This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003748 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC ET UNREST ELEC
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: CUD "LITE" PROTEST ENDS IN GOE CRACK 
DOWN, HIGH-LEVEL ARRESTS AND AT LEAST 11 DEATHS 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 3713 
 
Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. Summary: (C) At least 11 people were killed, reportedly 
including two policemen, and a similar number injured when 
riots broke out in the central Mercato and Piazza districts 
after the CUDP called for a series of street actions. 
Rock-throwing youth and security forces squared off in a 
number of locations in these districts.  Police arrested CUDP 
president Hailu Shawel, mayor-elect Berhanu Nega and other 
party leaders, in addition to what appeared to be hundreds of 
demonstrators.  MFA director for North America Grum Abay 
charged that the CUDP had orchestrated the street violence, 
busing in outsiders to provoke Mercato residents.  A number 
of other sources indicated that arrests of horn-honking CUPD 
sympathizers sparked spontaneous reactions from students and 
others in Mercato.  A CUDP spokesman denied to PolEcon 
Counselor that the CUDP had planned any violent acts and 
promised to reiterate a call for non-violence in a radio 
message Nov. 1.  The CUDP official (who was arrested a short 
time later) also said that the party's campaign of civil 
disobedience would continue.  A subsequent CUPD statement 
called for a general strike beginning Nov. 2. The streets of 
Addis had quieted somewhat by late afternoon on November 1, 
but a significant possibility of continued violence exists. 
The CUDP and GOE have thus moved away from dialogue and back 
towards a confrontation whose future course is hard to 
predict.  End Summary. 
 
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CUDP Launches Civil Disobedience Campaign 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After more than a week of hesitation, the opposition 
Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) unveiled on 
October 30 its new strategy of civil disobedience designed to 
apply popular pressure on the GOE to negotiate the CUDP's 
full eight-point agenda on democratization.  The strategy 
called on the public to undertake a graduated series of 
measures, which would include: 
 
1) a commercial boycott of the numerous businesses owned and 
operated by the ruling Ethiopia People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF); these companies include a bank, 
brewery, cement factory, printing press and assorted others. 
 
2) An advertising and consumer boycott of all government 
electronic media; 
 
3) a stay-at-home strike for one week beginning either 
November 7 or 14, depending on the end of Ramadan; 
 
4) Social ostracization of individuals believed to be 
cooperating in EPRDF "domination" efforts.  The CUD specifies 
that this measure does not apply to all EPRDF supporters, nor 
by implication to all Tigrayans. 
 
5) Open public gatherings to be specified later; 
 
6) Cooperation to prevent "the illegitimate use of force" on 
opposition members by security forces; 
 
7) Notify NGOs, embassies and human rights organizations 
about the "unlawful acts" of the GOE; 
 
8) Honking car horns during rush hour the week beginning Oct. 
31 in order to send a signal to visiting African Union heads 
of state; 
 
¶3. (C) The CUDP leadership adopted these measures amidst a 
tightening security noose around the party's main offices in 
Addis Ababa.  Police and plain clothes security forces 
surrounded the offices beginning on Friday, October 28 and 
remained throughout the weekend.  CUDP officials told emboffs 
that at least a dozen party officials were rounded up in the 
area around the offices, but security forces refrained from 
arresting any well-known CUDP leaders.  Security forces did 
pull one local-hire British employee from the vehicle of the 
British DCM in the vicinity of the offices, however, and 
released her only after the personal intervention of British 
Ambassador Bob Dewar.  Two Dutch diplomats at the scene were 
also taken briefly into police custody.  CUDP leaders issued 
a call for supporters to gather around the offices to protect 
party officials from security forces, which led to more 
arrests and crowd control efforts.  CUDP first vice president 
Bertukan Mideksa told Pol/Econ Counselor Oct. 31 that nearly 
all those arrested over the weekend had been released after a 
few hours, though at least three CUDP members had been beaten 
while in custody. Meanwhile, the state media denied reports 
that arrests had taken place at the CUDP headquarters.  No 
serious injuries were reported, but tensions ran high in the 
area over the weekend. Another manifestation of increased 
tensions was the series of police checkpoints established 
around Addis Ababa at key intersections on October 30. 
 
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Horn-Honking Leads to Rock-Throwing and Repression 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4. (C) On October 31, the first day of the CUDP's 
horn-honking protest, the GOE reportedly responded by 
arresting somewhere between 30 and 200 drivers from both 
taxis and private vehicles for "instigating violence."  News 
of these arrests was disseminated through both state media 
and private, opposition-oriented newspapers.  On November 1, 
reports suggest that additional arrests of drivers in the 
central Mercato area prompted a popular reaction.  Some 
accounts suggest that arrests outside a large high school 
prompted students to come out on the street and confront 
police.  Grum Abay, the MFA's director for European and North 
American Affairs, told the Charge that afternoon that the 
CUDP had bused its own activists into the Mercato area to 
incite the protests.  CUDP Director of International Affairs 
Yacoub Hailemariam separately denied to Pol/Econ Counselor 
that the party had organized any rock-throwing or street 
actions.  He insisted that the party's public messages had 
emphasized non-violence, and had called only for 
horn-honking. 
 
