This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003770 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
ROME PARIS LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2015 
TAGS: PREL PINS KPKO ER ET EE BORDER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: UNMEE'S WITHDRAWAL COULD PROMPT 
ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3747 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 3725 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 
1.4 (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  UNMEE DSRSG Amb. Azouz Ennifar does not 
foresee the imminent outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, and dismisses recent public statements by UN 
officials in New York and Asmara as overly alarming.  On the 
other hand, UNMEE itself could precipitate armed 
confrontation, were it to withdraw.  Amb. Ennifar warns that 
UNMEE's withdrawal would create a vacuum that Ethiopian FM 
Seyoum said Ethiopia would fill through re-occupation of the 
Temporary Security Zone.  PM Meles also implied as much to 
Charge, by reminding her that Ethiopia had in the past and 
could in the future maintain the security zone without the 
UNMEE.  However, we assume Eritrea would not accept Ethiopia 
replacing UNMEE.  Ambassador Ennifar reiterated his request 
to the USG to assist with aerial surveillance so that 
peace-keepers would not longer be blind to movements of 
troops in the TSZ and outside it.  Ennifar firmly believes 
that a comprehensive economic and political package 
acceptable to both governments could resolve the dispute. 
Ethiopia's National Security advisor told Charge the same 
thing.  USG engagement, including the immediate appointment 
of an American to serve as UN special envoy, is key to 
addressing the stalemate.  Ennifar was surprised and 
concerned when Charge mentioned a delay in naming the US 
envoy.  Both Ennifar and Charge agreed that the US envoy was 
key to a peaceful resolution and had a fair chance of success 
if he approached the issue in a comprehensive manner. The 
November 6-8 UNSC mission to the region aims to express 
support for UNMEE, but is unlikely to address the parties' 
key concerns.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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UNMEE PULLOUT MAY PROMPT ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) Recent public statements on Ethiopia-Eritrea from UN 
headquarters (e.g., November 2 UN SYG statement expressing 
concern about troop movements) are overly alarming, according 
to Amb. Azouz Ennifar, Deputy Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General (DSRSG) for the UN Mission in Ethiopia 
and Eritrea (UNMEE).  In a November 4 meeting with Charge and 
deputy P/E chief, Ennifar asserted that UNMEE SRSG Legwaila 
had been blind -sided by such a statement attributed to an 
UNMEE spokesman in Asmara.  Ennifar said he did not foresee 
the imminent outbreak of hostilities, and noted that UN 
peace-keepers in Cyprus monitored a peaceful stalemate that 
had lasted for years. 
 
¶3. (C) Ennifar (strictly protect) attributed "alarmist" 
reports to UNMEE Force Commander Major General Rajender Singh 
trying to safeguard his Indian troops, who had only suffered 
a single casualty thus far (from a non-combat-related traffic 
accident).  He criticized UNMEE's evacuation of dependents, 
many of whom had resided in the area for as long as five 
years, for creating the impression that the mission was on 
the verge of "collapsing."  UNMEE needed to be realistic; it 
was "ridiculous," he said, that UNMEE and UN headquarters had 
discussed "temporary pullout" as an option. 
 
¶4. (C) Ennifar reiterated concern that continued Eritrean 
restrictions on UNMEE could lead India and Jordan to withdraw 
their contingents, who comprise the majority of UNMEE forces 
in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).  According to Ennifar, 
India's ambassador to Ethiopia had said that if there were no 
change within 30 to 60 days, then "we'll pull our people." 
 
¶5. (C) Ennifar reported that Ethiopian Foreign Minister 
Seyoum had informed him that were UNMEE to withdraw, then 
Ethiopia would seek to re-occupy the TSZ, as Ethiopia's 
previous retreat had been conditioned on UNMEE's 
establishment of the TSZ.  Charge said that PM Meles had 
stated to her that prior to UNMEE, Ethiopia had administer 
the TSZ and could do so in the future. Ennifar and Charge 
both agreed that such a scenario would not be acceptable to 
Eritrea and could lead to confrontation because the TSZ is 
entirely composed of land awarded to Eritrea by the boundary 
commission. 
--------------------------------------- 
INCREASED MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR BORDER 
--------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) On the other hand, the UN should not report that the 
border situation is stable, Ennifar said.  "Major moves are 
going on," he noted, especially during nightfall, when the 
GSE restricted UNMEE's active monitoring.  Potentially 
troubling developments on the Eritrean side included: 
-- the sighting of several new T-52 tanks, near the port of 
Assab, in contrast to older, less serviceable T-52s 
previously identified by UNMEE and located between Assab and 
the TSZ; 
-- the Eritrean military conducting air operations, involving 
helicopters, in the TSZ; 
-- the frequency of senior Eritrean military commanders 
visiting the TSZ; and 
-- the GSE's re-conscription of previously discharged 
draftees. 
 
