This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 002289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MO AG WI
SUBJECT: FAREWELL LUNCH WITH BELKHEIR ON EVE OF HIS TAKING 
UP AMBASSADORIAL DUTIES IN RABAT 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Over a one-on-one lunch November 6, Ambassador and 
departing presidential Chief of Staff Belkheir discussed the 
latter's November 9 departure to Rabat as Algeria' new 
ambassador, the challenges that awaited, and the personal 
factors that made him well-suited for the difficult task of 
building better communication and trust between Morocco and 
Algeria. Belkheir emphatically argued that Algeria had no 
territorial claims on the Western Sahara, that Morocco's 
rejection of the Baker Plan was a missed opportunity, and 
that Algeria's goal was not an independence outcome but 
respect for the principle of self-determination. 
Underscoring the need for both realism and flexibility from 
all sides, Ambassador encouraged Belkheir and Algeria to 
focus on autonomy for the Western Sahara -- the only area 
where there was some common ground on this contentious issue 
-- and how it could be achieved in a way that honored the 
principle of self-determination. Belkheir was strongly 
critical of Iranian President Ahmadinejad's call for "wiping 
Israel off the map" and said there should be full Syrian 
cooperation with the Mehlis investigation of the Hariri 
assassination, even if the trail led to close family members 
of Bashar Asad.  On bilateral issues, Belkheir expressed 
satisfaction with the continuing expansion of U.S.-Algerian 
cooperation and noted that he had discussed the Blue Lantern 
problem (since resolved in principle) directly with President 
Bouteflika following his last conversation with the 
Ambassador. 
 
¶2. (C) With Belkheir's departure, Embassy Algiers has lost a 
major interlocutor.  The latter has provided an immediately 
accessible, discreet channel to President Bouteflika; 
collaborated with us on sensitive issues ranging from 
military cooperation to the POW release (where the President 
did not want the MFA involved); and served as a channel for 
very frank discussion of problematic Algerian behavior on 
certain issues.  Given Belkheir's unique attributes (his role 
in inviting Bouteflika to return to Algeria in 1999 to run 
for the presidency, his reputation as one of the top power 
brokers in the country, and his connections across the 
bureaucracy and military), it is expected that the next 
presidential chief of staff will be a far less influential 
figure. (End Summary and Comment) 
 
CURRENT BILATERAL CLIMATE 
WITH MOROCCO IS "VERY DIFFICULT" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Belkheir said he was departing for Rabat November 9 to 
take up his new duties as ambassador to Morocco.  He said the 
Moroccan Deputy Interior Minister al-Himma had called him the 
previous day to finalize arrangements for his arrival and 
brief him on the King's speech commemorating the Green March. 
 Noting the current bilateral climate was "very difficult," 
he said somewhat wistfully that he had hesitated a great deal 
before accepting President Bouteflika's request but had 
accepted out of a sense of duty and in response to 
Bouteflika's strong urging.  Ambassador said Belkheir had an 
important task before him:  creating better communication, 
building confidence between the two governments, and creating 
a regional climate more conducive to resolution of the 
Western Sahara issue.  The current impasse and tensions 
served no one's interest and only diverted attention and 
energies away from cooperation on issues of common concern -- 
terrorism, drug networks, clandestine immigration, and 
greater regional economic cooperation. If anyone could 
improve communication between the two countries, Ambassador 
commented, it was he (Belkheir).  His personal connections to 
the royal family, his long involvement in Moroccan-Algerian 
relations, and his longstanding personal commitment to 
improved ties suited him well for the task before him. 
 
"UNCLE" BELKHEIR'S PERSONAL TIES 
TO MOHAMMED VI MAY BE A POSITIVE FACTOR 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Belkheir repeated that the situation was very 
difficult. The Moroccan press was stirring things up.  The 
King's last-minute cancellation of PM Ouyahia's visit was 
seen as a very grave insult by Bouteflika and others in the 
leadership, and would be difficult to overcome.  The absence 
of any positive response to the Polisario's release of the 
remaining Moroccan POWS was also disappointing.  Nonetheless, 
he readily agreed, recalling his and Ambassador's 
collaboration in crafting and realizing this humanitarian 
initiative, facilitating the release had been the right thing 
to do and had lifted a burden for Algeria.  Ambassador 
commented that while we still hoped both sides could find a 
way to engage in a cycle of reciprocal positive steps, one 
could never go wrong in taking a humanitarian step that 
reduced human suffering.  Despite these negatives, in seeking 
to promote better communication and trust, Belkheir remained 
hopeful that his good personal relations with Hassan II and 
Mohammed VI would be a positive factor.  In this regard, he 
recalled that during one of their many meetings, Hassan II 
had called the future Mohammed VI into the room and 
introduced Belkheir as "your friend and your uncle." 
 
