This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

091020Z Nov 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL, G, S/P, R 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM NI ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMOCRACY AT THE TIPPING POINT 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 182307 
 
     ¶B. ABUJA 2079 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i.Thomas P. Furey for reason 1.4 b 
&d. 
 
¶1. (C) With the shadow of the 2007 elections looming and a 
democracy scorecard that is mixed at best, Nigeria finds 
itself at a critical tipping point. There is great concern 
about whether the GON has the political will to implement the 
political reforms needed to increase transparency and enhance 
the effectiveness of key electoral institutions. Failure to 
do so will have a negative impact on the GON's burgeoning 
domestic credibility gap, which is in large part a byproduct 
of its dismal conduct of the 1999 and 2003 elections. Lack of 
adequate preparation only fuels continued speculation about 
the intentions of Obasanjo regarding a third term. As a 
result, it is important for the USG to engage the GON about 
laying the groundwork for a credible and democratic 
transition process in 2007. The USG must continue and ratchet 
up frank discussions with the GON about the need for free and 
fair elections in 2007 and continue, when necessary, with 
critical feedback on the GON,s progress in its preparations 
for and execution of those elections. End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) The following headings are keyed to the questions in 
reftel, paragraph 6. 
 
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¶A. Identify key areas of democratic deficit and the 3 - 5 
most important desired outcomes over the next 6 - 8 months 
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¶3. (C) Democratic deficit: Nigeria,s shortcomings are well 
known: corruption, a weak judiciary, winner-take all 
politics, weak political parties, a passive electorate, an 
overly strong executive, no system of effective checks and 
balances, and ineffective electoral institutions wholly 
dependent on the executive branch. Taken together these 
deficiencies impede Nigeria's democratization efforts and 
raise important questions about the Obasanjo administration's 
priorities and intentions. 
 
¶4.  (S) Given this difficult political terrain, the Obasanjo 
administration's plans are of major concern. Political 
activity is in a holding pattern as the body politic attempts 
to decipher the intentions of the President (see ref B) to 
either exit in 2007 and to pave the way for a successor. The 
major concern is that although President Obasanjo is 
constitutionally ineligible to run for a third term, he 
continues to behave as if he is an incumbent candidate.  He 
has sought to punish anyone demonstrating opposition to a 
potential third term bid or anyone making moves to position 
himself to become Nigeria's next president. This is 
especially true regarding his rival, Vice President Atiku 
Abubakar. The shrinking political space has reduced the 
normal pre-election politicking to a guessing game of "is he 
staying or is he going," creating an environment in which 
substantive movement on major electoral reforms has stalled 
and political tensions and violence are on the increase. 
 
¶5.  (S) Desired Outcomes:  Given this background, the most 
important short term priority is getting President Obasanjo 
to agree publicly to leave office in 2007. Further progress 
flows from this simple declaration of his plans. Thus, 
clarity on this fundamental issue would help open the 
political space necessary to allow Nigeria to return to a 
dynamic process and begin the process of implementing the 
major reforms still necessary for credible elections in 2007. 
 
¶6. (C) A second important short-term priority is to improve 
the functionality and credibility of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC).  As an appendage to the 
executive branch which is stacked with pro-government 
politicians: it has a poor track record in organizing past 
elections.  INEC will play an important role in determining 
whether the 2007 elections are credible. The specific agenda 
of reform starts with bolstering INEC's independence and 
continues with improving INEC,s capacity for the technical 
and logistical business of organizing an election. The 
discussion must be initiated and completed as soon as 
possible in order to give INEC a chance to concentrate on the 
details of organizing an election including, most 
immediately, accurate registration of a voter,s roll for an 
estimated 50 million eligible voters.  Post is already 
working with INEC through partner organization IFES, but 
technical assistance from the USG and other donors is not 
enough.  Nigeria must commit to fully funding the commission 
(as of October INEC still had not received its 2005 budget 
allocation from the GON) and the GON must show the political 
will to enable INEC to conduct free and fair elections. 
 
