. (C) In their bilateral meeting with A/S Rademaker on 5 
October, the Indonesian delegation said they agreed on 
non-proliferation goals, but have strong reservations about 
PSI.  Indonesia requires many more confidence building 
measures and they believe that the UN should remain the focus 
of this and similar efforts.  They understand the necessity 
for PSI as a counter-proliferation measure; however they are 
still looking at the details.  They are concerned PSI will 
create "disharmony" within ASEAN and are still looking at the 
details.  Another concern is how PSI relates to the Law of 
the Sea. 
 
¶15. (C) Indonesia would prefer that this and similar 
initiatives would come through the UN, rather than from a 
group of individual countries.  "PSI should have been created 
in a multilateral forum; and the UN is the proper forum." 
Part of this perspective comes from their view that PSI, and 
other similar regimes that are set up outside of the UN, 
diminish the authority of the UN. 
 
¶16. (C) They also questioned who would have authority to 
interdict ships on the high-seas, blaming the U.S. for past 
mistakes, like the "misidentification" of the DPRK shipment 
of missiles as a stateless vessel, noting that Indonesia has 
huge sea areas "and that this agreement could have large 
impact on our country."  In a parting shot, the Indonesian 
head of delegation said that they are suspicious of PSI, and 
they believe that PSI will allow the U.S. to "push the 
limits" of international law. 
 
¶17. (C) A/S Rademaker responded by noting that 60 plus 
nations have endorsed PSI.  PSI activities are undertaken in 
line with international law and domestic law.  The entire 
intention of PSI is increasing cooperation between countries. 
 The UN supports PSI, citing a public statement by UNSYG 
Annan, and the flexibility of this grouping allows for swift 
and effective action to counter the rising threat posed by 
proliferation.  A/S Rademaker also urged Indonesia to 
intervene with APEC economies that have not yet met their 
commitment to conclude an Additional Protocol so APEC's goal 
of universal adherence by the end of 2005 is met. 
 
SIGNING OF ARTICLE 98 AGREEMENT URGED 
===================================== 
 
¶18. (C) During his bilateral meetings with Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia, A/S Rademaker also urged the signing of 
Article 98 agreements with the United States.  His 
counterparts were unfamiliar with Article 98, and A/S 
Rademaker gave a short tutorial on the need for Article 98 
agreements, emphasizing the reciprocal nature of the 
agreement.  He handed out information packets on Article 98, 
and his interlocutors promised to bring the matter to the 
attention of appropriate officials in their capitals. 
 
CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
================== 
 
¶19. Over a year in making, the ARF Missile Defense Seminar 
advanced two U.S. objectives:  greater acceptance in the 
Asia-Pacific region of U.S. missile defense policies and 
programs and strengthening the ARF (one of only two fora in 
the region that includes the U.S.) by enhancing its viability 
as a cooperative security forum.  The event was well attended 
by ARF participant countries, and U.S. experts fully utilized 
this unique opportunity to debunk myths and address 
misperceptions about missile defense.  Skeptical views were 
aired by the Chinese, Pakistani, Indonesian, and Malaysian 
delegations, but U.S. experts effectively countered those 
views and, at the same time, provided transparency on U.S. 
missile defense programs and policies, favorably impressing 
even the skeptics.  Because they bring together the relevant 
officials from 25 participant countries and organizations, 
ARF sponsored functions have proven to be a cost-effective 
way to advance U.S. interests.  In addition to the missile 
defense agenda, the U.S. delegation was able to conduct PSI 
and Article 98 bilaterals on the margins. 
BOYCE