SELF-DETERMINATION IS ALGERIA'S 
OBJECTIVE, NOT WESTERN SAHARA INDEPENDENCE 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador said one of Belkheir's challenges would be 
to convince the Moroccan leadership that Algeria, whatever 
might have been the case in the past, now genuinely saw the 
stability of Morocco and the throne as a vital Algerian 
interest.  This was important because some senior Moroccans 
even today feared Algeria's real goal in the Western Sahara 
was setting up an ostensibly independent Polisario state 
dependent on Algeria.  Belkheir emphatically stated that 
Algeria's objective was not independence, but ensuring 
respect for the Sahrawis' right to self-determination.  As in 
the past, he argued that Morocco's rejection of the Baker 
Plan had missed an opportunity to secure an outcome that 
would have met Morocco's needs (i.e., autonomy) while 
honoring the principle of self-determination.  Stressing that 
Algeria had no territorial claims or ambitions whatsoever in 
the Western Sahara, he recalled a conversation several years 
ago in which Hassan II had said Morocco "understood" 
Algeria's need for access to the Atlantic and thus would be 
willing to provide a "land corridor" for Algeria.  Belkheir 
said he had responded that Algeria had no territorial claims 
whatsoever but was only seeking self-determination for the 
Sahrawis.  For Algeria the stability of Morocco and the 
Moroccan throne were vital to Algerian interests. 
 
AMB:  NEED FOR REALISM ON WESTERN SAHARA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Belkheir asked if Ambassador had seen President 
Bouteflika's recent letter to President Bush (in which he 
noted that Algeria had kept its commitment to the President 
to cooperate fully with Baker and reaffirmed Algeria's strong 
attachment to implementing the Baker Plan).  With evident 
concern, he also noted that Ambassador Bolton had raised the 
issue of whether MINURSO's mandate should be renewed, since 
it was clearly not fulfilling its mandated mission. 
Regarding the latter, Ambassador said we had, as he knew, 
voted to extend MINURSO for another six months, and that had 
been the right decision.  That said, reminding all concerned 
that the status quo should not be taken for granted was 
useful and appropriate.  It was important to avoid another 
UNFICYP-type situation, where a costly peacekeeping force 
became a pillar of an unsatisfactory status quo, enabling the 
parties to avoid their responsibilities for achieving a 
solution. 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding the Bouteflika letter, Ambassador said it 
had presented Algerian views very clearly.  At the same time, 
one had to be realistic.  Morocco has rejected the Baker 
Plan, no one was prepared to impose a solution, and, with the 
parties stalemated and issues like Iraq, Iran, Syria, and 
Palestine on Washington's plate, it was unlikely there would 
be much high-level interest in investing heavily in the 
issue, especially at a time when there were few signs of 
flexibility that could make progress possible.  One also had 
to be realistic in recognizing that Morocco was no more 
willing to accept an independence outcome than the Polisario 
or Algeria were willing to accept a unilateral fait accompli 
incorporating the Western Sahara into Morocco.  This being 
the case, anyone who was really serious about a solution 
needed to be focusing on the one element of the Baker Plan -- 
autonomy -- where there was some common ground.   Noting 
Belkheir's own arguments that Morocco's rejection of Baker 
had been a missed opportunity to produce an autonomy outcome 
that Morocco could live with, Ambassador said the challenge 
was to find a way, within a UN framework, to bring such a 
solution about through a process that honored the principle 
of self-determination.  To succeed, imagination, realism, and 
flexibility would be required from both sides.  Belkheir 
listened carefully, neither agreeing nor disagreeing. 
 
IRAN, SYRIA 
----------- 
 
¶8. (C) Belkheir introduced the issue of Iran, expressing 
astonishment and concern over Iranian President Ahmadinejad's 
"irresponsible" call for "wiping Israel off the map." 
Ambassador said we agreed such remarks by a head of state 
were unprecedented and dangerous, and expressed 
disappointment that Algeria and other Arab states had not 
spoken out more clearly and forcefully in public in response 
to such unacceptable statements.  These statements 
underscored our concerns over Iranian efforts to seek a 
nuclear weapons capability under the guise of a peaceful 
nuclear energy program.  The development of such a capability 
by Iran would be extremely destabilizing for the region.  It 
was essential to maintain a firm international consensus in 
order to convince Iran to change course.  On Syria and the 
Mehlis Report, Belkheir volunteered that it was important for 
the Syrian leadership to cooperate with the investigation, 
even if the trail led to individuals such as Military 
Intelligence Chief Shawkat or Bashar Asad's brother Maher. 
 
BILATERAL ISSUES/BLUE LANTERN 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador briefed Belkheir on recent progress in our 
bilateral relations, including last week's signing of a $4 
million landmark MEPI grant to strengthen English teaching in 
Algerian public schools, the planned December signing of an 
S&T Cooperation Framework Agreement, important progress in 
narrowing the remaining issues in the Open Skies negotiation, 
upcoming high level visits, and the joint military exercise 
now under way.  Ambassador said an important exception to 
these positive developments was the continuing lack of 
cooperation on the Blue Lantern issue.  Ambassador reviewed 
familiar arguments, stressed Algeria's interest in 
cooperating with what was a minor, technical, non-obtrusive 
request, expressed concern over MOD Minister-Delegate 
Guenaizia's apparent reluctance to meet with the Ambassador 
to discuss the issue, and noted the very concrete 
implications of non-cooperation, which were neither in our 
nor Algeria's interest. 
 
¶10. (C) Belkheir expressed satisfaction with the overall 
growth and direction of U.S.-Algerian relations, agreed we 
needed to resolve the Blue Lantern issue, and said that 
following Ambassador's expression of concern in their last 
conversation, he had briefed President Bouteflika.  The 
latter, he reported, had replied, "I am the Minister of 
Defense."  (Comment: The day after this luncheon 
conversation, the Defense Attache received a formal note from 
the MOD indicating that following "a study," the MOD had 
decided to cooperate with our Blue Lantern request.  This 
suggests the President in his capacity as Minister of Defense 
may have directly intervened to resolve the problem.) 
ERDMAN