This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E AND IO 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO ET ER UNSC EE BORDER
SUBJECT: UNSC MISSION TO ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BREAKS NO NEW 
GROUND 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3769 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 3760 
     ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 3725 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Japan's UN PermRep Amb. Kenzio Oshima told 
UN Security Council members and troop-contributing countries 
in Addis that his November 7-8 trip to Ethiopia and Eritrea 
on behalf of the Council was "technical" in nature, and did 
not aim at promoting political dialogue.  Providing a readout 
of his meeting with Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, Oshima 
said Ethiopia's position on border demarcation had not 
changed: Ethiopia accepted the boundary commission's decision 
"in principle", which was not the same as "final and 
binding."  Despite its opposition to immediate demarcation, 
Oshima praised Ethiopia's "restraint" in responding to 
Eritrea's restrictions on UNMEE, noting that UNMEE 
characterizes Ethiopia's military deployments as "defensive." 
 UNMEE officials, meanwhile, were more vocal in highlighting 
UNMEE's inability to monitor 60 per cent of the border, 
especially military movements on the Eritrean side. 
According to UNMEE Force Commander Singh, both sides have 
activated airfields and air defenses; moreover, each side 
appears to have deployed two additional divisions, 
supplementing existing troops along the border.  UNMEE SRSG 
Legwaila warned that UNMEE's withdrawal would be "the 
quickest way to war," as Ethiopia threatens to re-occupy the 
Temporary Security Zone separating the two countries if UNMEE 
leaves.  While France agrees that UNMEE's withdrawal would be 
"a catastrophe that must be avoided at all costs," Japan 
believes that revising UNMEE's mandate could generate cost 
savings.  The UNMEE SRSG strongly opposes the current Greek 
draft UNSC resolution, believing that it comes too late after 
the issue was first brought to the Security Council a month 
ago, and that it would only "enrage" both parties.  UNSC 
members voiced support for a U.S. special envoy; UNMEE SRSG 
underscored that the envoy should represent the United 
States, not the United Nations, as Eritrea had rejected the 
previous UN envoy as "illegal."  Charge replied that U.S. 
would seek an envoy, whether U.S. or UN or both, that Eritrea 
and Ethiopia would accept.  UNMEE again pleaded for satellite 
imagery of the border in order to improve the safety and 
security of UNMEE troops.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) At a November 7 meeting hosted by the Charge, Japan's 
UN PermRep Amb. Kenzo Oshima, Chairman of the UN Security 
Council's Working Group on Peace-keeping Operations, briefed 
heads of mission from UNSC members and troop-contributing 
countries (TCC) on his meeting earlier that day with 
Ethiopian FM Seyoum and his expected visit the following day 
to Asmara.  Senior officials from the UN Mission in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (UNMEE) accompanied Oshima, including Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Amb. 
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Deputy SRSG Amb. Azouz Ennifar, and 
UNMEE Force Commander Major-General Rajender Singh. 
 
----------------------------- 
UNSC MISSION ONLY "TECHNICAL" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Amb. Oshima defined his mission as "technical": he 
would meet with UNMEE, UNSC members, TCCs, and, if possible, 
representatives of Ethiopia (GOE) and Eritrea (GSE).  His 
most important message was to push Eritrea (GSE) to lift its 
restrictions on UNMEE, while expressing the UNSC's confidence 
in how UNMEE troops performed under difficult circumstances. 
"I'm not here for any negotiations or political discussions," 
he declared.  Oshima had met with Ethiopian FM Seyoum, and 
was awaiting confirmation from the GSE of appointments the 
next day in Asmara.  (NOTE: A November 8 UNMEE press briefing 
confirmed that Oshima met with Colonel Zacarias Ogbagaber, 
Eritrea's Chief of the Commission for Coordination with 
UNMEE, and with presidential advisor Yemane Ghebremeskel. 
END NOTE.)  UNMEE officials explained that Oshima would not 
visit the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), which lies entirely 
within Eritrea, as doing so required too much transit time, 
due to Ethiopia and Eritrea's refusal to allow direct flights 
between their two countries. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Reviewing UNSC actions, Oshima said "operational 
problems affecting TCCs", resulting from the GSE's ban of 
UNMEE flight operations and other restrictions, were a 
"matter of great concern" to the UN.  The UNSYG had reported 
movements of troops in areas adjacent to the Temporary 
Security Zone (TSZ), he said, as well as "irregular 
movements" within the TSZ itself.  He referred to the UNSC 
statement issued on October 4 (S/PRST/2005/47).  No decision 
had been taken on a draft UNSC resolution proposed by Greece, 
he added, but despite different views, there was no 
disagreement among members that the GSE had to lift 
restrictions on UNMEE.  In addition to addressing the 
"immediate issue" of the GSE's restrictions on UNMEE, the 
UNSC was concerned about the root cause of the stalemate 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, he said, acknowledging that 
there was "frustration at the lack of progress in 
demarcation". 
 