¶7.  (C) The third short-term priority outcome is to focus 
Nigeria on quickly and decisively establishing the &rules of 
the game8 for the 2007 elections and avoiding lengthy 
debates on distractions.  The National Assembly has been 
considering a draft electoral bill since early this year. 
Nigeria,s electoral rules need reform and the Assembly,s 
draft bill would solve some of the problems in the system 
while exacerbating others.  However, if the new electoral 
rules are not established soon, they will be very difficult 
to implement and risk becoming too little, too late.  INEC 
has also stated publicly that it is committed to pressing 
forward with an electronic voting system (EVS) for the 2007 
elections.  This is a controversial proposal, and there is 
considerable debate about the feasibility and merits of 
electronic voting amongst civil society and in the National 
Assembly.  Given the time frame, costs, technical challenges 
and size of such a project in Nigeria, post believes that for 
2007 the EVS issue is a non-starter and is little more than a 
"red herring" which diverts time and attention from more 
pressing issues. Eliminating this and any other pre-election 
red herrings, including pedantic discussion of the electoral 
reform bill, will encourage greater focus on the myriad of 
technical and logistical problems waiting to be solved. 
 
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¶B. Outline a six-month diplomatic and programmatic strategy 
to achieve the outcomes and C. Identify specific needs from 
the department or other parts of the USG, including 
resources, high-level visits, public diplomacy-related 
efforts, that would provide key support to accomplish these 
objectives. 
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¶8. (S) A six-month strategy aimed at affecting these outcomes 
should start with a policy anchored on convincing President 
Obasanjo to articulate his plans to step down in 2007. This 
policy should be communicated to President Obasanjo by the 
USG at the highest levels and at the earliest opportunity.  A 
visit to Nigeria by a high level USG official with a major 
policy speech on democratization in Africa would be a timely 
and important way to communicate this important message. 
Other visits by official and unofficial Americans respected 
by President Obasanjo should reinforce the same message. 
 
¶9.   (C) This strategy could be complemented by a robust 
in-country public diplomacy campaign in which post clearly 
articulates the message that in a democracy the electoral 
process is more important than any individual officeholder. 
The USG should articulate consistent and unequivocal support 
for a dynamic political process which leads to credible 
elections for a new president in 2007. 
 
¶10.   (C) This campaign should seek to contrast the 
impressive African regional and continental record 
established by Obasanjo since 1999 with the challenge of 
leaving an equally impressive domestic legacy. Success in the 
international arena and failure in the domestic one would 
only tarnish the overall reputation of the Obasanjo 
administration. Thus, free and fair elections, credible by 
international and domestic standards, could make or break the 
president,s domestic legacy. Both public and private 
feedback by the USG on the Obasanjo administration's progress 
in implementing a free and fair 2007 election should be part 
of an ongoing and high-level dialogue. 
 
¶11. (C) While it is important to start at the top in the 
Nigerian political context, it is also important to 
simultaneously work other potential levers of influence. Key 
targets are members of the National Assembly who are 
currently debating important electoral reforms and who have 
been called on to change the rules in order to extend the 
present presidential mandate.  Frank, private discussions 
about the pace and content of the current electoral 
legislation, supplemented by public statements underscoring 
the vital role of the National Assembly in a democratic 
system, would reinforce the consistent theme of reform paving 
the way for a successful transition in 2007. 
 
