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Diana T Fritz  08/27/2006 05:51:19 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04696

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO AMB DCM MEPI P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MSISON
DRAFTED: POL:BTHOMSON
CLEARED: DCM MQUINN, AMB RNEUMANN

VZCZCADI424
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHBUL RUEHIL
DE RUEHAD #4696/01 3231250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191250Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2393
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0244
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1456

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 004696 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF KU QA SA TC
SUBJECT: UAEG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFGHANISTAN 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (S)  Summary: On November 9, U.S. Ambassador to 
Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann, visited Abu Dhabi and met with 
Minister of Information Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan 
(AbZ) and MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid al Noaimi.  He inquired 
about GCC states, views and UAEG's recommendations on 
Afghanistan.  AbZ responded that Afghanistan needs to be 
outward-looking and to be proactive in engaging other nations 
in seeking assistance.  Al Noaimi suggested that Afghanistan 
should look to the UAE, a federation of seven emirates, as an 
example of successful nation-building and should be more 
specific in expressing its needs to potential donors.  AbZ 
showed some, unspecified, willingness to respond to a focused 
direct approach from President Karzai.  AbZ stated that 
UAEG's 220-man Special Ops presence in Afghanistan would 
continue.  He was clear that UAE desire not to publicize its 
military support for Coalition was based on potential 
terrorist threats to UAE; not political factors.  The 
sensitivity does not apply to economic assistance.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------------ 
"Afghans, Look Outward!" 
------------------------ 
¶2. (S)  Responding to Ambassador Neumann's inquiry as to what 
Afghanistan could do differently, Al Noaimi said that the 
Afghans need to arrive at consensus on a common vision for 
their country and to "market" that vision, transcending 
tribal loyalties.  He said Karzai should appoint emissaries 
to see what is happening in the gulf and elsewhere.  AbZ 
noted that Afghanistan has remained too insular and that many 
of the Afghans' ongoing struggles stem from that isolation. 
Both UAEG interlocutors extolled the UAE,s success as the 
result of a conscious effort to keep up with the outside 
world.  AbZ called on Afghans to "learn from us--learn to 
look outward; they should get out and follow our example." 
 
--------------- 
UAE Special Ops 
--------------- 
¶3. (S)  Since October 2003, UAEG has maintained 220 Special 
Ops troops in Afghanistan.  In prior conversations, Abu Dhabi 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (MbZ), Deputy 
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, has told 
Ambassador and General Abizaid that UAE troops will remain in 
Afghanistan until the mission is complete, the intent being 
to have UAE troops "bloodied" and seasoned by combat to 
prepare them for action against potential security threats 
when/if required at home.  AbZ admitted that the UAEG has 
little effective control over its ports and borders, noting 
that over 3,000 Saudis alone and an "unknown number" of other 
foreigners cross back and forth daily.  AbZ warned that the 
foreign threats menacing the UAE from inside are growing 
daily, but joked that if he could choose between the current 
situation and that posed by Abu Nidal twenty years ago, he 
would welcome back Abu Nidal. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GCC Attitudes toward Afghanistan 
-------------------------------- 
¶4. (S)  AbZ characterized the GCC states' perception of the 
Afghan problem as relatively small compared to Iraq.  He said 
that caught between assisting with the earthquake in 
Pakistan, Hurricane Katrina, infrastructure development in 
Iraq, and development assistance projects in the Palestinian 
territories, even the UAE is "stretched to its limits," 
noting that the rest of the GCC states are even less likely 
to offer assistance.  AbZ observed that Saudi Arabia will not 
be reaching out overseas.  Taking a swipe at the Saudi king, 
he said:  "It is not in King Abdullah's personality; he is 
not the type to make sure his neighbor has a meal tonight." 
He further noted that "the Kuwaitis have their own problems 
right now and will not initiate any project on their own," 
but may be willing to join others once a development program 
begins.  He complained that "Qatar is doing much less than 
they could," but said he has low expectations of their 
willingness to help. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Building a nation is not easy -- 
Leadership lacking in the region 
-------------------------------- 
¶5. (S)  Al Noaimi said that "Arabs are not having serious 
discussions about anything right now including Afghanistan." 
He sees "all talk and no action -- and with even the talk 
being tailored to domestic audiences.  Arabs have not 
awakened to the seriousness of the current situation and to 
security threats; we see it, the Qataris and Jordanians see 
it, but no one else seems to."  He continued: "Building a 
nation is not easy, but it absolutely starts with leadership, 
which is lacking throughout the region."  He portrayed the 
UAE as a leader in the region by default since everyone else 
seemed to be "suffering from paralysis."  AbZ pointed out 
that immediately following 9/11 even the Saudis were slow to 
act and distance themselves from the Taliban, and eventually 
did so only after the UAE took the first action.  He added 
that he had heard later from the Saudis that if the UAE had 
not acted when they did, the Saudi government would still be 
deciding what to do. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Afghan Elections, Counter Narcotics, Pakistan 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶6. (S)  AbZ expressed interest in the current state of Afghan 
politics, asking why the vote count took so long to finalize. 
 Ambassador Neumann explained that the infrastructure 
problems throughout Afghanistan meant that ballot boxes were 
being transported from remote regions by horse and donkey, 
pointing out the need for physical infrastructure to improve 
trade and transportation of agriculture to market.  AbZ said 
he was not convinced that Karzai would be tough on the 
narcotics because the international community was not 
providing adequate alternatives.  Ambassador noted that 
better infrastructure will pave the way for agricultural 
alternatives to opium to take hold in remote areas. He also 
commented on the interaction between Presidents Karzai and 
Musharraf, which has escalated into heated words in the past. 
 (Embassy Kabul Comment: It is better now and we are working 
hard to keep it that way.  End Comment.)  AbZ wondered 
whether Musharraf was perceived as domestically weaker than 
in the past. 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment: Both UAEG interlocutors expressed 
appreciation for Ambassador Neumann's visit and recommended 
that the Government of Afghanistan be more specific and 
forthcoming in describing its needs in ways that will appeal 
to potential donors as, for instance, at the planned Compact 
for Afghanistan Conference in London, January 30-31.  Neumann 
undertook to work on this with the GOA.  UAEG has shown a 
marked propensity to respond with greater alacrity when 
requests are project-related as opposed to petitions for cash 
contributions.  End comment. 
 
¶8. (U)  This message has been cleared by Ambassador Neumann 
in Kabul. 
SISON