¶7. (C) Ennifar said UNMEE did not have information on the 
location of Eritrean troops moving away from the border with 
Sudan, but underscored that, as a result of GSE restrictions, 
UNMEE could only monitor 40 per cent of the border.  He 
reiterated UNMEE SRSG Legwaila's October 26 request to the 
USG for aerial or satellite surveillance (ref B), noting that 
the UN did not need the imagery itself but only the 
analysis.  (Comment:  It would reassure the UNMEE troops if 
we could provide them with satellite images and or 
information regarding troop deployment.  One of the reasons 
they are nervous is their inability to ascertain what is 
going on in the TSZ.) 
 
----------------------------------------- 
NEED TO PROMOTE MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Although the parties agreed on 85 per cent of the 
border, building consensus on demarcation of the remainder 
remained difficult, Ennifar said.  Eritrea sought the return 
of three key areas: Badme, the Sitona triangle, and parts of 
its southern border.  Ennifar said he wished that PM Meles 
would not include the "accepted in principle" April 2002 
decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC), 
because he believes that in fact were Eritrea to agree to 
discussions, Ethiopia would agree to demarcation along 
similar lines as the delimitation.  Charge pointed out that 
she had met with Meles's National Security advisor earlier 
that day.  He had suggested that a comprehensive package for 
normalizing relations was key to a successful resolution of 
the border dispute.  In this package Badme would be only a 
footnote, the bigger issue being economic (septel). 
 
¶9. (C) Charge said that she believed that the issues of 
resettlement, access to the port of Assab, and economic 
cooperation were critical to Ethiopia.  Ennifar noted that 
Ethiopian FM Seyoum had identified access to the Eritrean 
port of Assab, not the contested status of Badme, as the 
major issue that had to be discussed between landlocked 
Ethiopia and its neighbor.  Charge said so had Ethiopian 
General Zamora.  Developing Assab would primarily benefit 
Ethiopia, as Eritrea relied on the port of Massawa, Ennifar 
said.  Ennifar advocated a comprehensive economic development 
package involving World Bank assistance, saying the parties 
themselves could not supply a solution to the current 
stalemate. 
 
--------------------- 
USG ENGAGEMENT IS KEY 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Ennifar hailed US plans to name a UN special envoy, 
saying that US leadership was key to resolving the 
stalemate.  Neither the UN nor the AU was playing a 
significant role, Ennifar explained.  When Charge indicated 
that there was a hang-up between the US and the UN in naming 
the envoy, he expressed his surprise and considerable concern 
and urged that we resolve the problem quickly. 
-- UN SYG Annan was considering visiting the region again, 
but was not likely to be successful in Asmara, which had 
forbidden him from flying directly to Addis Ababa during his 
previous visit in July 2004. 
-- Japanese PermRep Amb. Kenzo Oshima's visit, on behalf of 
the UNSC, would be limited to providing "confidence and 
support to UNMEE."  Oshima would join Ethiopian FM Seyoum at 
a November 7 working lunch in Addis Ababa, and meet with UNSC 
ambassadors at Charge's residence, and then meet the 
following day with the UNMEE Force Commander and GSE 
Commissioner in Asmara.  However, Oshima was not scheduled to 
meet either PM Meles nor President Isaias. 
 
¶11. (C) Ennifar said no progress had been made in pushing the 
parties to participate in either a war reparations 
commission, or a commission to investigate the causes of the 
war, both mechanisms established by existing accords between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.  He called for modifying the existing 
UNMEE mandate to allow the SRSG to play a political (as 
opposed to simply administrative) role, consistent with other 
UN peace-keeping missions. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT: As the situation on the border becomes more 
critical, it also becomes more urgent to name the US envoy to 
avoid miscalculations on both sides.   END COMMENT. 
HUDDLESTON