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Diana T Fritz  08/27/2006 06:01:15 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04540

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   P/M ECON PAO RSO USLO DAO AMB DCM MEPI

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MJSISON
DRAFTED: POL:JFMAYBURY
CLEARED: DCM:MRQUINN CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI832
PP RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUEKJCS
DE RUEHAD #4540/01 3110319
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 070319Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2242
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5534
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/I, AND NEA/ARPI, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SY IZ AE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD MEETS ABU DHABI, DUBAI 
LEADERSHIP, AND IYAD ALLAWI 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 4200 
 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 4261 
 
Classified By: DCM Martin R. Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: During an October 18-20 visit to the UAE, 
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met leaders of Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai emirates, as well as former Iraqi Prime 
Minister Iyad Allawi.  Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the 
just-held constitutional referendum and the approaching 
December 15 parliamentary elections, and thanked Abu Dhabi's 
leadership for its quiet efforts to urge greater Sunni Arab 
participation in Iraq's political process.  A significant 
portion of each meeting centered on USG and UAEG concerns 
over Iranian interference in Iraq's domestic affairs, and 
Syria's failure to stop insurgents from crossing into Iraq 
from Syria.  Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid 
proposed a joint Abu Dhabi-Dubai "operation" to urge Sunni 
Arab involvement in the political process.  All interlocutors 
favored a greater role for Dubai-based Iraqi Sunni cleric 
Ahmed Al Kubaysi.  End Summary. 
 
Constitutional Referendum 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) At a meeting October 18 with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince 
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan 
bin Zayed (HbZ), Ambassador Khalilzad reviewed the October 15 
constitutional referendum, noting that approximately 10 
million Iraqis had voted.  He briefly described the 
constitutional amendments announced on October 12, including 
the review clause that will allow the next Council of 
Representatives a one-time opportunity to amend the 
constitution.  He thanked MbZ and HbZ for their help in 
persuading greater Sunni Arab participation in the political 
process. 
 
Next Political Milestone: December 15 Elections 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad underscored the need for Iraqis 
to participate in the December 15 parliamentary elections, 
and that it would be particularly helpful to see greater 
involvement by moderate, cross-sectarian political 
personalities and parties. 
 
¶4. (C) MbZ inquired whether the U.S. had had any success 
tracing financing for Zarqawi and the Baathists from "this 
part of the world."  He said the UAEG believes there is money 
coming from "the Wahhabi part of the world," namely Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.  In a smaller meeting immediately 
following this discussion, MbZ, without being specific, 
mentioned his concern that funds from some entities in the 
UAE were getting into the wrong hands. 
 
Iranian Influence 
----------------- 
 
¶5. (C) MbZ asked about the extent of Iranian influence in 
Iraq, particularly on the security forces.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad said the Iranians were gaining "considerable 
influence" in Iraq.  Sunni insurgents were inadvertently 
helping Iranian penetration into Iraq.  U.S. forces are 
"entangled" in western Iraq fighting the insurgency, which 
has "opened the door" for the Iranians in the south.  In 
Baghdad, certain institutions, including the police, have 
been "penetrated" by Badr Brigades and other forces that are 
Iranian, he said.  Iranian influence can be felt "across the 
board," Khalilzad said. 
 
MbZ: Syria's Bashar No Different Than Old Guard 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶6. (C) The Al Nahyans expressed little sympathy for Syrian 
President Bashar.  Ambassador Khalilzad said the Syrians are 
seeking to get Bashar and Iraqis together for a "photo 
opportunity," and some Iraqis were contemplating going to 
Syria.  MbZ said the Iraqis should not go to Syria until they 
get something positive from the Syrians in return. 
Ambassador Khalilzad said that was his tactic as well.  MbZ 
inquired about the situation in Syria in light of Interior 
Minister Kanaan's suicide.  "How messy it is going to be?" 
Ambassador Khalilzad said President Bashar was going to come 
under more pressure.  MbZ said the Syrian president was 
"living in another world. I don,t think Bashar is a person 
you can trust."  Bashar may be in his 30s, but he has the 
same mentality as the old guard, MbZ said.  "Syria is a 
country that needs a major change."  Ambassador Khalilzad 
agreed with MbZ. 
 
Sufis to the Rescue? 
-------------------- 
¶7. (S) In a smaller meeting with only Khalilzad and Charge, 
MbZ and HbZ asked whether other countries ) especially 
Jordan and Turkey -) were being helpful to the U.S. in Iraq. 
 MbZ also offered his theory that the promotion of Sufism (as 
a benign, more spiritual form of Islam) would serve as an 
antidote to Muslim fundamentalism and extremist violence in 
the region.  MbZ said he would supply the names of Sufis who 
might advance such a strategy. 
 