¶5. (C) Charge and PolEcon Counselor surveyed the Mercato and 
Piazza areas at midday and saw ample evidence of widespread 
street battles.  Many streets were littered with rocks that 
had apparently been thrown at police and nearly all shops in 
both areas were shuttered.  Taxis and other vehicles had 
vacated the area, but large numbers of people continued to 
roam about and gather in small groups.  Make-shift barricades 
impeded traffic and some small fires were burning.  Tension 
was palpable but police appeared to have restored order in 
all areas.  Large numbers of police moved about in trucks and 
on foot, some wearing riot gear.  Others blocked off certain 
areas.  Emboffs also observed several police trucks carrying 
water cannon.  Groups of police were also rounding up groups 
of demonstrators and transporting them in flat-bed trucks.  A 
number of ambulances raced around the area.  One group 
reported to PolEcon Counselor that large numbers of people 
had been arrested, and others beaten. 
 
¶6. (C) Post's security investigators confirmed with one local 
hospital that eleven individuals had been killed in the 
disturbances and another 11 injured.  Wire reports placed the 
number dead at five.  A former GOE cabinet official told the 
Charge late on Nov. 1 that two of the dead were policement. 
Post will continue to gather information on casualties. 
 
------------------------------ 
GOE Arrests Top CUD Leadership 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Several sources reported that at 4:00 pm local time, 
security forces arrested senior CUDP leaders, including 
President Hailu Shawel, Addis Ababa mayor-elect Berhanu Nega, 
public affairs director Gizachew Shiferaw and Yacoub 
Hailemariam.  Other leaders may also have been taken into 
custody.  Post had no word on where they had been taken or 
what charges would be filed against them.  (Note: Senior GOE 
officials have warned repeatedly that they have "piles of 
evidence" against party leaders and were prepared to act on 
it if street demonstrations took place.  CUDP leaders had 
been anticipating that they might be arrested, and discussed 
the possibility several times with Charge and other emboffs 
in recent weeks. End note.)  Instructions for civil 
disobedience that the party issued over the weekend indicated 
that if the arrests occurred, the CUDP campaign would move 
immediately to a stay-at-home strike.  The party issued a 
public statement to this effect late on Nov. 1, calling for 
capital residents to stay at home beginning Nov. 2 for an 
indefinite period. 
 
¶8. (C) Prior to the actual arrests of opposition leaders, MFA 
official Grum had told the Charge during their November 1 
meeting that the GOE might finally round up senior CUDP 
leaders in the wake of the protests.  The Charge urged 
continued restraint by the GOE, and argued that high-level 
arrests might trigger more protests.  Grum expressed 
skepticism that popular reaction would be significant. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
CUDP, Already in Legal Limbo, May Soon Be Banned 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (C) Prior to the onset of demonstration and arrests, the 
CUDP also continued to struggle on the legal front.  After 
expelling vice president Lidetu Ayalew from the party for 
refusing to turn in his previous party's (EDUP-Medhin) 
registration certificate along with the CUDP's official 
merger documents to the National Electoral Board (NEB), the 
coalition formally requested NEB approval for its merger on 
October 28.  The NEB responded by stating publicly that the 
CUDP should cancel any public events or actions until its 
application for official party status had been approved, and 
reiterated that the party had not legal standing to organize 
activities until its application had been approved.  Lidetu 
told post his refusal to relinquish his previous party's 
registration stemmed in part from his concern that the NEB 
would use the CUDP's transitional status against its leaders 
when they were arrested (see ref A).  PM Meles and other 
EPRDF leaders have made clear that they intended to ban the 
CUDP and charge its leaders with treason if they pursued 
street action against the GOE. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Comment: A Predictable Tragedy, An Unpredictable Future 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10. (C) Post and other members of the Ambassadors Donors 
Group have argued to CUDP leaders for weeks that in the 
current climate, even a non-violent public demonstration was 
likely to spiral out of control and lead to unnecessary 
deaths.  That prediction came true on November 1.  The CUDP's 
stated purpose for its campaign was to force the GOE to give 
more ground in its negotiation on further democratizing 
Ethiopia's institutions, especially the National Electoral 
Board.  The MFA's Grum Abay told us today, however, that the 
time for such negotiations had now passed. 
 
¶11. (C) Today's killings and arrests may persuade remaining 
CUDP leaders and the public to step back from the brink of 
broader violence, or may plunge Ethiopia even deeper into 
crisis.  The CUDP leadership's decision to forego Parliament 
and pursue its agenda through popular protests implied that 
the party would be willing to withstand arrests and 
repression along the way, however.  The GOE can be expected 
to deal with continued street action decisively.  Post will 
work with other donor embassies to urge GOE restraint and an 
end to provocative actions by the CUDP.  We will also seek to 
pick up the pieces of the lapsed political dialogue we 
promoted several weeks ago. 
HUDDLESTON