¶5. (SBU) Oshima said he would report his findings to the 
UNSC, but noted that the SRSG had already reported recent 
border developments to that body.  Possible next steps 
included considering whether to approve a new resolution, 
appoint a special envoy, or propose that "witnesses" to 
previous agreements either meet or intervene.  Oshima said no 
decision had been reached yet, after consultations between 
the UNSYG and the USG, on whom the envoy would represent. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
NO CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA'S RESERVATIONS ON BORDER DEMARCATION 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Oshima said he had a "good meeting" on November 7 
with GOE FM Seyoum, but reported no change in Ethiopia's 
position from its October 31 letter to the UNSC.  According 
to Oshima, Seyoum continued to assert that actual demarcation 
of the border would require "readjustments," e.g., to ensure 
that a village not be divided in two.  Seyoum also had said 
that the border issue was not the sole issue between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea: economic trade, normalization of relations, and 
access to the sea were also key. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Oshima said that while it would be useful if the GOE 
were to state publicly that it accepted the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
Boundary Commission's (EEBC) decision as "final and binding," 
as stipulated by the Algiers peace accord, the GOE continues 
to agree with the decision only "in principle".  Highlighting 
the difference, Oshima questioned whether "I will marry you 
in principle" meant the same as "I will marry you 
unconditionally."  Describing himself as an "expert in 
linguistic contortions," SRSG Legwaila agreed that this 
represented a significant caveat.  Legwaila said mutual 
acceptance of the EEBC decision would be a good basis for 
parties to begin dialogue.  Not accepting the finality of the 
EEBC decision was a violation of article 415 of the peace 
agreement, Legwaila added. 
 