¶12.   (C) Finally, the USG has to selectively provide clear 
feedback on the electoral process. Actions by the GON, 
especially those which contravene the country's laws, should 
be criticized.  Key deficiencies such as the lack of 
electoral preparation, and the lack of overall credibility of 
key electoral institutions should also be the target of 
public critique.  Thus, a selective strategy pointing out the 
most serious shortcomings in preparation for 2007 should be 
combined with positive messages reminding the current 
administration of its heavy burden of responsibility in 
helping create an environment that is consistent with the 
aspirations of the Nigerian people. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶D.  Impediments to progress in democratization 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
¶13.   (C) In Nigeria, the major roadblock to democratization 
lies with the lack of political will thus far demonstrated by 
the Obasanjo administration. With its intentions not clearly 
articulated, the political environment is confused and 
preparations for the election of a new administration 
stalled. With a strong record of getting what it wants in 
terms of policy and legislation, it is easy to conclude that 
the current confusion is intentional. This is especially true 
regarding the continued institutional deficiencies of the 
national and state electoral bodies. The obvious conclusion 
is that by leaving election institutions weak and dependent, 
one will be able to manipulate them later. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Ironically this pattern of behavior runs contrary 
to the ideals espoused by Nigeria in its official capacity as 
respected leader in ECOWAS, the African Union and its New 
Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the 
United Nations. In front of these international bodies, 
Nigeria has spoken out, often eloquently, in defense of 
democracy and the rule of law. In a sense, this pro-active 
strategy, in which President Obasanjo has become an important 
African interlocutor and symbol of African leadership, has 
insulated him from probing criticism about domestic 
shortcomings in Nigeria's implementation of these same 
ideals. As a result, African and European leaders most likely 
to be able to influence Nigeria's haphazard implementation of 
democracy are probably reluctant, primarily because of its 
importance in regional and international issues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶E.  Identify Other Countries, Organizations or Groups with 
significant impact 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶15. (S) President Obasanjo is most influenced by the opinions 
of other leaders whom he considers to be his peers on the 
world stage.  He is concerned about his legacy.  U.S. and 
European leaders are most likely to have some sway over his 
decision regarding whether or not to remain in office beyond 
2007 and how well his administration will conduct the 2007 
elections.  Within Nigeria, the two groups most likely to 
have an impact on these matters are the National Assembly, 
who need to pass any constitutional changes enabling a 3rd 
term, and the judiciary, who play a vital role in enforcing 
the constitution and the electoral rules.  However, the weak 
judiciary has failed to adequately play this role in past 
elections.  We should also remember the potential impact of 
Nigeria,s largely passive electorate.  If this &sleeping 
giant8 is roused to action, most likely by a 
political/economic crisis, the power of 150 million people 
could be channeled to advocate for democratic change. 
 
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¶F.  Identify key areas of democracy promotion supported by 
host government.  Identify areas in which host government 
policies run contrary to USG goals 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶16. (C) Nigeria largely has in place the necessary democratic 
structures, laws, and institutions and there are no overt 
government policies which would impede our pursuit of 
democracy promotion.  However, poor implementation and lack 
of political will often cause these institutions and 
structures to underperform.  Nigeria is making some efforts 
to attack root problems such as corruption and to improve 
transparency, especially through institutions like the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent 
Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), and through their 
participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), although to date the efforts are perceived 
to be focused on the President's political enemies.  These 
initiatives need to continue and to be applied more widely 
and vigorously. 
 
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¶G. Evaluate the consequences of this policy 
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¶17.  (U) The USG's relationship with Nigeria is based on 
mutual need and respect. Nigeria provides critical support 
for USG policies in Africa, through leadership on important 
political issues and especially by providing peacekeepers for 
trouble spots around the continent.  As a country with major 
international aspirations, Nigeria is likely to continue 
these activities in lines with its own view of its role on 
the world stage. 
 
¶18.   (C) Implementation of a proactive policy does run the 
short-term risk of alienating the Obasanjo administration. 
With the political stakes for 2007 high, and a sense that the 
USG has formed a unique and interdependent relationship with 
the Obasanjo administration, he could view public criticism 
of Nigeria's democratic deficiencies as a lack of 
appreciation for his efforts in moving Nigeria forward on 
issues such as corruption and therefore alienate him at the 
end of his mandate. 
 
¶19.  (C) However, an equally sizable risk is that lack of 
action in taking a stand about Nigeria's democratic 
deficiencies will risk alienating both Obasanjo's successor 
and the Nigerian people. With the potential for violence 
particularly high in a confused and manipulated transition, 
failure by the USG to take a clear stand in support of basic 
democratic principles risks creating greater long-term 
problems. Ultimately in Nigeria, as elsewhere, the process is 
more important than any one individual. Building policy on 
this basic pillar, while not without risks, will in the 
long-term pay the best dividends both in terms of the process 
of democratization as well as long-term stability. 
 
FUREY