This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003760 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO FROM VICKI HUDDLESTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR ET ER UNSC EE BORDER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MELES SAYS UNSC DRAFT RESOLUTION ON 
BORDER JEOPARDIZES PEACE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Vicki Huddleston for reason 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  Prime Minister Meles contended that the 
drafted UNSC resolution on the Ethiopia/Eritrea border would 
jeopardize any chance of a peaceful settlement. Isaias would 
be emboldened -- and "rewarded for his "blackmail" -- by 
getting a Security Council endorsement of demarcation of the 
border without dialogue.  According to the PM, the national 
security of Ethiopia is more important than the views of the 
UNSC.  Demarcation without dialogue would lead to backlash, 
he said, weakening Ethiopia and strengthening Eritrea. 
Therefore under no circumstance can Ethiopia accept such a 
UNSC resolution.  Meles asked if the US position, which he 
said had supported implementation of demarcation accompanied 
by dialogue, had changed.  I assured him that the US was 
pressing hard to delay the resolution or modify it so that 
neither side would be forced into a corner, and that we were 
hopeful that the US/UN envoy would be announced soon. 
Reported troop movements by both countries toward the border 
and the internal unrest in Addis could cause a deterioration 
of the border situation and a miscalculation by one of the 
parties. British Ambassador who just met with Meles reports 
that the PM say Ethiopian commanders in the military zone do 
not view the situation with undue alarm, but have reinforced 
and redeployed as a precaution against a misjudgement from 
Isaias resulting from internal strife here and the UN draft 
resolution.  End Summary. 
 
 ¶2. (C)  Earlier in the week, the Foreign Minister and the 
Prime Minister both expressed their extreme concerns about 
the draft resolution, specifically Operative paragraphs 9 and 
¶10.  I told them both that the USG was doing its best to 
delay, cancel, or modify the resolution so that it would not 
close doors or limit the options of the US/UN envoy.  On 
November 2, in the midst of street violence (septel), the 
Prime Minister called me in to again reiterate his concern 
that the USG was pressing for operative paragraph(s) that 
would demand the immediate demarcation of the border.  I 
again reassured him that this was not the case.  He said that 
DAS Yamamoto had told him that the US position was to 
implement demarcation with dialogue, and that it was his 
impression from his conversations with high level USG 
officials at the annual UNGA that this was their position as 
well.  I spoke with DAS Yamamoto after the meet to confirm 
our position and again passed on to the PM that it had not 
changed.  I also pointed out that we were going to move 
quickly on the envoy as we are increasingly concerned about 
reports that both sides are moving troops and tanks closer to 
the border. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Meles said that a resolution calling for 
implementation of demarcation without preconditions could 
allow Isaias to tell the UN that since it had now endorsed 
his position, it was up to the UNSC ensure that demarcation 
was carried out, so no envoy would be needed.  Even if Isaias 
agreed to the envoy, the proposed resolution would still 
reward his "blackmail" of the UN. If Isaias accepted the 
envoy but insisted that, as per the resolution, the 
demarcation should begin immediately, the situation would 
still deteriorate.  Ethiopia would refuse because its very 
security was at stake, and this would return the situation to 
square one.  The UNSC's views were of less importance to 
Ethiopia than its national security, Meles warned.  Ethiopia 
was willing to listen to its friends and to involved itself 
in give and take, but it was not appropriate to ask Ethiopia 
to "break". "There is no reason to bend if demarcation means 
fighting Eritrea with all the chips on their side and having 
exposed ourselves to political backlash domestically -- that 
would be breaking.  Telling Eritrea to go to Hell would give 
us a better fighting chance. We would rather fight before 
making concessions that militarily debilitate us," Meles 
argued.  "To agree to demarcation (without dialogue) would be 
like shooting ourselves in the head. Ethiopia must have 
dialogue on all (relevant) issues, including the border, if a 
solution is to be found." 
 
¶4.  (C) It is not UNMEE that keeps Eritrea from war, Meles 
claimed, but the fact that Isaias does not have the 
capability to defeat Ethiopia.  "He doesn't want to die," the 
PM added.  But for Ethiopia to accept demarcation without 
dialogue would be pointless, as it would destroy any chance 
of peace.  "It won't happen."  Meles said that the Boundary 
Commission is a bilateral agreement between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia.  The Security Council was not/not asked to 
guarantee demarcation, but rather was only asked to guarantee 
the cease fire   Meles doubted that the Security Council had 
a legal basis for enforcing demarcation. 
¶5.  (C)  Meles summed up by saying that the draft resolution 
would give Isaias more ammunition for another war because the 
UNSC would have endorsed demarcation without dialogue. 
Ethiopia's position on this point was laid out in the GOE's 
five-point plan, he reiterated.  "What must be done is to 
prove to Isaias that other options are closed.  Ethiopia 
would like to have peace so we have refrained from responding 
or provoking Isaias.  If Isaias wants to attack, he will, but 
if he decides he can't win then he will engage in give and 
take," Meles said.  A resolution that includes operative 
paragraph 10 on demarcation is worse for Ethiopia than losing 
UNMEE, because Ethiopia has managed the border in the past 
without UNMEE.  "But with this resolution, prospects for 
peace are seriously jeopardized." 
 
¶6. (C) Comment: Meles will not accept demarcation without 
dialogue because he will lose critical support from both 
EPRDF party members and significant portions of the 
population.  Although I made it clear that we had not support 
OP10 of the current proposed resolution, the Ethiopian 
mission in New York is reporting corridor conversation that 
lead Meles to believe that the USG supports including OP10 as 
a way of placating Isaias and improving the chances that he 
will accept the US envoy. Meles is fond of talking about the 
"red line" -- the position Ethiopia will not go beyond.  This 
is clearly a red line issue.  From my view point, including 
language in the resolution that calls for demarcation without 
some reference to dialogue would reduce the US/UN envoy's 
flexibility and chances of success.  Given the build-up on 
the front, I urge the naming of our envoy as soon as opssible 
and continued efforts to delay the UNSC resolution, or ensure 
that it does not do more harm than good. 
HUDDLESTON