¶8. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila expressed concern that FM Seyoum had 
repeatedly told him, DSRSG Ennifar, and the UNMEE Force 
Commander that "the Boundary Commission will never open 
offices in Ethiopia," when in fact the EEBC has two offices 
in Ethiopia that have been closed as a cost-saving measure. 
As the EEBC requires offices on both sides of the border for 
demarcation, Seyoum's comment challenges the notion that 
Ethiopia is ready to demarcate the 85 per cent of the border 
that is not in dispute, Legwaila said. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Asked if he was satisfied with Ethiopia's reaction 
to Eritrea's restrictions, Oshima said FM Seyoum "reassured 
us of restraint."  Ethiopia had responded "appropriately," he 
said, adding that both the UNMEE SRSG and Force Commander had 
characterized Ethiopia's redeployment of forces as 
"defensive." 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to Oshima, Eritrea's charge d'affaires in 
New York had told him that the GSE had proposed a bilateral 
arrangement to Ethiopia, but had not pursued it further, as 
Ethiopia had rejected it.  SRSG Legwaila observed that 
Ethiopia had, on several occasions, proposed swapping 
territory, and that the final point of PM Meles' five-point 
plan proposed dialogue, which Eritrea had rejected. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
UNMEE CANNOT MONITOR ERITREAN MOVEMENTS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila interjected that the GSE's 
restriction on UNMEE flights prevented UNMEE from monitoring 
60 per cent of the border.  UNMEE could not determine whether 
Eritrea was now building up forces along its side, he said. 
On the Ethiopian side, there was "more transparency": UNMEE 
knew Ethiopia had been amassing troops since December 16, 
¶2004.  He noted that UNMEE had requested satellite imagery 
from the United States (ref C), as "there is no other 
alternative" to aerial surveillance.  Without aerial 
surveillance, UNMEE Force Commander Singh said he would need 
15 times more troops (i.e., 45,000) to monitor the border; 
even more would be needed if the GSE imposed further 
restrictions, such as allowing only foot patrols.  Singh 
noted that UNMEE operated under Chapter VI (peaceful 
settlement of disputes) of the UN Charter, and therefore 
depended on consent from both parties, which was now 
"incomplete."  "We have lost our ability to serve as a 
tripwire, and to warn the international community," Singh 
lamented. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
AIRFIELDS AND AIR DEFENSE ACTIVATED ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDER 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) UNMEE Force Commander Singh outlined key military 
developments: 
-- Both sides had activated airfields and air defenses. 
-- Ethiopia had deployed two additional divisions in the 
western sector, along with two special forces units.  These 
were in addition to eleven divisions deployed along the 
border in December 2004, and seven more divisions added in 
January 2005.  Singh noted that PM Meles had notified him and 
the SRSG of the January deployment. 
-- Eritrean troops were now deployed on (rather than near) 
the border, and maintaining and preparing defenses. 
-- UNMEE had recently observed one to two new Eritrean 
divisions in areas adjacent to the TSZ, but now could no 
longer locate them. 
-- Within the TSZ itself, the GSE had restricted UNMEE from 
patrolling the western and central sectors at night.  UNMEE 
had also curtailed challenge inspections in many areas. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
UNMEE,S WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE "QUICKEST WAY TO WAR" 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶13. (SBU) SRSG Legwaila cautioned that allowing UNMEE's 
withdrawal would be the "quickest way to war," as the 
Government of Ethiopia had pledged to reoccupy the TSZ in the 
event UNMEE withdrew (ref A).  The TSZ was intended to keep 
Eritrean troops 25 kilometers from the border, he said. 
Current restrictions hampering UNMEE's freedom of movement, 
especially during the night, were thus not only "making 
nonsense of the Temporary Security Zone," but also breeding 
suspicion, which could ultimately "force war quickly," he 
said.  Legwaila said movements of troops, tanks, or aircraft 
were a secondary concern, compared to the GSE's flight ban on 
UNMEE; reversing the ban would allow UNMEE to monitor and 
assess such movements. 
 
¶14. (SBU) France's ambassador to Ethiopia remarked that the 
withdrawal of UNMEE would be "a catastrophe that must be 
avoided at all costs."  He added that many parties had 
attempted to reach out to Eritrea, without success. 
 
¶15. (SBU) As chairman of the UNSC's working group on 
peace-keeping operations, Amb. Oshima said he had convened a 
separate meeting with TCCs.  Five recent casualties among 
UNMEE peace-keepers prompted concerns that TCCs could 
withdraw their contingents, he said, as the GSE's flight ban 
included medical evacuations. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Amb. Oshima said Japan was concerned about UNMEE,s 
$186 million annual cost, as peace-keeping operations cost $5 
billion annually.  Mandate review could generate savings, he 
said. 
 