Meeting with Dubai Crown Prince 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) At a meeting October 19 with Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid (MbR), Ambassador Khalilzad discussed the 
need to "win over the population from the insurgency," and 
urged MbR to use his influence with his Sunni contacts. 
Iraqis idealize the UAE and its success in producing 
prosperity, he added.  Ambassador Khalilzad said the UAE 
could help Iraq economically by encouraging investment there, 
but also by helping Iraqis build their institutional 
capacity, such as in the banking sector.  MbR affirmed the 
UAE's support for U.S. objectives in Iraq.  One way to 
succeed, MbR said, is to ensure that Iraqis reap more of the 
economic benefits in the post-war period. 
 
¶9. (C) MbR proposed that Dubai, together with Abu Dhabi, 
create a joint "unit" or "operation room" that would identify 
people and organizations in Iraq that the USG could work with 
to encourage Sunnis to participate.  MbR also said that he 
still believes that Ahmed Al Kubaysi, a Dubai-based Iraqi 
cleric, could be urged to play a positive role in encouraging 
Sunni participation.  "He does not want to be prime minister. 
 He wants to help bring people together," MbR said. 
Khalilzad agreed that it would be good for the UAE to 
encourage not only Al Kubaysi, but Al Kubaysi's other 
contacts as well.  MbR said that Dubai had "a lot of 
contacts" in Iraq, and that he would "talk with my brothers 
in Abu Dhabi (referring to the Al Nahyan ruling family)" 
about how the UAE can help move Iraq's political process 
forward.  (Note: MbR delegated Dubai State Security Chief 
Mohammed Qemzi to follow up on the "operations room."  End 
note.)  An organized cross-sectarian alliance of Iraqis 
headed by Allawi would isolate and weaken Al Qaida, MbR said. 
 He also applauded the constitutional amendment addressing 
the legal protection of Baath Party members.  Some Iraqis 
were forced to be Baathists, he said, and should not be held 
liable.  Rank and file Baathists should be allowed to 
participate in the political process, ideally with a new name 
for their movement. 
 
¶10. (C) MbR also sought U.S. views on Iran, including its 
interest in acquiring nuclear power.  He said it would be 
good to persuade Iran that they don't need nuclear weapons, 
and that dealing with Iran needed to be done peacefully, not 
militarily, since Iran would "make a great deal of trouble 
for us" if the U.S. went to war with it. 
 
A Role for Ahmed Al Kubaysi? 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Al Kubaysi's name came up again the night of October 
19 when Ambassador Khalilzad and Charge met with MbZ, HbZ, 
and Iyad Allawi in HbZ's palace.  When asked whether Al 
Kubaysi could play a positive role, HbZ responded that what 
was required was to guide him.  Allawi said that Al Kubaysi 
could be "very useful" in getting the insurgents on board. 
He added that Al Kubaysi is respected by the ulema and is 
influential.  Major General Atiq Juma Ali bin Darwish, 
director of Defense Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid's 
Office for Military Coordination and a frequent UAE emissary 
to Baghdad, said Al Kubaysi's call in 2003 for American 
forces to leave Iraq had been misunderstood because of an 
exaggeration by interpreters at the time.  Al Kubaysi did not 
say that he wanted American forces to leave Iraq immediately, 
but only after finishing the job in Iraq, Atiq said.  HbZ 
said that the UAE was not promoting Al Kubaysi out of any 
love for Al Kubaysi, but out of love for Iraq.  Atiq added 
that Al Kubaysi is accepted by the vast majority of Shi'a in 
Iraq and can be used as a bridge.  Allawi agreed with the 
assessment.  Allawi suggested that Al Kubaysi go to Baghdad 
to sit, talk, and influence.  HbZ said he would support frank 
talks with Al Kubaysi, adding that "moderate Sunnis and Shi'a 
must be supported in Iraq or the country will be handed over 
to Iran.  America will be replaced by Iran." 
 
Bringing Sunnis, Baathists, on Board 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (S) Allawi advised the U.S. to talk to President Talabani 
and Prime Minister Jaafari about helping with the budgets of 
mosques and salaries of imams.  The U.S. could also help pay 
for mosques that were destroyed and use its influence to 
raise the quota for Sunni pilgrims, Allawi said.  Atiq 
observed that the de-Baathification process had produced 
negative consequences and that it was important to try to fix 
the situation.  The way to handle it was not to go after the 
Baathis themselves (who are scared), but to treat them as 
normal citizens.  He would advise the Iraqi government not to 
prosecute or punish Baathis who did not have blood on their 
hands but who joined the party only to survive and put food 
on the table.  It was important, he said, to bring back most 
of those who were disbanded from the police and army.  Atiq 
added, "We need a strong leader in Iraq, not someone who is 
sleeping."  HbZ agreed that Iraq's history made that point 
clear. 
¶13. (U) Ambassador Khalilzad has cleared this message. 
SISON