This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 003694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE AND EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR PL
SUBJECT: DEFMIN CANDIDATES TELL EUR DAS PEKALA NEW GOP WILL 
EXPECT MORE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. 
 
REF: WARSAW 3493 
 
Classified By: Polcouns Mary Curtin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  In a brief October 20 visit to Warsaw, EUR 
DAS Mark Pekala met separately with the three leading 
candidates for Defense Minister in the expected coalition 
government of Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO). 
Although perspectives and tones differed, Bronislaw 
Komorowski (PO), Radek Sikorski (PiS) and Przemyslaw 
Gosiewski (PiS) were consistent in their message that Poland 
needs to receive, and be seen by the public to receive, more 
concrete benefit out of its "special strategic relationship" 
with the U.S.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Komorowski: The Confident Veteran 
--------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) In a 45-minute meeting with DAS Pekala, once and 
possibly future Defense Minister Bronislaw Komorowski 
emphasized that Polish-U.S. relations would be as good if not 
better under the new coalition government being formed by top 
vote-getter Law & Justice (PiS) and his own Civic Platform 
(PO) as they had been under the outgoing SLD government. 
Echoing his message to DCM several weeks earlier (reftel), he 
expressed concern that the current government had allowed the 
Polish public's traditionally strong pro-American attitudes 
to erode, principally through mismanagement of public 
expectations related to Poland's participation in Iraq.  As a 
result, the average Pole now believed that Poland had not 
received enough from the U.S. (i.e. non-immigrant visa waiver 
and/or more commercial contracts in Iraq) in exchange for its 
Iraq deployment. 
 
¶3. (C) Komorowski also said the Iraq mission had pushed the 
Polish military to its financial and material limits, "ripped 
apart" units to form a deployable force for Iraq, and slowed 
Poland's defense reform and modernization.   If Poland and 
the U.S. were to build a strategic relationship, and not just 
a tactical one, more than symbols were needed.  Regarding 
Iraq, "We don't know what obligations the current government 
has made, but we will meet any obligations."  Komorowski 
added, however, that if the U.S. expected Poland to stay in 
Iraq while simultaneously preparing to take up its ISAF 
commitments in 2007, the U.S. would have to provide help. 
The incoming government, he said, was looking for increased 
cooperation on a broad range of issues, including: 
 
- further assistance in accelerating professionalization of 
the Polish armed forces; 
- broadened political cooperation with the U.S., especially 
on Ukraine, Russia, and other regional issues; 
- continued cooperation on missile defense; 
- a visible gesture on visas, such as eliminating the fee for 
student travelers; 
- a visit by President Bush to Poland in 2006; and 
- substantive visits to Washington with tangible deliverables 
for the incoming Foreign and Defense Ministers. 
 
¶4. (C) Komorowski suggested that Poland would like to leave 
Iraq with a success, and inquired as to the possibility of 
making the Polish/MND-CS sector the first in which security 
was officially turned over to Iraq security forces.  This 
could be done in a ceremonial way highlighting the success of 
the Iraq mission, and would make it easier politically to 
ensure the continuation of the Polish mission as a training 
or advisory force. 
 
¶5. (C) DAS Pekala responded that the USG was aware of the 
importance to the Polish public of the visa issue, and 
expressed concern over the lost opportunities to connect with 
the next generations of Polish young people.  He emphasized 
that the U.S. also wanted a strategic relationship, 
reiterating President Bush's invitation for the new Defense 
and Foreign ministers to visit as soon as possible.  Pekala 
pledged that such meetings would be strategic, and expressed 
hope that the new Polish president or prime ministerial would 
visit Washington early in 2006. He stressed that any concrete 
discussion of military assistance should be preceded by 
conversations on missions, requirements and our respective 
capabilities. 
 
Gosiewski: The Quiet Insider 
---------------------------- 
¶6. (C) Pekala met later with Przemyslaw Gosiewski (PiS), 
deputy Chairman of the Defense Committee in the outgoing 
Sejm (parliament) and newly elected deputy floor leader for 
PiS.  Gosiewski, who was joined by PiS defense expert Pawel 
Soloch and newly elected PiS Senator Radek Sikorski, welcomed 
the opportunity to discuss the most pressing bilateral 
issues, particularly: 
 
- U.S. plans in Iraq; 
- U.S. plans in Afghanistan; 
- outstanding Polish "requests" in bilateral security 
discussions; and 
- ways of further developing the "special relationship" 
between Poland and the U.S. 
 
¶7. (C) Gosiewski asserted that the new PiS-PO government 
would put major emphasis on NATO and the trans-Atlantic 
relationship, as well as close cooperation with the U.S. in 
the Global War on Terrorism.  He stressed the importance of 
"providing security for all members of NATO."  He hoped that 
the new government would be able to form quickly, despite 
what he described as an "emotional" political campaign 
environment, estimating that new cabinet ministers would take 
office in "late October or early November." 
 
¶8. (C) In response to Pekala's explanation of U.S. goals in 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, Gosiewski acknowledged 
that a difficult political task faced those engaged in 
building democracy and stability in Iraq.  He said that his 
party was particularly engaged in Ukraine, and claimed that 
PiS had fielded the largest group of independent observers 
for the Ukrainian elections. 
 
¶9. (C) Gosiewski stated that the new GOP would need to learn 
quickly about U.S. plans in Iraq, so as to formulate 
appropriate and complementary Polish plans.  Unfortunately, 
the outgoing SLD-led government had left a very small budget 
for Iraq operations.  Iraq would therefore be one of the 
first major political issues debated, and the Polish public 
would be following Iraq issues closely in November and 
December.  For this reason, the GOP would need "convincing 
arguments" beyond just "coalition solidarity" to persuade the 
public.  In return for Poland's contribution in Iraq, the 
U.S. would have to provide concrete signals of its support, 
including "military support" and possible U.S. basing in 
Poland.  Gosiewski asked explicitly what the U.S. would offer 
in order to help the new government build support for an 
extended deployment in Iraq.  He also noted that the "special 
relationship" with the U.S. had caused problems for Poland 
with some other EU members, and even "with our prospective 
coalition partner, PO."  (COMMENT: He did not elaborate on 
this somewhat cryptic reference to PO.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶10. (C) Pekala replied that the first step should be to 
establish the operational needs on the ground in Iraq.  The 
U.S. had suspended discussions with the GOP during the Polish 
election season, particularly given that the outgoing 
government had explicitly left the final decision on Iraq to 
its successor.  Now it was time to renew the discussion at 
both expert and senior levels.  The U.S. was prepared for 
discussions in Warsaw, in Washington and at NATO in Brussels. 
 Once the new government was formed, the U.S. was also ready 
to hold the next round of the Strategic Dialogue, which would 
no doubt cover such issues as Iraq, Afghanistan, defense 
reform, missile defense and military cooperation and 
assistance. 
 
Sikorski: The Well-Connected Outsider 
-------------------------------------- 
¶11. (C) DAS Pekala's discussion over drinks with Radek 
Sikorski was shorter and more focused, as Sikorski had been 
present (though had not spoken once) at the Gosiewski 
meeting.  Sikorski began by noting President Bush's public 
statement during his October 12 meeting with President 
Kwasniewski that he would welcome an early visit to 
Washington by the new Polish FM and DefMin.  Acknowledging 
that his own name had "been bandied about" for the DefMin 
job, Sikorski said that he wanted to use his recent 
experience living and working in the U.S. (at the American 
Enterprise Institute) to play a "very positive role" in 
U.S.-Polish relations.  He therefore was interested in 
learning what the "real limits" were on U.S. assistance to 
Poland. 
 
¶12. (C) In reply, Pekala explained that the U.S. budget was 
under strain from Hurricanes Katrina and Wilma.  He also 
warned Sikorski that Poland could not realistically expect 
military assistance in the coming years to match the $100 
million package in 2005 under the Coalition Solidarity Fund 
or the $66 million in 2004 designated for the upcoming 
purchase of C-130 aircraft.  Rather, the levels in 2006 and 
beyond would more likely return to near the baseline of 
$30-35 million.  To this Sikorski responded in a serious tone 
that if the U.S. could not sustain $100 million assistance 
annually, "that would be a serious problem." 
 
¶13. (C) Sikorski suggested exploring "creative solutions" to 
find indirect ways of assisting Poland's defense 
transformation, such as working through the Polish-Ukrainian 
battalion or "stretching out the F-16 payments."  He also 
suggested concluding a "new bilateral agreement" (of 
undefined nature) between Poland and the U.S. to shore up 
public opinion, and suggested regional consultations on 
elaborating some form of "good cop/bad cop" approach to 
Belarus.  Sikorski also said that, if he were indeed chosen 
as DefMin, he would make his first foreign trip to Ukraine to 
signal solidarity.  Since he had spent the last few years in 
the U.S., it might not be appropriate in his case to go to 
Washington first. 
 
A Consistent Theme 
------------------ 
¶14. (C) COMMENT.  There seems little doubt that one of the 
three senior politicians whom Pekala met will become the next 
Polish Defense Minister.  Komorowski appears the obvious 
choice - PO has put him forward as its candidate for the Sejm 
Speaker, arguably the third-ranking job in government, but 
PiS has so far resisted the nomination, calling Komorowski 
too partisan.  Sikorski's name has been mentioned almost as 
often, but PiS-PO coalition discussion to date have allotted 
the Defense Ministry to PO.  Also, Sikorski's support base is 
not clear.  He does not have obvious ties to President-elect 
Lech Kaczynski or his twin brother Jarek, the party leader, 
but he clearly enjoys a close relationship with PM-designate 
Marcinkiewicz.  One possible job for Sikorski would be 
National Security Adviser, heading what Lech Kaczynski 
intends to be a much stronger Polish NSC.  Finally, though 
Gosiewski is sometimes mentioned as a possible DefMin, he is 
much more the inside party man and has very close ties to 
Lech Kaczynski.  Should current PiS floor leader Ludwik Dorn 
receive a cabinet post as expected, Gosiewski could well end 
up heading the PiS caucus, and he could equally well become 
Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Sejm. 
 
¶15. (C) Regardless of which man takes the job, however, the 
main message is the same.  The new Polish government will 
value the U.S. partnership and trans-Atlantic relationship 
above all, but it will also expect to gain more direct 
benefit from these ties.  An October 20 luncheon that 
Ambassador Ashe hosted in honor of Foreign Minister Rotfeld 
was notable for its collegiality; the only mildly discordant 
note was set by newly appointed Polish Ambassador to the U.S. 
Janusz Reiter, who took Pekala aside and went on at some 
length on this same theme of "Poland wants to see more out of 
this relationship."  It echoed again at a DCM-hosted dinner 
for DAS Pekala with a select group of journalists and think 
tank leaders.  Poland is a loyal ally and will stand by the 
U.S., but we can expect to be reminded regularly and at a 
senior level over the next few years that loyalty is a 
two-way street - which requires concrete examples of its 
benefits to both sides.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶16. (U) DAS Pekala cleared this message. 
ASHE