¶17. (SBU) India's ambassador to Ethiopia agreed with SRSG 
Legwaila that Ethiopia would reoccupy the TSZ if UNMEE 
withdrew.  He did not directly threaten to withdraw Indian 
troops (who, along with a contingent from Jordan, comprise 
the majority of UNMEE's military strength), but questioned 
what UNMEE,s future would be if it could not fulfill its 
mandate.  India advocated a meeting of "friends" of Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, and launching a parallel political process to 
address the current impasse.  (NOTE: No representative of 
Jordan attended Oshima's briefing.  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
NEXT STEPS: U.S. ENVOY INSTEAD OF NEW UNSC RESOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Addressing possible next steps, SRSG Legwaila said 
he strongly opposed the draft Greek resolution, saying it 
would simply "enrage" the parties.  "This resolution has now 
outlived whatever usefulness it might have (had)," he said. 
Legwaila said Ethiopian FM Seyoum was "violently opposed" to 
the proposed resolution (ref B), and that the GSE's reaction 
would be even worse.  The UNSC should have passed a 
restriction solely addressing the GSE,s flight ban on 
October 5-6, he continued, in conjunction with its 
presidential statement, in response to the call for 
"emergency action".  Now, he added, the proposed resolution 
was too late and irrelevant.  "We should forget about the 
resolution and do something else," he said.  Charge observed 
that the UNSC did not want to make a delicate situation more 
difficult.  Amb. Oshima remarked that the "reflexes of the 
Security Council" are to pass repeated resolutions and 
condemnations, but he questioned whether a strong resolution 
would help address the current situation. 
 
¶19. (SBU) UK Ambassador Bob Dewar expressed reservations 
about a meeting of "witnesses."  While this was an important 
option, it needed to be approached carefully, he said, "to 
ensure it adds value." 
 
¶20. (SBU) Legwaila argued that any new special envoy should 
represent the United States, not the United Nations.  Both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea had said the United States was the only 
interlocutor it could accept, he noted.  Thus, "it would be 
absolutely tragic" if the UNSYG appointed another UN special 
envoy who failed.  Legwaila explained that Eritrea considers 
the UN "irrelevant" and perceived former Canadian foreign 
minister Lloyd Axworthy,s earlier appointment as UN Special 
Envoy as an attempt by the UNSYG to renegotiate the EEBC 
decision.  Some GSE officials thus considered Axworthy's 
appointment as UN Special Envoy illegal, Legwaila said.  "No 
one should ask the Secretary-General to appoint a special 
envoy," given the circumstances of the earlier UN envoy's 
failure, Legwaila said.  If a second UN envoy failed, 
Legwaila said, then even someone with the stature of the 
former President Bush would not succeed.  "The United States 
must take a chance for peace," Legwaila concluded, urging the 
appointment of a U.S. envoy. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Charge told Legwaila that the key for the United 
States was not whether the envoy was UN or U.S./UN or U.S., 
but whether he was accepted by both sides.  Brazil's 
ambassador said he supported bilateral (vice UN) intervention 
to address Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions, as well as 
consultations with academic experts.   Norway poloff said his 
country supported a US envoy, whether US or UN-hatted, but 
that the envoy needed to make tough demands on both sides, 
and have the international community unite behind him. 
 
¶22. (U) Greek ambassador noted that the Council of Europe had 
been able to enforce unpopular decisions on its members, who 
accepted them as binding; he questioned why demarcation of 
commonly accepted portions of the border could not begin.  In 
response, SRSG Legwaila reiterated the well-established 
differences between the parties' positions on the EEBC 
decision: 
-- FM Meles has publicly stated that Ethiopia seeks dialogue 
prior to demarcation. 
-- Beginning in August 2003, Ethiopia refused to implement 
the EEBC's demarcation directives to the chief surveyor to 
fix lines along the border. 
-- Eritrea refuses to allow demarcation of the east, so long 
as Ethiopia refuses to allow demarcation of the entire border. 
Legwaila underscored that in demarcation of the border, 
Ethiopia seeks adjustments in delimitation; and that the 
GOE's acceptance of the EEBC decision only "in principle" 
remained a major stumbling block. 
 
¶23. (SBU) COMMENT: Amb. Oshima's "technical" visit on behalf 
of the UN Security Council provided him with a first-hand 
introduction to the issue in both countries and also 
clarified where each stands.  The visit also demonstrated 
continuing UN commitment to avoid another war.  Post 
continues to await guidance in response to UNMEE SRSG 
Legwaila's October 26 request to the USG for satellite 
imagery (ref C), as UNMEE troops would feel more secure if 
they had better information about the parties' troop 
deployments.  END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON